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Febi Rizki Ramadhan
"The Conspicuous Face of Punishment: Spectatorship and Public Governance in Public Caning in Aceh Indonesia"
Discussant: Rhino Ariefiansyah, Faculty of Anthropology, University of Indonesia

Atmaezer H. Simanjuntak
"Making God and the Devil: Commodity Fetishism and Capitalist Desire in a West Kalimantan Palm Oil Plantation"
Discussant: Rudy G. Erwinsyah, Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kesejahteraan Sosial, Kementerian Sosial RI

Eunike G. Setiadarma
"Cultivating Pembangunan: Rice and the Intellectual History of Agricultural Development in Indonesia, 1945 - 65"
Discussant: Gani Ahmad Jaelani, Faculty of History and Filologi, Padjajaran University

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Preface

The 2019 Arryman Symposium organized by the Indonesian Research Support and Scholarship Foundation (ISRSF). The Symposium is held annually as an opportunity to present the results of research and hard work by Arryman Fellows who has studied for one year at Northwestern University, USA.

The centerpiece of ISRSF's current work is the Arryman Fellows program, which sends talented young Indonesians to Northwestern University in Chicago, USA, to pursue doctoral studies in the social sciences and humanities. Our Foundation wants to find the most promising, talented, and committed young students who are inclined to pursue a life-long devotion to teaching, research, and scholarship.

ISRSF's endeavor to make sure Indonesia's most serious young intellectuals come forward and walk through the door we have opened to do their doctorate at Northwestern, one of the leading universities in the US. We believe higher education and the cultivation of new scholars is an important part of the struggle to give Indonesia a fair and equal voice in education and public life across Indonesia.

This year, three doctoral students will present their papers with a focus on:

Febi Rizki Ramadhan:
"The Conspicuous Face of Punishment: Spectatorship and Public Governance in Public Caning in Aceh, Indonesia"

Atmaezer H. Simanjuntak:
"Making God and the Devil: Commodity Fetishism and Capitalist Desire in a West Kalimantan Palm Oil Plantation"

Eunike G. Setiadarma:
"Cultivating Pembangunan: Rice and the Intellectual History of Agricultural Development in Indonesia, 1945 - 65"

On behalf of ISRSF, I would like to thank Prof. Jeffrey Winters and Ms. Elizabeth R. Morrisey from EDGS who administers the Arryman Fellows during their first year studies at Northwestern University.

We hope you enjoy reading these short writings, and perhaps they will inspire some of you to shape Indonesia in the future.

Dewi Puspasari
ISRSF Executive Director

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Research interest:
Gender and Sexuality, Moralities, and Surveillance studies.

The Conspicuous Face of Punishment: Spectatorship and Public Governance in Public Caning in Aceh, Indonesia[1]

Arryman Fellowship Paper
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Febi Ramadhan

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of the spectators of public caning in Aceh related to the practice of punishment and governance. As the only province that implements Islamic law, Aceh prescribes public caning as a form of punishment toward individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014, a local regulation that legislates Islamic criminal jurisprudence. This paper's central argument concerns the role of the spectators, as part of a particular public, in punishing the violators of Qanun Jinayat by attending to their caning and surveilling them. This paper demonstrates that the practice of discipline, which includes punishment, surveillance, and governance, is not conducted by the state as the sole and unitary actor. Rather, it is also conducted by the public. Furthermore, this paper situates the spectators as deliberate moral subjects who further state's mode of discipline toward the violators of Qanun Jinayat and challenges the prior literatures' assumption that the state is the only actor in the punitive practices.

Keywords:

punishment, spectatorship, public caning, Aceh, Islamic law, morality

[1] This paper is a preliminary draft of an Arryman Fellowship/Equality Development and Globalization Studies working paper. One of the sections, "The Conspicuous Face of Punishment: Spectatorship and Its Emotive Aspects" was part of a paper that I presented in the Annual Interdisciplinary Graduate Student Conference by Racism, Immigration and Citizenship program at Johns Hopkins University, "Eyes on Surveillance: Insecurity in Everyday Life," on April 5, 2019. This work was conducted under the auspices of an Arryman Fellow award from the Indonesian Scholarship and Research Support Foundation (ISRSF) and its benefactors: PT AKR Corporindo, PT Adaro, PT Bank Central Asia, PT Djarum, the Ford Foundation, the Rajawali Foundation, and the William Soeryadjaya Foundation. I would like to express my gratitude for Mary Weismantel, Jeffrey Winters, and Caroline Bledsoe in advising me. I thank all Arryman students for their thoughts and feedbacks, particularly Sari Ratri and Sabina Satriyani. I thank Annisa Dinda Mawarni for her moral, affective, and intellectual support for my project. I also thank Mariam Taher for being my discussant in Evanston and Rhino Ariefiansyah for being my discussant in Jakarta. I dedicate this paper to Ayu Regina Yolandasari.

Introduction

As a province with Special Autonomy in Indonesia, Aceh has been granted the authority to implement Shari'a law. Aceh is also the only province that legally implements Shari'a law. The Special Autonomy in Aceh was strengthened by Law No. 44/1999 that recognizes the "Special Status of the Province of Aceh Special Region" and Law No. 18/2001 that in principle confers broader powers of self-governance in areas that include religious and provincial legislation. At the local level, regional regulations that legislate Shari'a law are referred to as *qanun*. While *qanun* stresses a broad array of issues, one *qanun* that particularly influences the penal system in Aceh is Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 on Criminal Law. This *qanun* codifies acts that are considered violations of Shari'a law and prescribes various modes of punishment for these violations, including public caning.

Since its first implementation in 2005, public caning in Aceh has been portraying a clear enactment of pain, yet it has been successfully attracting spectators to watch it. The central question that I raise in this paper concerns the issue on why does the practice of public caning appealing for the spectators. I argue that public caning is appealing for the spectators because it provides an opportunity for the spectators to exercise their moral surveillance toward individuals who violate the *qanun*. In so doing, the spectators actively involved in the process of punishing the violator of the *qanun* by producing shame toward the violators, in which it plays a pivotal role in the deterrence process.

In approaching the issue of punishment, this paper is primarily influenced by Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1995), a canonical text in the social study of punishment. One of Foucault's general rules in this book (1995:23) is not to concentrate on punishment alone or the mechanisms that create repressive effects but rather to situate them in a whole series of possible positive effects. Therefore, as he argues, punishment should be regarded as a complex social function (Foucault, 1995:23) and worthy of academic discussion. Foucault's approach on punishment is shared by Fassin (2018) who seeks to study punishment in the context of social science without intending to justify or criticize it. Therefore, it is not my intention to criticize the implementation of Shari'a law in Aceh. Neither is it the purpose of this research to evaluate the practice of public caning there. Instead, this paper presents a comprehensive and elaborate study on the role of spectators and spectatorship in relation to public caning in Aceh.

Academic study regarding the performance of punishment is not entirely new. As Fassin (2018:27) points out, the study of punishment began with the inception of philosophy. Philosophers inspired legal scholars and, recently, political scientists, economists, sociologists, psychologists, historians, and anthropologists to study the topic further. In defining punishment, this paper draws on H. L. A. Hart's "elements of punishment," a term he coined in 1959 and that most writings on punishment have referred to for the past fifty years (Fassin, 2018). According to Hart's (1959) standard or central case, five elements are necessary to characterize punishment in criminal matters. Punishment must "involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; be for an offence against legal rules; be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense; be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender; and be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed" (Hart, 1959). This paper particularly focuses on Hart's last element, in which he argues that punishment, by definition, must be administered by an authority of a legal system. In Hart's argument, the government plays a role as a sole, unitary actor of punishment. The case of spectatorship in Aceh shows otherwise: it is not merely the government that actively punishes the

criminal; rather the public also takes part in the act of punishing.

To date, discussions of the role of the public in the practice of punishment tend to focus on the issue of vigilantism (Brown, 1975; Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1976; Abrahams, 1987; Johnston, 1996; Ahmad, 2017; Fassin, 2018). As Fassin (2018:44) suggests, vigilantism is built on citizens who deem the official authorities as incapable of solving security issues and who commit themselves to replace the authorities by punishing the suspects themselves. Fassin's argument aligns with Ahmad's *private citizens* who take the law into their own hands (Ahmad, 2017:9) and Johnston's *autonomous citizenship* in which private voluntary agents engage in legal conduct without the state's authority or support (Johnston, 1996:226). The discussion of vigilantism, however, cannot capture the complexity of the role of spectators in the case of Aceh. In the context of public caning in Aceh, the spectators work within the state's mode of punishment, and they have a role in furthering the state's vision of punishment of individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat. While examining vigilantism is beneficial for shifting our understanding from the state as the sole actor in punishment to public participation, no academic discussion has comprehensively captured the dynamics of public caning in Aceh, let alone the role of its spectators.

Fitzgerald (2016:1) argues that spectators and actors are not mutually exclusive. That is, many scholars situate spectators as a mere backdrop in the political arena, whereas he claims spectators function as political actors with their own impacts (Fitzgerald, 2016:1). He draws on Ranciere's argument that spectators observe, select, compare, interpret, and link what they see to a host of other things that they have seen before, and they then refashion what they see (Ranciere, 2014:13). By drawing on Ranciere's argument, Fitzgerald (2016:2) argues that spectatorship provides a useful foil against accounts of what constitutes political participation. Fitzgerald's ideas derive from a broad political context rather than from a more specific discussion of punitive systems. However, Fitzgerald's invitation to look at spectatorship helps me to move beyond the state as the sole actor in a punitive system.

The discussion of spectatorship in the context of public practices of punishment is not novel. In describing the penal system in 18th century France, Foucault (1995:57) stresses the importance of people as the audience of capital punishment. He writes, "in the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was required for the performance" (Foucault, 1995:57). However, the case of 18th century France is clearly different from that of contemporary Aceh. In Foucault's discussion, the French government summoned the people as spectators with the intention of making an example for the spectators (Foucault, 1995:58). In the case of Aceh, the presence of spectators is not mandatory. The issue of mandatory/not-mandatory is important because it clarifies the motives and intentions of the spectators. For Foucault, the spectators are situated as subjects of state sovereignty, whereas in Aceh the spectators' own will drives the spectatorship. I argue that the presence of the spectators cannot be separated from the spectators' moral framework that influences their presence and participation in the performance of public caning.

This paper reverberates the ethical turn in anthropology, as both incorporate moral/ethical issues (Fassin, 2014; Mattingly and Throop, 2018). Fassin (2014:430) identifies the ethical turn as an approach that focuses on moral subjects and their subjectivities. It initially occurred at the beginning of the 2000s as a remarkable convergence stemming from various horizons and traditions of the anthropological world. It would be ahistorical,

however, to argue that the study of morality in anthropology has taken place only after the ethical turn, since throughout the history of anthropology, anthropologists have mentioned issues of ethics and morality (Mattingly and Throop, 2018:476). Further, as Roger Lancaster (2012:520) shows, since Plato seldom have moral philosophers imagined a system of morality without a place for punishment.

Aside from literature on morality, this paper also builds from the discussion of affect or emotion. I argue that the spectators of caning in Aceh mobilize emotions and do so through two pathways. First, the spectators often jeer and taunt the individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat. These forms of excitement, as Ahmed (2014) argues, should be understood as a social and cultural process, rather than a merely psychological one. Second, the spectatorship of public caning in Aceh produces shame in the violators. The enactment of shame enables the spectators to perform affective governance of the violators. I draw on Jupp, Pykett, and Smith's (2014) discussion on affective governance that refers to the ways in which the work of state agencies, civil servants, and public services involves emotional negation, excess, dilemma, rhetorical fantasy, as well as emotional celebration and commitment. However, their approach to affective governance tends to situate the state as the main actor, while my discussion focuses on how spectators further the state's modes of punishment and governance by involving an emotional aspect. Nevertheless, I do not intend to diminish the role of the state in punitive practices. Its role remains integral, particularly since it is the government of Aceh that enables the public caning in the first place. This paper invites the reader to see punishment elaborately as a practice that is not limited to the state, but is also conducted by non-state actors.

To gather the data for this research, I use video footage that documented the practice of public caning in Aceh for capturing the nuanced aspect of public caning in Aceh. Aside from video footage, I analyze news articles concerning public caning in Aceh. Moreover, I utilize several ethnographic and other academic materials that focus on Aceh in order to draw a comprehensive account of the historical context of public caning in Aceh and its relationship with the Islamic identity formation throughout history. Given that this paper was written without any actual fieldwork, it should be noted that this paper intended to be a preliminary study and, therefore, the arguments in this paper is not yet final.

This paper has five sections. The first section briefly describes the penal history of Aceh, in which it also delves on the discussion regarding the historical contexts that made the contemporary public caning in Aceh came into being. The second section stresses the categorization of crimes that reflected upon the legal codification of acts that considered immoral, wherein it provides an understanding of a particular moral framework that influences the spectators' act during the practice of public caning. The third section discusses how the spectators mobilize emotion by producing shame toward the violator of Qanun Jinayat. The fourth section addresses the theoretical field that I would like to contribute, in which I discuss the role of spectatorship in the larger context of punishment and governance toward the violator of Qanun Jinayat. I situate the case of spectatorship of public caning in Aceh as an empirical case that brings the discussion of punishment and governance beyond the government as a sole, unitary actor. The last section presents conclusions and plans for future research on the topic.

In the Making of Public Caning: A Brief Penal History of Aceh

One of the earliest accounts on Islamic penal system in precolonial Aceh can be found in the time of Iskandar Muda, the twelfth Sultan of Aceh Darussalam who came into

power in 1607. During his first three years in power, Iskandar Muda amplified the legal system which was based on Shafi'ite law and centered upon the ruler as the head of an Islamic state (Riddell, 2006:42). His amplification of the Shafi'ite law can be found in the existence of four separate courts in operation during his reign: a civil court, a criminal court, a religious court, and a court at the customs house which settled disputes among merchants, both foreign and local (Riddell, 2006:42). However, even though Shafi'ite law is the basis of the legal system, the available evidence of legal cases and punishment show variation between the punishment performed by the Acehnese religious authorities and the prescriptions for punishment by Shafi'ite law. According to Riddell (2006:43), the standard punishment for convicted adulterers was strangulation, which is different from Shafi'ite law that prescribes stoning.

In addition to the legal system that was based in Islamic law, there was also a set of judicial practices under the direction of the rulers, which drew on traditional local practice and was known as *Hukum Adat*. A more comprehensive discussion of this form of law, then, can be found in Hurgronje's account on Acehnese society. According to Hurgronje (1906:72), there was a proverb in Aceh that explain the interwoven relationship between Islamic law and customary law, *"Hukom ngon adat lagee matai tam ngom mata puteh; hukom hukumolah adat adatolah"* which can be translated to "*Hukom* [law] and *adat* [customary law] are like the pupil and the white of the eye; the *hukom* is Allah's *hukom*, and the *adat* is Allah's *adat*." This proverb provides an understanding that Islamic law implementation in Aceh is not a merely recent phenomenon. Rather, it has already rooted in pre-colonial Aceh.

Both Riddell's (2006) and Hurgronje's (1906) accounts show that, in the context of Aceh, Islamic law has its root since the pre-colonial times. Riddell (2006) shows that Sultan Iskandar Muda already implemented Islamic law, particularly the one that derived from Shafi'ite law, since the 17th century. Hurgronje (1906), moreover, writes about an Aceh's proverb that shows the interwoven relationship between Islamic law and customary law. By looking at the historical context regarding the relationship between Aceh, as a territory, and Islam, I infer that the territorialization of Aceh as an Islamic territory already occurred since the pre-colonial times.

In the context of contemporary Aceh, one of the most conspicuous forms of Islamic law can be seen in *qanun*, a local regulation that legislates Islamic law. *Qanun* is based on the Law No. 18/2001 that was ratified on August 9, 2001, and has been implemented since January 1, 2002. This law defines *qanun* as the regional regulation of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, as the law is implemented in the context of special autonomy. According to the official website of Aceh's government, the first legislated *qanun* is Qanun No 7/2002 on Financial Management and Accountability of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. *Qanun* in Aceh legislates a broad array of issues, including finance and economy, natural resources, education, governmental system, healthcare, election, children's protection, women's protection and empowerment, employment, and criminal law.

Aside from *qanun*, the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh can also be traced to several formal institutions. According to Feener (2006:11), Aceh's Shari'a bureaucracy comprises some distinct but interrelated bodies coordinated by the State Shari'a Agency: the Shari'a Courts *(Mahkamah Syariah)*, the Ulama Consultative Council *(Majelis Permussyawaratan Ulama)*, and the Shari'a Police *(Wilayatul Hisbah)*. As Feener (2006:11) points out, the system of Islamic courts is the oldest institution of state *shari'a* in Aceh, established in Sumatra

by the Japanese during the wartime (1942-1945). Aceh's Ulama Consultative Council is the oldest state-affiliated body of its kind in Indonesia, dating to 1965. Aceh's Shari'a Police, however, is the most recent institution, established through the enactment of Regional Regulation No. 5/2002 and further defined in sections of Qanun No. 11/2002 (Feener, 2006:12).

It should be noted, however, that the Islamic law implementation in Aceh is not a given condition, nor is it a consequent effect of a continuously stable process since the time of the sultanates. Instead, the political background of post-colonial Aceh plays a prominent role in shaping the contemporary implementation of Islamic law in Aceh. As Salim (2004) points out, however, discussion of the political context in Aceh and its relation to Islamic law should not be reduced to the elite-focused analysis. According to Salim (2004:80), it has been argued that Muslim rulers have employed *shari'a* as a symbol to acquire political legitimacy from their Muslim citizens and political influence with other Muslim countries. Additionally, it also has been argued that the codification of *shari'a* by Muslim regimes is intended in the interests of legal unification in order to produce political stability (ibid.). However, Salim (2004:81) argues otherwise, in which he demonstrates that the calls for *shari'a* by Muslim groups are not driven simply by politicization itself, but rather a result of a reassertion of self-identity which has inevitably led to a resurgence of the demand for self-determination.[2]

Following the independence of Indonesia in 1945, there was a growing political interaction between the ulama under the leadership of Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh, who was the chairman at PUSA, and the Central Government of Indonesia about the negotiation of Acehnese Islamic identity (Salim, 2004:87). Salim (2004:87) notes that there are five important events that worth considering in these events: (1) the meeting between the *ulama* and Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia, in 1948. In this meeting, the *ulama* demanded a wide autonomy to apply *shari'a* law; (2) the meeting between the *ulama* and Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the leader of Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, in 1949, in which the *ulama* insisted on the establishment of the province of Aceh; (3) Daud Beureueh-led rebellion that broke out throughout Aceh in 1953 following the integration of the region of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra; (4) the visit of Hardi, the Deputy Prime Minister, in 1959, in which he granted the special provincial status to Aceh on behalf of the Central Government; and (5) the negotiations between Daud Beureueh and Colonel Muhammad Jasin, the Commander of the Komando Daerah Militer Aceh that successfully ended the rebellion. All of these events, therefore, show that *shari'a* in Aceh is part of a contentious project between the ulama and the Central Government of Indonesia.

[2]In his discussion of the shari'a from below in Aceh 1930s-1960s, Salim (2004:83) argues that the rise of a new generation of ulama in the 1930s brought with it a particular struggle to restore Islamic identity into the social life of the Acehnese. This restoration, in his argument, is based on the notion that Islamic identity played a pivotal role in the Aceh War in 1873-1904. Aceh War deepened a sense of intertwined regional and religious identity of the Acehnese (ibid.). What Salim referred to as a new generation of ulama is the reformist ulama who organized themselves under the umbrella of PUSA or Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh in 1939. One of the attempts conducted by PUSA was reinvigorating religious education by replacing the traditional schools (dayah) to new schools called madrasah, which merged traditional religious education with modern methods and an extended curriculum (ibid.:84). Aside from that, PUSA often held rallies throughout Aceh in which they called the people of Aceh to be united under the banner of Islam and to be alert to their religious duties, particularly regarding obedience to Islamic rules (ibid.).

The formal surrender of Daud Beureueh in 1962 marked the end of the rebellion led by him. However, the political contention regarding sovereignty in Aceh was still ongoing. In 1976, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was founded. Since December 1976, GAM had been continuing the uprising struggle against the Central Government of Indonesia and fight for the independence of Aceh (Baikoeni and Oishi, 2016:21). However, despite the fact that GAM and Daud Beureueh's movement share a similar discontent toward the national government of Indonesia, it should be noted that both of them pursued different goals (McGibbon, 2004:6).

Daud Beureueh's movement sought to establish *shari'a* in the provincial government and was part of a larger movement to establish an Islamic state, whereas GAM was mainly driven by ethnic-nationalist that sought independence from Indonesia (Aspinal and Crouch, 2003:5). Nevertheless, I think that GAM is worth noting since it also played an important role in shaping the contemporary Aceh at present, particularly regarding the implementation of *qanun* in contemporary Aceh.[3]

On December 26, 2004, Aceh was hit by a massive tsunami. A day after the tsunami, GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire, which was unconditional and to last indefinitely. The ceasefire, then, followed by a series of meetings between GAM and Indonesian government from January to July 2005 that was initiated by a former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Finally, GAM and the Indonesian government reached an agreement in Helsinki on August 15, 2005, by self-government rather than the old alternatives of independence or autonomy (Reid, 2006:17). According to the point 1.1.6 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (2005), Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions and customs of the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal requirements of Aceh. This point, then, affirms the implementation of *qanun* in Aceh.

3 According to Baikoeni and Oishi (2016), there are six historical periods regarding the contention between GAM and the central government of Indonesia. These six historical periods are important to understand because it provides the political background to understand the contentious history between Aceh and Indonesia which later gave birth to the implementation of qanun. The first period occurred in December 1976 – Mid-1979, in which the initial emergence of GAM and its strong ties in the Acehnese nationalism movement. The oppression perpetrated by the Indonesian government against GAM during this period did not draw much attention from the regional and international community. The second period occurred in mid-1979 – mid-1989, in which Hassan di Tiro—the leader of GAM—fled overseas in 1979 and made GAM became dormant. However, Internationalization of Aceh conflict was slowly unfolding in this period by the efforts of the Acehnese leaders in exile, who sought support for their independence struggle from the international community. The third period occurred in mid-1989 – late 1991, in which the conflict escalated after the return of the trained guerrillas of GAM in mid-1989 from Libya to Aceh. During this period, which started in January 1990, the Kopassus was sent to Aceh. The fourth period occurred in late 1991 – May 1998, in which GAM's military activities significantly decreased due to the massive military operation from the Central Government. However, its soft power increased due to more attention of the international community drawn to the struggle and plight of the Acehnese people. The fifth period occurred in May 1998 – October 2004, in which the post-Suharto process of democratization released social forces that had been simmering under the authoritarian political repression and these forces in turn impacted on the Aceh conflict and its management. Lastly, the last period occurred in October 2004 – August 2005, in which the stalemate of the Aceh conflict began to loosen up in 2004 when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla elected as the President and Vice-President of Indonesia.

Therefore, the implementation of qanun in Aceh, as part of Aceh as a Shari'a state project, should be understood not as a given legal fact, but rather embedded in the contentious history between Aceh and Indonesia since the 1930s.

Qanun Jinayat: The Codification of Moral Misconducts

Following the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in 2005, Aceh's *qanun* has been reestablished and respected as a regional regulation in Aceh. In this section, I discuss the relationship between Islam, crime codification, and morality that embodied in Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014. While the case of Aceh in codifying morality is not peculiar, this discussion is important for this paper because it provides an understanding on how the codification of crime in Qanun Jinayat corresponds to both Islamic law and a particular moral framework. This correspondence, moreover, is essential because it demonstrates how both the government of Aceh's and the spectators' act of punishing individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat.

Despite its distinctiveness within the national legal framework, the legislation of Qanun Jinayat is legitimized by Law No. 44/1999 and Law No. 18/2001. At the initial stage of the legislation of Qanun Jinayat, after the implementation of Law No. 18/2001, the Provincial Government of Aceh formulated a committee for gathering legal materials and postulating the Draft of Aceh's Qanun as the positive law in Aceh. The committee then categorized three areas of the Draft: (1) *al-qadha'* (Islamic *shari'a* court system); (2) material and formal *jinayat* (criminal law system); and (3) material and formal *muamalat* (civil law system). The committee prescribed issues only for *jinayat* law: (1) *Qanun* and Governor Regulation related to protection of morality, decency, and self-honor; (2) law codification for issues related to protection of human lives; (3) law codification related to protection of property and wealth; and (4) law codification that related to procedural law. The issue of morality and decency, which is referred to as *akhlak* and *kesusilaan*, particularly affected the legislation of *jinayat* in Aceh.

Etymologically, *akhlak* derives from the Arabic word *akhlaq* (أخلاق), a plural form of *khuluq*, which denotes an innate peculiarity, natural disposition, character, or nature. At the analytical and practical levels, *akhlaq* is often perceived as an Islamic conception of morality (Masud, 1996; Lewis, Haviland-Jones, Barrett 2016). *Kesusilaan* is often used in various contexts in the Indonesian language, from social norms to legal codes. While it is used pervasively, *kesusilaan* refers mainly to an ideal archetype of decency. Nevertheless, *kesusilaan* also means morality or ethics. An outdated Indonesian term for sex workers, for instance, is wanita *tuna susila*, which denotes women lacking morals.

The role of the *qanun* of Aceh is to govern both *akhlak* and *kesusilaan* as seen in the ratification of Qanun No. 12/2003 on *khamar* (producing, distributing, and consuming alcohol), Qanun No. 13/2003 on *maisir* (gambling), and Qanun No. 14/2003 on *khalwat* (intimate activities on the part of a non-married couple). According to the Explanation of Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014, the ratification of these three qanun originated in two considerations on the part of Government of Aceh. First, *khamar, maisir,* and *khalwat* tend to disturb Aceh society and are forbidden by *shari'a*, although the first two are not legally prohibited in Indonesian national law.[4] Second, the Government of Aceh acknowledges

[4] The Explanation of Qanun JInayat No. 6/2014 does not mention khalwat on this point.

that there have been numerous acts of frontier justice regarding activities that involve *khamar, maisir,* or *khalwat* following the implementation of Law No. 44/1999. Between September and December 1999, for instance, dozens of cases of gambling, alcohol consumption, and intimate activities between premarital couple faced frontier justice in various places in Aceh.

My discussion about *akhlak* and *kesusilaan* shows that the Government of Aceh governs morality through its *qanun*. Despite the semantic differences between *akhlak* and *kesusilaan*, it is clear that both are strongly related to morality. However, in the context of the anthropological discussion, it is not an easy task to define morality. As Fassin (2012:7) points out, the field of morality is not a theoretically homogeneous realm. He divides the literature on morality (with the risk of simplifying it) into two main bodies of research: Durkheimian and Foucauldian. In this paper, I am particularly influenced by the Foucauldian approach, partly because I argue that morality binds its subject not just by its authoritative nature; rather morality and its moral subjects have a constitutive relationship. In Foucauldian approach, morality consists of: (1) a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of prescriptive agencies such as family, educational institutions, and churches; (2) the real behaviors of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them; and (3) the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code.[5]

Empirically, the governance of morality through legal codification by the Government of Aceh can be found in Qanun Jinayat. Eleven years after the implementation of Qanun No. 12/2003, Qanun No. 13/2003, and Qanun No. 14/2003, Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 was ratified. This *qanun* governs *jarimah* (any activity restricted by Islamic Law that can be sanctioned, later referred to as "violation"), *pelaku jarimah* (the actor who engaged in the violation, later referred to as "violator"), and *'uqubat* (the penal sanction for the violator).[6] Qanun Jinayat also describes two forms of *'uqubat: 'uqubat hudud* and *'uqubat ta'zir. 'Uqubat hudud* refers to a form of *'uqubat* that its form and measurement already determined. Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 Article 4 Section 2 prescribes that the form of '*uqubat hudud* is caning. As for *'uqubat ta'zir*, it refers to a form of *'uqubat* that optional and its measurement has a range for its limit. Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 Article 4 Section 3 divides *'uqubat ta'zir* into: (1) *'uqubat ta'zir* utama (primary *'uqubat ta'zir*) which consists of caning, fine, imprisonment, and restitution; and (2) *'uqubat ta'zir* tambahan (complementary *'uqubat ta'zir*) which consists of a program of control by the state, restitution by the violator's parents, the government return the violator to their parents, dissolution of marriage, deprivation of property, and annulment of rights and license.

[5] The Foucauldian approach on morality can be found in the second volume of History of Sexuality (1990), in which Foucault also discusses three dimensions of morality. The Durkheimian approach, on the contrary, is based on the three principles he defines in his lecture "The Determination of Moral Facts." Morality is a system of rules of conduct that are invested with a special authority by virtue of which they are obeyed simply because they command. An act of morality must interest our sensibility to a certain extent and appear to us as, in some way, desirable (Durkheim, 1974:35-36). Each of these approaches has its own characteristics that can be traced to two philosophical genealogies: the Durkheimian lineage has a Kantian genealogy, and the Foucauldian lineage has an Aristotelian genealogy (Fassin, 2012:7).

I describe in the Table 1 below. Among these ten categories, three of them (gambling, alcohol production/distribution/consumption, and intimate activities between premarital couple can be found in the 2003 *qanun*.

Table 1. Category of Violation in Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014

Category of Violation	Definition
Khamar	Production, distribution, and/or consumption of alcoholic drink or anything with an alcohol content of 2% or more.
Maisir	An act of gambling between two or more people that includes the winner's getting money or another form of prize from the loser.
Khalwat	An act of a man being in a private place with a woman when they are not *mahram* (certain legally-defined relationships) that could lead to *zina*.
Ikhtilath	An intimate act between a man and a woman outside the marital relationship
Zina	A consensual act of sexual intercourse of one or more men and one or more women outside of the marital relationship.
Pelecehan seksual	Sexual harassment conducted toward a male or female victim.
Pemerkosaan	An act of sexual violence toward the victim's vagina or rectum with the perpetrator's penis or something else, or toward the victim's vagina or penis with the perpetrator's mouth.
Qadzaf	An act of accusation that someone has engaged in *zina*, without the ability to present four witnesses.
Liwath	An act of sexual activity between two consenting men.
Musahaqah	An act of two or more consenting women involving genital or non-genital caressing for sexual pleasure.

6 Unlike jarimah and violator, I decide not to translate 'uqubat into English. While the closest translation for 'uqubat is punishment, the use of "punishment" might blur when I discuss about punishment in general or in the theoretical context.

The categorization of violations shows that the Government of Aceh codified moral misconduct, in which it demonstrates there exists a strong relationship between the notion of crime, religion, and morality. In order to understand the relationship of this triad, I shall elaborate on each of the relationships in the following argument. First, in the context of Islamic law implementation in Aceh, the relationship between religion and morality can be traced to the function of Islamic law itself. According to al-'Awwa (1979:133), the preservation of moral principles by the Islamic penal system is not simply a doctrinal deduction, but rather it forms an integral part of Islamic lawmaking. In other words, there is no dichotomy in the Islamic legal system between criminal law and moral principles, since Islamic criminal law is always used to confirm, protect, and enforce respect for Islamic moral principles. This intermingling relationship between Islamic law and morality, then, is different from that of Lambek's analysis regarding the relationship between religion and morality. Lambek (2012:345) argues that from an anthropological perspective, religion and morality are not fully isomorphic and cannot be fully identified with one another. However, by situating Islamic law as the analytical unit, I think that Islam, as a religion, and morality are commensurable since both of them occupy the same realm and intertwine with each other.

Second, in order to understand the interwoven relationship between religion and crime, particularly in the context of Aceh's *qanun*, it is important to draw upon the ontology of Islamic criminal jurisprudence. While Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 frequently mentions *hudud* and *ta'zir* both in its articles and its complementary explanation, the fundamental explanation of *hudud* and *ta'zir* itself remains vague. According to al-'Awwa (1979:127), there are two categories of crime and punishment in Islamic legislation: determined and discretionary. Determined crimes and penalties are those that already explained in the Quran or Hadith and consisted of two kinds: crimes of *hudud* and *qishas* (Ibid.). As for the crimes of *hudud*, there are several types that fall under its category, in which the categories are different from that of Qanun Jinayat's categories of violation.

Table 2. Category of *Hudud* (al-'Awwa, 1979)

Category of *hudud*	Definition
Ridda	Rejection to Islam by word, deed, or omission
Baaghi	Unlawful rebellion toward the state that based on the Islamic system
Sariqa	Theft
Haraba	Highway robbery
Zina	Fornication between unmarried individuals
Qadzaf	False accusation that someone engages in *zina*
Shorh al-khamr	Alcohol consumption

The penology of Islamic criminal jurisprudence shows that the legislation, codification, and implementation of Islamic law in Aceh's qanun is different from that of the "official" Islamic criminal jurisprudence. In Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014, for instance, there are no categories for *ridda, baaghi, sariqa,* and *haraba*. Therefore, it is worth noting that Islamic law implementation in Aceh is not completely a replica from that of Islamic criminal jurisprudence system, but rather already localized in the context of Aceh.

Ultimately, in accordance to the Islamic law implementation in Aceh, I argue that what is considered as crimes in Aceh, particularly in respect to Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014, is not only referred to the act that violated the law but also perceived as a deviation to a particular moral framework. This argument exemplifies by the discussion in the Explanation of Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 examined earlier, in which the Government of Aceh acknowledges that there has been frontier justice toward activities that involve alcohol consumption, gambling, and intimate activities between premarital couple following the implementation of Law No. 44/1999. This acknowledgment by the Government of Aceh shows that Qanun Jinayat, as a legal product, corresponds to the frontier justice that often targeted activities related to gambling, alcohol consumption, and intimate activities between premarital couple. Therefore, there are two arguments that can be drawn based on this acknowledgment.

First, the Government of Aceh's codification of moral misconduct shows that their work can be affected by the moral framework. Therefore, Aceh—as a state—should be understood as a moral-based entity. As Fassin (2015:6) points out, state as an institution has actions framed by legislation, the allocation of resources, and the organizations of the means. These factors determine the state's modalities. The state's agents work in reference to a certain professional ethos, the principles of justice or order, and attention to social and psychological realities that are the products of the agents' professional habitus. Thus, in terms of the legislation and codification of Islamic law, the Government of Aceh's action can be constituted by their own moral framework.

Second, the discussion of morality occupies an important place in this discussion because morality serves as the nexus between the state and society, in which it epitomizes by the Government of Aceh's correspondence to the vigilant frontier justice. However, it should be noted that at the empirical level, morality is not a monolith. Instead of situating morality as one dominant, unitary framework, it is a system of perception in which right and wrong are culturally defined. Therefore, the different cultural groups might project their own framework of morality. On that note, what I mean by the nexus between the state and society is not the singular and monolith framework of morality, but rather a particular moral framework that posits the individuals who engage in activities that related to *khamar, maisir,* and *khalwat* as criminals. Understanding that morality is not a singular, unitary, and monolithic entity is important because it does not omit the possibility of other moral frameworks that exist in society.

The Conspicuous Face of Punishment: Spectatorship and Its Emotive Aspects

On May 17, 2017, the Shari'a Court of Banda Aceh sentenced two men who engaged in *liwath* activity as guilty. Initially, these two men were found by vigilantes who entered their rented room on March 28, 2017. Both of them spent two months in prison before getting caned on May 23, 2017. Since they already spent two months in prison, the number of caning decreased from 85 to 83 strikes. As Qanun Aceh No. 7/2013 on Jinayat Procedural Law Article 262 Section 1 instructs, the caning must be held in a public space where the people can watch it. Therefore, the first caning toward the violator of *liwath* took place in front of Syuhada Mosque, which located in Lamgugob, Banda Aceh.

In front of the mosque, a stage already erected and a crowd gathered around it. Some of the spectators even climbed a tree and sat on top of it. Many cameras and smartphones were being held by the spectators, ready to capture the moment of the caning; from journalists, government officials, to the general public of Aceh. Not too far from the stage,

there are several chairs used by religious leaders and government officials from various levels. During that day, the violators of *liwath* were not the only ones that were being punished. Rather, there were several others who were being caned publicly. On that day, a total of ten individuals was publicly caned, eight of them were engaged in *ikhtilath* and two of them, which I discuss in this part, were violated the law of *liwath*. Prior to the caning, a woman recited a verse from Al- Quran, specifically the second verse of Surah An-Nur: *"The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of sexual intercourse, lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be taken by pity for them in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. And, let a group of the believers witness their punishment."* Following the recital, an opening speech and a prayer were being delivered.

It is not an exaggeration, then, for Conquergood (2013:267) to argue that public performance of execution is a ritual in which the state dramatizes its absolute power and monopoly of violence. Indeed, Conquergood (2013) focuses on the practice of capital punishment by the state as a lethal theatre. However, the very nature of the performative act in public caning in Aceh could not be overseen, since its theatricality is well-prepared, from the detailed instruction in the procedural law to the everyday mundane repertoire on and around the stage. However, the practice of caning is not only performative since it ritualized, but also because it is conducted in a public manner. Therefore, the presence of the spectator plays a pivotal role in the public caning in Aceh as a performative act.

In the context of public caning toward the men who engaged in the violation of *liwath* on May 23, 2017, the numerous amount of people, as I mentioned earlier, already gathered around the stage even before the caning started. As the violators walked toward the stage, the crowd that already gathered around the stage indistinctly jeer over him. The violators, who wore white robe provided by the government, accompanied by two Shari'a polices on his sides. While the violators brought to the stage, some of the spectators shouted "homo!" The jeering, moreover, did not only occurred when they walked toward the stage, but also expressed when a government official announced his religion, education, and the number of the cane, which are Islam, MAN (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri or Islamic senior high school), and 85 canes.[7]

The excited jeering plays an important role in the spectatorship of public caning. The expressed excitement shows that the spectators differentiate themselves from the violator of Qanun Jinayat. As Ahmed (2004:14) argues, emotions involve different orientations towards the objects they construct, which means naming emotions have effects that we can describe as referential.[8] Following Ahmed's argument on emotions and its referential object, the excitement that is expressed by the spectators of public caning derived from their act of differentiating themselves from the violators that are being punished on the stage.

As I argued in the previous section, the codification of Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014 cannot be separated from how the government of Aceh corresponds to the frontier justice that occurred throughout September – December 1999. The frontier justice act could be seen as a manifestation of a particular moral framework that also embodied by the government of Aceh in codifying Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014. In other words, both the people who involved in the frontier justice in 1999 and the government of Aceh who codify the crimes ground their actions in a particular moral framework that defines what is right and what is wrong for the Acehnese society. Moreover, I argue that the spectators who excitedly watch the public caning in Aceh also share this particular moral framework.

Aside from the excited jeer and taunt, there is another aspect in the case of spectatorship of public caning in Aceh that is worth noting: the pervasive acts of recording and disseminating the video footage of the individuals being caned on the stage. These pervasive acts of capturing the violator can be seen as an act of public surveillance. I draw on Dandeker's definition of surveillance, in which he defines surveillance as the gathering of information and the supervision of subject populations in organizations (Dandeker, 1990: vii). Dandeker's approach of surveillance is beneficial since it provides a broad and general understanding of surveillance that captures the theoretical development in surveillance studies.[9] My argument regarding public surveillance is quite similar to that of Marwick's discussion on social surveillance, in which she notes that discussion about surveillance to date has yet to answer the reason on why people of relatively equal power are watching each other and acting on the information they find (Marwick, 2018:326). Marwick (2018:327) argues for a form of horizontal surveillance (as opposed to the practice of government surveilling its citizens or vice versa) that made salient by the social digitization normalized by social media.

I argue that the process of capturing and disseminating the video footage of the violators by the spectators as a form of surveillance because it involves the gathering of personal information of individuals being caned. In many video footage that can be found in YouTube and Facebook, the personal data of the violator often displayed in a clear and detailed manner, including their faces and information that are being announced by the government official (their names, addresses, parents' names, and so forth). Indeed, one might perceive the pervasive acts of capturing the video footage as a mere form of documentation or memorialization. However, I argue that these practices can be perceived as a form of surveillance by drawing on Dandeker's (1990) and Marwick's (2018) arguments. Given that the spectators do not merely keep the video footage for themselves, but rather uploaded it in various social media, the spectators have a role as surveillance agents who deliberately gather the information of the violators, as subject population, and disseminate it.

The role of the spectators in capturing the process of the caning (and the personal information of the violator that announced in it) is important because it provides an empirical framework for understanding how surveillance of an act considered a crime

[7] Before the caning took place, a government official announced the profile of the violator, which consists of his name, date of birth, sex, nationality, address, religion, job, and education.After that, the government official read the sentence from the Shari'a Court and the number of cane for him.

[8] One of her examples can be found in her analysis regarding the affective politics of fear, in which she follows Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety. In her discussion, the difference between fear and anxiety is most often represented in terms the object (Ahmed, 2004:64). Another example of the referential object of naming emotion can be found in Ahmed's discussion of the performativity of disgust. Ahmed (2004:85) delineates that disgust is dependent upon contact, in the sense that it involves a relationship of touch and proximity between the surfaces of bodies and objects. In other words, Ahmed argues that emotion requires referential object that is located outside the subject. In the case of excitement in spectatorship of public caning in Aceh, the referential object is the violators who are being caned, whereas the subject is the spectators who watch the process of the caning.

[9] As Galič, Timan, and Koops (2017) demonstrate, the field of surveillance studies—just like any other academic field—is always growing. Initial discussion of surveillance can be traced to Bentham's panopticon, in which it later incorporated in Foucault's (1995) discussion of panopticism.

is conducted the general public. Davies (2014) uses a similar argument regarding the surveillance of sexuality in Indonesia. She incorporates Eric Stein's concept of village biopower to discuss how the practice of surveilling sexuality is not limited to the state. Village biopower constructs alternative modernity in which bodies may be ordered and managed, without necessarily creating the kind of Western, individualized subjectivity described by Foucault (Stein, 2007:57). As Davies (2014:32) points out, Stein's conceptualization is not confined to the village context, but instead refers to non-state power. Davies' work, however, is not free of criticism. While she mentions the role of family and peers in surveilling sexuality (Davies, 2014:45-46), she actually focuses on the role of police and other state apparatuses in surveilling sexuality (Davies, 2014:39). Thus, the role of the non-state power in surveilling sexuality remains understudied.

By looking at the surveillance practices of the violators being caned in Aceh, I propose that the act of capturing and disseminating video footage demonstrates that the vigilantes and spectators serve a role as surveillance agents. While the intention behind their acts of surveilling remains unclear, it should be noted that the individuals who surveil homosexuality in Aceh neither part of the state nor summoned by the government of Aceh. In this way, the case of Aceh is different from, for instance, the 18th-century French penal system (Foucault, 1995:48). The presence of the vigilantes and spectators shows their position as deliberate moral subjects. This position and the practices of surveillance embedded in it challenges the early notion in surveillance studies that are derived mainly from Foucault's incorporation of Bentham's panopticon (Hier, 2003; Galič, Timan, and Koops, 2017). Instead of locating the state as the locus of surveillance, the case of Aceh brings me to a more recent understanding of surveillance, shown in Mathiesen's (1997) discussion of the viewer society.

As Mathiesen (1997:219) points out, viewer society is built on the total system of modern mass media, particularly television. Mathiesen's use of television is beneficial to shift the analysis from total surveillance by the state to more everyday practices of surveillance. In other words, he postulates a framework that may be used to represent situations in which large numbers of people are able to focus on something in common (Hier, 2003:404). Only the mass media industry can produce televised content that plays a prominent role in the synoptic system. The case of Aceh, on the contrary, situates the spectators as the surveillance agents that benefit from the rise of technology. The spectators need only smartphones, internet connection, and social media to produce their own contents. These technologies place the spectators as the primary surveillance agent and decentralize surveillance practices.

It should be noted, however, that the spectators are not the representative of the whole Aceh society. As a province that inhabited by more than 5.1 million people, the act of spectating public caning by a few numbers of people seem peculiar. Yet, its peculiarity does not invalidate the fact that there is a specific public that did it. Hence, the discussion about the public itself is essential to investigate. Michael Warner (2002) provides an

10 Warner (2002:67-118) also characterizes a public by seven traits, which comprise: (1) a public is self-organized; (2) a public is a relation among strangers; (3) the address of public speech is both personal and impersonal; (4) a public is constituted through mere attention; (5) a public is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse; (6) publics act historically according to the temporality of their circulation; and (7) a public is poetic world-making.

excellent theoretical framework to analyze this issue. In his discussion of publics and counterpublics, He distinguishes the public, as a kind of social totality (Warner, 2002:65), to a public, as a specific audience.[10] In the context of Aceh, the society of Aceh as a total totality can be perceived as the public, whereas its particular group of people who spectate the public caning can be perceived as a public.



Figure 1 A particular moral framework as a nexus between the government of Aceh and a public who serves its role as the spectators

The distinction between *the* public and *a* public, in the context of spectators of public caning in Aceh, is not only limited to their different acts, but also to the cultural ground of their actions, which I argue grounded in a particular moral framework. My figure above shows that this particular moral framework embodied by a public that actively surveilling homosexuality and the government of Aceh that punishes it. However, as Morgan and Orloff (2017:18) argue, the state is not a uniform, cohesive entity. Rather, the state comprises of complexity and multiplicity of actors and institutions within the state (Morgan and Orloff, 2017:18). Drawing on Morgan and Orloff's explanation, I take a nod to Fassin (2015:6) who argues that the state— or to be precise, actors within the government of Aceh as a state—works in reference to modalities that grounded in a particular moral framework.

Spectators as Actors: From Public Punishment to Public Governance

In tracing the role of spectators in the political arena, Fitzgerald (2016:1) argues that spectators should be perceived as actors, rather than functions as a mere backdrop. He draws on theater theory to epitomize his argument, in which he argues for an analysis of the political realm as the theatrical arena (Fitzgerald, 2016:83). In so doing, Fitzgerald (2016:4) refers to Grotowski (2008:369), who argues that theater recognizes spectators as a constitutive element because spectators are what makes theater what it is. While Fitzgerald needs to struggle to discuss the importance of spectators by making a linkage between politics and theater, a similar argument inferred by Foucault (1995:57) who argues that the people were the main character in the ceremonies of public execution. Drawing on both Foucault's (1995) and Fitzgerald's (2016) arguments, this section focuses on the role of spectators in public caning in Aceh regarding the issue of punishment, surveillance, and governance.

In order to locate the spectators in the analysis of punishment in the context of public caning in Aceh, the aim of public caning itself is need to be discussed. Given that the

caning is conducted in public, it is apparent that its purpose is to give a lesson to the violator and Aceh society at large so they would not violate Qanun Jinayat in the future. This purpose of giving a lesson is described in one of the interviews conducted about the implementation of caning in Aceh. Following the case of public caning on September 28, 2017, that had few spectators, Drs. Rianto Waris, an Assistant Regent III Aceh Tamiang, stated:

"There is a declining trend [in the number of spectators], indeed. However, we hope that it would not happen again in 2018. Thus, what should be done? The government can do socialization [programs], including that of qanun law. As for [Aceh] society, it can be a lesson, especially for the individual who got the caning. Also for the society, it can be a lesson so there will be no more violation for qanun in the future." Drs. Rianto Waris, Assistant Regent III Aceh Tamiang, September 28, 2017 (published by SerambiTV on October 2, 2017)

This statement shows that the purpose of caning is to govern people's actions—to correct their wrongdoings and situate them on a path of rightful living that does not violate Aceh's *qanun*. Therefore, the purpose of caning is not merely to inflict pain upon the violator, but rather to enact a sense of guilt and shame that keeps people—both the violator and spectators—from violating the Islamic law legislated in *qanun*. In so doing, it is clear that public caning framed as deterrence punishment, rather than restorative or retributivist.

In penology, deterrence theory of punishment refers to the idea that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime (Lee, 2017:2). The theory of deterrence was first developed in the 1760s by Cesare Beccaria and later incorporated by Jeremy Bentham in 1789 (Sverdlik, 2017:1). It should be noted that both Beccaria's and Bentham's discussion of deterrence was conducted in the context of justifying punishment, in which it mainly influenced by their utilitarian paradigm. My discussion, on the contrary, follows Fassin's (2018:32) agreement to Hart who insisted on the importance of conceptually clarifying what punishment is before asking what justifies it. In other words, Fassin (2018) seeks to discuss punishment in the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical realms without attempting to provide its moral and/or legal justification. Thus, I do not intend to situate deterrence as a moral and/or legal justification, but rather as an empirical purpose of punishment as it argued by Drs. Rianto Waris above.

While it is clear that the government of Aceh intended the implementation of public caning as a mode of deterrence, it is necessary to look at the impact of such an act of deterrence. As Kavka (1978:291) points out, the intention of the punisher may not meet with the impact for the criminal. Therefore, the response of the violator of Qanun Jinayat should be taken into consideration. One of the responses can be found in the statement below, in which a violator of Qanun Jinayat argued that public caning invokes deterrent effect.

"The clear thing is the impact of being caned is the embarrassment, especially for those who already have families. So, their children can see the caning. Of course, it's the most valuable lesson [for me]. If [the punishment is happening] in prison, it's less effective because the number of people who can watch [the punishment] is limited. But, if [it happens] in a public place, it is can also be a lesson for others. If you do something, this is the risk; being caned in public. If the caning is more painful, it doesn't matter [for me] because it's a risk, but it's the shame that I can't stand. So, caning in public invokes deterrent effect. In the future, if you want to repeat the same [violation], you'll think twice." J, a violator of Qanun Jinayat No.6/2014, interviewed by Modusaceh on April 30, 2018

By looking at J's statement above, there are two points that can be taken. First, he remarked that the effectiveness of deterrence process in the public caning in Aceh is constituted by the number of people who can watch the punishment. This statement epitomizes the importance of the spectators in the process of public caning. Second, he argued that it was not the pain of the caning that was being his concern. Rather, it was the shame that he could not stand. I shall elaborate these two points to emphasize how spectatorship plays a pivotal role in the deterrence process, as well as punitive and governance practices.

First, J contrasted public caning that occurred on the stage with punishment that takes place in prison. This comparison is worth noting because it provides an empirical framework in regard to punitive space and its relationship to the deterrence process. What I mean by the punitive space is the space where the punishment took place. In this regard, I incorporate an analysis of the spatialization of punishment in the context of public caning in Aceh.

Following Setha Low's analysis on the spatialization of culture, I refer to spatialization as a mean to locate, both physically and conceptually, social relations and social practice in social space (Low, 1996:861). As for space itself, Lefebvre (1991) defines space as a physical and social landscape which is imbued with meaning in everyday place-bound social practices and emerges through processes that operate over varying spatial and temporal scales. In the context of public caning in Aceh, the practice of punishing the *violator* took place in various places: the lawmakers' office of People Representative Council of Aceh, the office of Wilayatul Hisbah, the Shari'a Court, to the stage of execution. Nevertheless, the actual, physical punishment toward the violators only took place on a particular location: the stage.

The stage itself, as a physical place, is erected by the government of Aceh who serves the role as the executioner of Qanun Jinayat. However, I think that the punitive space is not limited to the physical place, but rather has its social aspect. Thus, approaching public caning as a performative act is necessary for this analysis since it enables the analysis to move beyond the physical space of punishment by addressing the spectators as part of the punitive space. Indeed, the projection of space might be varied from one subject to another. The spectators might focus on the stage and ignore the crowd that stands with them. The executioner who holds the cane might only focus on the person in front of him, and his space is limited on certain parts on the stage. The violator, condemned as they are, perhaps aware of the massive amounts of the people around the stage. Yet other possibilities exist. The violator on the stage might only focus on the cane from the executioner and abject the crowd. The violator might only aware of particular individuals who watched them. Nevertheless, it is not my intention to discuss the variety of spaces that are being projected by each subject, since the analysis requires data from actual fieldwork, which this paper, as I convey in the introduction, is lack of. Therefore, I approach the punitive space from the point of view of the observer and try to posit it in the analytical level.

In my argument, the spectatorship of caning clearly has an effect on the process of punishing itself. Since the crowd around the stage often cheering over the body of the *violator* during the caning, the spectators are actively involved in the symbolic act of punishing. The punitive gaze toward the violator leaves no room for the violator for not feeling condemned. My argument on this subject derived from my analysis regarding the spectators' moral framework, in which the spectators exercise their moral subjectivities.

Therefore, the spectators of public caning in Aceh can be perceived as furthering state's mode of punishment by reproducing a notion that the violator needs to be governed since they violated Qanun Jinayat.

Second, J repeatedly mentioned the role of shame in public caning as a deterrent aspect. In his statement, however, the shame is not merely fueled because the spectators can watch him. Rather, the fact that the violators already married and have their own families could strengthen the shame. The role of the family in producing shame in this case is similar to that of Davies' analysis on the role of sexual surveillance in Indonesia. As Davies (2014:29) points out, the possibility of evoking shame is so powerful that no further threats need to be made to ensure people curtail undesirable behavior. Moreover, if one person causes shame, it is not only this exact person that shamed but rather the entire family, in which Davies (2014:30) calls it as kinships of shame.

By looking at shame as deterrence and the role of spectators in evoking it, I propose that spectatorship of public caning in Aceh constitutes a form of affective governance. I draw on Jupp, Pykett, and Smith's (2014) discussion on affective governance that refers to the ways in which the work of state agencies, civil servants, and public services involves emotional negation, excess, dilemma, rhetorical fantasy, as well as emotional celebration and commitment. However, their approach on affective governance tends to situate the state as the main actor, while my discussion on spectatorship of public caning focuses on how spectators further the state's modes of punishment and governance by involving an emotional aspect. It should be noted, however, that the enactment of shame toward the violators of Qanun Jinayat does not stop the moment they were being caned. While, indeed, the festivities of the crowd jeer and taunt the violator occurred during the moment of the caning, the carnivalesque aspect of spectating the violators' pain reproduced even after the violator left the stage. In order to understand this point, I draw on the discussion of surveillance as I discussed before in the previous section.

By following the surveillance practice toward violators of Qanun Jinayat, I argue that it functions as a mode of affective governance. My argument regarding the relationship between surveillance practices and governance is not novel, indeed. Monahan (2010:97) argues for two types of surveillance that directly challenge ideals of democratic governance, which consist of differential control and automated control. The differential control can be understood with the social sorting functions of the surveillance system as it explained by David Lyon (2003, 2007). In this regard, surveillance operates as a mechanism for differentiating society by discerning or actively constructing differences among the populations and regulating the populations in accordance to their assigned status (Gandy, 2006; Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). However, the discussion of surveillance as governance tends to focus on the surveillance practice by governments or private corporates, whereas the case is different from that of the spectators in Aceh. Nevertheless, despite the differential locus between these cases and the case of Aceh, I find the analytical framework useful to explain the function of surveillance toward homosexuality by the spectators in Aceh.

Both punishment and surveillance, then, fall under the same categorical umbrella that Foucault (1995) discusses: discipline. He argues that discipline is a technique of control that connected to the logic of maintaining power relation (Foucault, 1995:23). However, as Foucault (1995:215-216) argues, discipline is not confined to institutional body per se, but rather a type of power that comprises of a whole set of instruments, procedures, and

levels of application.

""Discipline" may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a "physics" or an "anatomy" of power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by "specialized" institutions (the penitentiaries or "house of correction" of the nineteenth century), or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by pre- existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power (one day we should show how intra-familial relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have become "disciplined," absorbing since the classical age external schemata, first educational and military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological, which have made the family the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal); or by apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning (the disciplinarization of the administrative apparatus from the Napoleonic period), or finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police)." (Foucault, 1995: 215-216)

By looking at Foucault's approach on discipline, I argue that discipline, as a conceptual framework, should be decentralized. While Foucault argues that discipline may not be identified as particular institutions or apparatuses, his discussion on the variety of disciplinary levels tends to focus on institutionalized bodies such as military, medical institution, to family. In this sense, Foucault only discusses the modality of discipline in certain organized bodies. The case of spectatorship in Aceh, on the contrary, is different from that of Foucault's analysis. The spectators are self-selected, and they are not organized by nor subjugated to the state's sovereignty.

Lastly, the involvement of spectators in the governance practices toward the violators shows that the act of punishing crime is not only conducted by the state. This argument is beneficial to challenge the underlying assumption on crime and punishment, as Fassin (2018) already done so. Fassin (2018:32) draws upon Hart's five elements of punishment to later elaborate his analysis. According to Hart (1959), punishment should involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; be for an offence against legal rules; be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence; be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender; and be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed. Hart's (1959) classification shows that the state lies at the heart of the punitive system, yet as Fassin (2018:43-44) argues, whereas the state typically exercises the monopoly of the use of legitimate violence, it actually faces the presence of other actors who also claim a right to mete out justice or more exactly to take the law into their own hands. Fassin (2018:44) substantiates his claim by demonstrating disparate kinds of mobilizations of vigilantism, from the Ku Klux Klan in the United States to the Minutemen at the Mexican border. In the case of Aceh, the spectators cannot be understood as doing vigilante acts because their spectatorship does not derive from their dissatisfaction of the state's mode of discipline. Rather, the spectators, through their spectatorship practices, further state's mode of governance toward individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat. This role of spectators in actively furthering state's mode of governance demonstrates that the spectators, in respect to Fitzgerald's (2016) notion, are not merely a backdrop for a certain punitive practice. Rather, they serve their roles as the actors within the punitive system by spectating, surveilling, and governing the individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat.

Concluding Remarks and Further Research

Throughout this paper, I have sought to demonstrate that there exists an intermingling relationship between a particular moral framework and Islamic law as it is manifested in the codification of Qanun Jinayat. This relationship is pivotal in understanding the issue of spectatorship of public caning in Aceh. This particular moral framework drives both the spectators' excited jeering and their pervasive act of surveilling the violator of Qanun Jinayat. My discussion, furthermore, refutes the understanding of punishment as well as surveillance that in earlier literatures rests on the state as the sole and unitary actor. The case of spectatorship of public caning in Aceh demonstrates that the spectators assume an active role in affectively governing the violators.

As stated in the introduction, this paper reverberates around the ethical turn in anthropology, in which the study of morality enters the discussion. I argue that morality is a nexus between the state (that codifies Qanun Jinayat and prescribes caning as a form of punishment) and the spectators (who deliberately watch the process of the caning). This paper demonstrates that the spectatorship is driven by the spectators' own will. Therefore, unlike Foucault's analysis on the spectacle of the scaffold, the spectators in Aceh cannot be perceived merely as subjugating themselves to the state's sovereignty. Rather, they actively extend the state's mode of punishment and governance toward individuals who violate Qanun Jinayat. The presence of the spectators during the process of the public caning, moreover, enables them to exercise their moral surveillance toward the violators. In so doing, the spectators are actively involved in governing acts that they deem to be immoral.

The claim that I present in this paper derives from my interpretation of the case of public caning in Aceh, without any actual fieldwork. Therefore, the arguments regarding the spectatorship of public caning in Aceh should be taken as preliminary. In order to achieve a comprehensive anthropological understanding about the spectatorship of caning in Aceh, further research is necessary. It is necessary to delve into the spectators' intention and mobilization, the non-spectators' indifference, and the everyday practices that revolve around the process of implementing the caning. Further research on the spectators' intention, particularly, is important in order to provide an elaborate analysis of their expressed emotions. A detailed analysis of affective governance, for instance, requires extensive understanding of intention and clearly cannot be pursued without fieldwork. Tracing the contemporary context of piety, contestation and resistance toward the implementation of Islamic law, and the development of the legal system are also worthy of future examination and analysis.

The importance of the role of spectators as a particular public aligns with my broader interests. I intend to study how non-state actors are involved in acts of discipline toward certain identity groups. The state as an institution has the right to monopolize violence. Nonetheless, non-state actors conduct a mode of discipline which is not entirely different from the state's mode of governance. In the case of Aceh, the group subjected to the spectators' affective governance is violators of Qanun Jinayat. In my intended research area, the group subjected to the disciplining act is individuals with non-normative gender and sexual identity. In this case, the actors of the disciplining act are varied, yet they might be connected through a certain moral framework. Understanding the pervasiveness of the act of policing others, which includes punishment, surveillance, violence, and governance, is my focus for future research.

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The 2019 Arryman Symposium

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Making God and the Devil: Commodity Fetishism and Capitalist Desire in a West Kalimantan Palm Oil Plantation[1]

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Abstract

What might explain the rise of a new object of worship in a late-capitalism timespace, when life seems to be falling apart? A Dayak Desa farmer community's experience of agrarian change towards a new capitalistic—and mystifying—industrial plantation, has subjugated them to a world dominated by things/objects they themselves have created. Building upon Marx's "commodity fetishism," this paper investigates an allegory of production dialectic, involving a new symbol of god and the devil, in West Kalimantan's palm oil plantation area. I suggest that focusing on the regression of materiality, and into the realm of immaterial supra sensibilities of the palm oil tree, is productive to understand the absolute strangeness of the normal capitalist every day.

Keywords:

Commodity fetishism, Dayak Desa farmers, agrarian change, palm oil plantation, production dialectic.

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Introduction

"Something strange is afoot. All mixed up and confusing. Used to be … us here. Them there. Subjects knew their place and, as for objects, they were meek and would never dare trespass. But now? Objects! You have nothing to lose but your chains."
(Taussig 2018)

"Dengar pohon tu. Bicara dia tu, ingat dia." (Listen to the trees. They speak, they remember)
-a Desa shaman

What might explain the rise of a new object of worship in a late-capitalism timespace, when life seems to be falling apart? In 2016, while researching Dayak Desa farmers' collapsing belief in the sacred Tapang Madu tree *(Koompasia excelsa)* in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, I observed their immediate search for a replacement. At the time, several farmers had tattooed palm oil tree *(Elaeis guineensis)* symbols on their bodies. Others had painted the same symbol on the walls of their houses. Two years later, when I revisited the area, palm oil trees had reached a new form of embodiment. They were worshipped in weekly church sermons and shamanic practices. Moreover, palm oil trees were in consistent peril from the lurking devil, in the form of eight-legged black dog phantoms that haunted farmers during plantation work. Apparently, palm oil trees were transforming—from a mere cash crop object to an abstraction that seemed to subjugate Desa farmers' symbolic cosmology. Is the palm oil tree the future? Is it a god in the process of construction?

This paper examines the coming about of a new fetish[2] in Desa farmers' symbolic cosmology—transitioning from Tapang Madu to palm oil trees. A deep-seated material change, reflected in a land-use shift from heterogeneous rain forest to expansive monoculture cash- cropping, and a religious conversion to Christianity, has provoked a symbolic—or rather ideological—response from Desa farmers. This response attributed consciousness, will, and intention to the palm oil tree—an anthropological reality, a god in the making.

The farmers' change in belief might come across as a repudiation of "modernity" and signal a tendency to revert to their "traditional" state. To the contrary, I argue that Desa farmers' construction and mystification of the devil contributes to a hybrid form of a fetish which helps them constitute a reality in which they come to terms with the changing mode of production, from pre-capitalism to industrial capitalism. It is a fetish that embodies their collective representation of what it means both to lose control over and to be controlled by the means of production—a historical and on-going process of dispossession in which

[2] I recognize the negative connotation the terms "fetish" and "fetishism" carry. Pietz's genealogy of the fetish (Pietz 1985, 1987, 1988) reveals how the concept, developed under the influence of Hegel (2001), Freud (1997a, 1997b, 1997c), and Marx (1976), originated in the 16th-17th century. The term was fetisso, initially deployed by Europeans to accuse groups that sprang up along the coast of African Guinea of irrationality due to their "false idolatry" as opposed to (present) true belief. The term designates a "primitive" superstition (Matory 2018; Morris and Leonard 2017), as an attempt to undermine "the others." Indeed, such an assumption is one of the first mistakes of the original theory of fetishism—a naïve belief in naïve belief, which is why fetishism is said to have been nothing but an "immense miss understanding" between cultures (Gemerchak 2004).

the social relations of capitalism are valorized and normalized. Even further, the fetish might also reinforce the expansion of capitalist relations into the farmers' web of life—modifying the very quality of their action and work (Latour 2010). Desa farmers' sense of loss entails inescapable enticements, self-consuming passions, discriminatory tactics, and devastating social costs (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Taussig 1980).

In this paper, I analyze the historical context in which one mode of production and life has been supplanted by another, and how the devil represents this process of alienation. I argue that historically changing land use has subjugated Desa farmers, outside of their cognizance, to a world dominated by things/objects that they themselves have created. This domination is nowhere more prevalent than in the expansion of the palm oil plantation, spearheaded by two private plantation companies PT Harapan Desa (HD) and PT Surya Pratama (SP), into the hinterlands of the Buayan river area in Meliau sub-district, West Kalimantan province.

My argument is based on Marx's understanding of commodity fetishism and the process of human beings' alienation from their nature to what Lukács (1972) calls second nature.[3] The "commodity fetishism" concept is productive in illuminating the workings of beliefs, for it takes us beyond a perspective that approaches beliefs as misrepresentations of social reality to attend to how social reality is generated (Žižek 1994b; Giddens 1979; Taussig 1987b). Here I refer to beliefs in a Lacanian sense: instead of being something solely interior, belief is radically exterior, embodied in the practical, effective procedure of people (Lacan 1998). Palm oil tree fetishism in Desa farmers' daily life operates in such a way.

Marx explains that a commodity is a queer thing—it abounds in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties which give it a rather mysterious veil (Matory 2018; Keane 2007; Meyer 1998); or as he describes it, a commodity is magical and filled with necromancy (Marx 1976). One reason for Marx's emphasis on the mysterious trait of commodity, I think, is his inclination toward elaborating capitalism as a necessarily mystifying phenomenon. As he writes:

> "It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to

[3] Lukács' understanding of "second nature" builds upon Marx's idea of human alienation from nature. As Marx explains, workers could not create anything without nature, without the sensuous external world (Marx 2012). However, as the products of workers' labor are expropriated from them, nature is reduced to a mere means of subsistence that is eventually further and further removed from the worker. This alienation is a symptom of the rise of a new social formation—namely capitalism. Lukács' explains that "men are constantly smashing, replacing, and leaving behind the 'natural,' irrational, and actually existing bonds, while, on the other hand, they erect around themselves in the reality that they have created and 'made,' a kind of second nature which evolves with exactly the same inexorable necessity as was the case earlier with irrational forces of nature (more exactly: the social relations which appear in this form)" (Lukács 1972). Transition to "second nature" means that man is further and further distanced from "'first" nature, with the seeming immediacy of nature enjoyed in previous societies becoming increasingly rare. Instead, what humanity encounters is a system of commodities, goods imported from every corner of the globe, and serially processed through a complex division of labor before arriving to their consumer in their finished forms. In other words, this nature, "second nature," becomes the world to which humanity is immediately accustomed. With the rise of capitalism, everything changes; in place of the

find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hand. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities" (Marx 1976:165).

Under a capitalistic mode of production, producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange the products of their labor (Marx 1976). They come to know the specific social character of their own private labor only in the act of market exchange (Stallybrass 1998), during which a new discursive social sphere is constructed (Habermas 1993). The producers do not know anything about the labor that congeals value in the commodity. In a sophisticated and complex system of exchange, it is improbable that they would know anything about the labor. Thus, fetishism is inevitable, as it is universal and necessary in the world market (Harvey 2010; Mulhern 2007; Spyer 1998; Rutherford 2003). In the context of my study, the market system—meaning agribusiness—disguises real social relations between persons by the exchange of commodities which in turn abstracts the relations among people as relations between things, between products of labor. Here, the commodity loses its material sensibility while simultaneously transfiguring into a thing of supra sensible qualities—the precise definition of the hysteria of conversion proper to capitalism (Stallybrass 1998; Keane 1998; Žižek 1994a).

The introduction and integration of palm oil cultivation into Desa farmers' daily life have obscured their definite social relations between men to the fantastic relation between material things (Marx 1976, 2005). The exchange ratio of palm oil mediates and determines people's activities. At first, most Desa farmers were against palm oil cultivation and the opening of big plantation companies because they were unaware of palm oil's economic potential. However, with the passage of time and an increase in the global market's demand for palm oil, farmers have begun to realize its high economic value. This realization has influenced their decision to reduce the time spent on personal field cultivation, to open up new lands for palm oil cultivation, and to submerge themselves in a capitalistic market—a vague and entangled system they have come to know only in the past three decades.

The advent of a capitalistic market—palm oil agribusiness—brings with it a split between farmers and the palm oil they produce and exchange (Marx 1976; Ripstein 1987; Taussig 1980), between material social action—or the real conditions of existence—and the representational forms in which this action is reflected back to the practitioner (Moyaert 2004) . The result of this split is the subordination of Desa farmers to the palm oil they produce which appears to be independent and self-empowered. Not only are they separated, but also the price of their product constantly varies beyond their prediction and control. The companies decide the price they are willing to pay to each farmer, after deducting various production costs. A stable price over long periods of time is rare. With this condition, as Taussig (1980, 2018) suggests, the farmers are even more subject to the mystifying domination of the market as they base all of their everyday decisions on the price of their harvest. For the farmers, all of this appears to be very normal.

old self-sufficiency, people are embedded in a system of universal commerce, a universal dependence of nations on one another (Marx 1996).

This paper utilizes primary and secondary data for the analysis. I was able to conduct field research on topics of "agrarian change" and "rural microfinance," in 2014, 2016, and 2018, in the Buayan river area. The study focuses on several villages within PT HD and PT SP plantation concessions. The secondary data is from existing research on palm oil plantation economy and a rural land development project. I also use secondary resources for colonial data on the historical non-timber forest products (NTFPs) trade and the para-rubber economy in West Kalimantan, as well as Christian evangelical mission records. By bringing together ethnographic data on the palm oil tree as a fetish and historical accounts of the tree as a commodity, I hope to go beyond Weber's "iron cage" and show the "mist-enveloped regions" and thereby the absolute strangeness of the normal capitalist every day.

Life Before the Palm Oil Plantation

The History of Land-use Change in West Kalimantan

Subjugation of the cognate mind may be achieved through ideology shift over timespace materialized in gradual dispossession of a mode of production (See Comaroff and Comaroff 2008, 2009). In the Desa farmers' case, the history of land-use change spans hundreds of years, encompassing their ancestors' contact with multiple exterior groups: Chinese traders, Dutch colonists, and the modern Indonesian government. Desa ancestors also established trade connections with other Dayak subgroups that they met during various sojourn expeditions. All of these contacts had a role in palm oil plantation expansion and contributed to the decay of Tapang Madu belief and the construction of a new palm tree fetishism. To understand the process of new fetish construction, it is important first to understand the historical context in which it began.

Borneo[4] contains unique ecosystems that are among the richest on the planet (MacKinnon et al. 1996.) Prior to the introduction and integration of cash crops into Desa farmers' cultural landscape, the Borneo forest was dominated by a family of tree species called *Dipterocarps*. This family comprises 16 genera and roughly 700 tree species, more than 270 of which have been identified in Borneo Island; 155 of them are endemic to the island. *Dipterocarps* are largely arborescent, ranging in size from intermediate shrubs to towering emergent canopy trees. In West Kalimantan, these trees have an average height of 45 m to 60 m and produce high quality timber. Although this species is recorded to have once dominated the entire West Kalimantan forest, due to illegal logging, forest fires, climate change, and conversion to monoculture farming, the number of trees has decreased drastically.

The West Kalimantan forest has long been an arena of political economy contestation between both exterior groups from abroad and local Dayak subgroups, with the *Dipterocarps* tree species in the forefront of trade conflicts. The trade conflicts are due mainly to the multiple interests of different groups regarding *Dipterocarps* timberwood and non-timber forest products (NTFP). With interests in both local and international markets, these groups compete for a monopoly over trade routes and access to NTFPs located in the innermost parts of the forest.

[4] Borneo is the name of the island on which three countries share borders: Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. The Indonesian side of Borneo is called Kalimantan. Kalimantan is further divided into five provinces: North Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan. The Desas of concern lives in West Kalimantan.

Various NTFPs have caught the interest of various groups, including edible birdnests, exudates (resins, latexes, and gums), rattans, and illipe nuts (Padoch and Peluso 1996; Cleary 1996; De Beer and McDermott 1996; Sellato 2002; Wadley 2005).

For the purposes of this paper, I focus primarily on the NTFPs extracted from Tapang Madu trees that contributed to the construction of the Desa's belief in its most traditional form: honey and beeswax. This tree is one of several *Dipterocarps* species inhabited by bees *(Apis dorsata)*. Traditionally, Desas harvested honey once every three months for their daily consumption and pharmaceutical needs. At this time, Dayak groups, including the Desas, were living graciously through their subsistence system in which they developed a set of forest access ethics to govern their access to and processing of extracting NTFPs. By living subsistently, the Dayak groups were poised to exploit their forest in a sustainable manner that would not lead to total deforestation yet would still be enough for consumption.

Honey and beeswax were among the first NTFPs that local Desas traded with exterior groups. Chinese traders were the first to voyage, sporadically, to North and West side of Borneo and conduct trade with local Dayak groups. Although Chinese in significant numbers had settled in Borneo since the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD),[5] the revival of Taoism in China during the Song Dynasty (960-1279)[6] promoted more intense NTFP trade with local Dayaks. The revival of Taoism carried with it a revival of the study of traditional Chinese medicine (Reid 1987). Beeswax served as an important material in the traditional Chinese pharmaceutical, since it could be processed into moisturizers, cosmetics, and even edibles.

By the year 960, Chinese traders had already intensively begun to establish their trading system with outer Dayak groups who lived by sea and river shores. Chinese traders went into the depths of the West side of Borneo forest to search for beeswax from bee hives on trees such as Tapang Madu. This systematic trading could occur only with legitimization by a newly emerging power, the Sriwijaya Kingdom in South Sumatera, which had been able to take control and monopolize the Malaka Strait at about the same time. Until the early 17th century,

historical reports (Warren 2007) noted that NTFPs in the West side of Borneo forest were still plentiful despite the ever increasing demand for trade and personal consumption. For every 0.45 kg of beeswax, local Dayak could harvest an estimated 10.9 kg to 13.6 kg of honey for trade (Sellato 2005). This description points to the wide availability of Tapang Madu trees during the era—a tree with an economic value just made known to the local Dayak.

The years from 1840 until the 1900s mark Dutch colonization over Borneo as an entire island. The emergence of this new political system had significant impact on the Chinese traders in the West side of Borneo. This impact would later also affect the beeswax harvested from Tapang Madu and the distribution of beeswax as well as honey to the global market. Supposedly, NTFPs were over-exploited during this era.

[5] Cheng Te-k'un. Contact Between China and Southeast Asia in Ancient Times Through Archaeological Discovery in Sarawak, translated by Zhen Ya (Nanjing: Southeast Culture, 1986.1), p. 149.

[6] Ann, Wan Kong. Examining the Connection between Ancient China and Borneo through Santubong Archaeological Sites, edited by Victor H. Mair (Philadelphia: Sino-Platonic Papers, 2013. 236), p. 8.

In 1850, as Dutch colonists began to expansively set foot on Borneo land, Chinese traders were forced to move outside the borders of European authority. Those who were still interested in NTFP trade moved further inside the forest via river branches. Others, who lived in lowland river ports and coastal areas, sent their representatives upriver in a large, complex network of trade (Wadley 2005). Chinese taukeh (large merchants) funded these journeys, supplying credit and supplies so that forest products could be transported to towns (Chew 1990). De Vries (in Kaal and Crane 1992) suggests that trade resources between interior Dayak groups and exterior Chinese groups comprised mainly items that coastal people used extensively, with a high demand for honey and beeswax. Export statistics of the Dutch dominions included thousands of dollars' worth of NTFPs, including beeswax (USD 18,048). Chinese traders funneled most of the products downstream and sold them to the Dutch colonies on the shores.

Trade in NTFPs remained a major contributor to the region's economy until the late 19th century. However, the trade slowly began to show signs of change when the Dutch themselves began to process the NTFPs into manufactured goods. These products attracted higher prices than raw NTFPs. As world demand for goods such as timber and rubber increased from the end of the century, much of Borneo represented what Wood (1985:3) has termed a resource frontier, "a relatively unpopulated peripheral region that has natural resources sold on the world market." This transition increasingly entailed a restructuration of the long-established production pattern to one that was structured more by the demands of the world commodity market, mediated through the local state and its agencies (Cleary 1996). To meet these "luxury" product demands, the Dutch started to develop plantation systems all over Borneo.

Dutch colonists introduced the para-rubber tree *(Hevea brasiliensis)* to the Dayaks in the early twentieth century (Dove 1994, 1998), making para-rubber the first cash crop that the Desas knew. The Dutch owned major para-rubber plantations in the Meliau area of West Kalimantan and swiftly expanded into the hinterlands (Semedi and Bakker 2014). One important private Dutch para-rubber plantation company was NV Kapoewas Rubber Maatschappij, established in Meliau in the early 1930s (Semedi and Bakker 2014; Fortin 2011). At the time, NV Kapoewas secured a seventy-five year land lease for 12,257 hectares (Brinkgreve 1947). Although the company was able to develop only 652 hectares of para-rubber plantation by the mid-1940s (Ibid.), NV Kapoewas' land concession formed the foundation for future palm oil plantation development.

Large scale para-rubber cultivation proved to be very lucrative, as it required little labor and fetched a good and stable price, with several major trading booms monthly (Sellato 2005). An official report in 1928 suggested a production in 1926 of 20,000 metric tons from the West side of Borneo, while Southern side and Eastern side of Borneo produced a total of 15,000 tons (Potter 2005). Seeing these booms and the economic gain that it brought, Desa farmers might have become interested in opening their own small scale para-rubber tree plantations, although they didn't have the equipment and chemicals needed to maintain a stable production rate. Those who were beginning to experiment with raising rubber seedlings for their own smallholder plantations had to face hostility from Dutch officials (Ibid.) Desas' own interest in para-rubber plants and the gradually expanding Dutch-owned plantations suggest that the heterogeneous forest areas were beginning to be opened for monoculture cash cropping. Hence, forest trees—including Tapang Madu—were felled in high number to meet the plantation land requirement. Although the Desas had learned of the high economic value of planting para- rubber

trees, they still maintained NTFP trade with the Chinese. Supposedly, during this time Desa farmers' main interest was in shifting to more profitable cash crops rather than participating only in NTFP trade. Arguably, Tapang Madu's economic value began to decrease at this time.

The rise of industrial capitalism in West Kalimantan during the early 20th century commodified the Desas' land. The land began to be perceived as territory in need of appropriation by certain groups of people. The Dutch, who had acquired high political status through fraudulent deals with local elites, provoked interior Dayak groups to stage regular raiding expeditions on neighboring groups' territories. This aggressive strategy was meant to seize land control and to pillage other groups' NTFP resources, as the availability of NTFPs had decreased exponentially.

From the end of the 1960s to the early 1970s, the remotest interior groups started to join the mainstream forest product trade, with timber wood at the forefront. In approximately a decade, logging companies obtained rights to access and use extensive plots of the West Kalimantan forest (Semedi and Bakker 2014). The international demand for high-quality timber was at its peak, and prices soared compared to prices for NTFPs. Since the highest quality timber was located in the Dipterocarps forest deep upriver, interior Dayak groups in turn entered into the timber boom that had been going on for some time downstream by the exterior groups (Peluso 1983). Small amounts of NTFPs were collected during this time and traded at low prices. However, the upriver forest suffered massive damage from logging activities. The Tapang Madu was particularly affected as its high quality timber attracted the most attention, compared to other trees. The thirst for timber peaked in the 1970s, and timber companies established many new infrastructures, such as roads and workshops, to produce and transport timber more efficiently.

As new infrastructures were developed, the Desas witnessed a gradual influx of new consumer goods through the opening of new marketplaces in larger villages. They could now travel between villages more easily and were exposed to new technologies such as radios, motorcycles, and sometimes cars. Timber companies and the Desas were not the only beneficiaries from this development. Christian missionaries also gained advantage from the ease of transportation. New roads meant new access to the innermost Dayak villages which, for the missionaries, were golden opportunities for their conversion mission—a different kind of invasion from what the Dayaks had experienced previously.

[7] Although Christian missionaries experienced accelerated progress in their conversion mission during the 1970s, the introduction of Christianity—Catholicism in particular—to West Borneo actually dates back more than 150 years. It was 1865 when the Jesuit missionary Father de Vries visited Singkawang, a port town by the river Kapuas, to set up pastoral journeys inward to the West Borneo hinterlands with several Catholics of Chinese descent who had settled in the town and commenced trade decades earlier. Over the course of thirty years, Singkawang developed into a permanent base station for resident priests and missionaries who travelled from there to serve other places in West Borneo. These West Borneo missions had to stop in the later 1890s, however, due to a lack of mission personnel, and in the same period, the permanent station in Singkawang was closed. However, a 1903 report relayed that priests and missionaries stationed in Singkawang had accomplished 467 conversion baptism missions to hinterland Dayaks by the time of that closing (Steenbrink 2007). The arrival of Capuchin friars in 1905 signaled a new beginning for the previously ended Jesuit mission. In the first decade of their new mission, the Capuchins redeveloped Singkawang mission station with hopes of reaching even further into the Dayaks'

The Godly Human Engineering

Christian missionaries reached Ne' Gambang village—some fifty miles upriver from Meliau sub-district—where the Desa farmers of concern resided in 1970.[7] The missionaries were never too welcome in this purely Dayak village due to their different skin color and, as perceived by the Dayak farmers, ill intentions. *"[Seperti] hantu!"* (They look like ghosts!) described one old farmer.

This rejection prevented the missionaries from settling in Ne' Gambang village, and instead they had to commute some four miles downriver to Pianggu village where they developed a mission post, church, and school. To ease their mission, the friars used Catholic-converted Pianggu villagers with kin-ties with the Desa farmers at Ne' Gambang to lure the latter into the promises of Catholicism and an agreement to be converted. Although there are no exact records, it apparently took years of mission work to finally get some Ne' Gambang Desa farmers to agree to conversion, and another decade to establish a church in the hills of the village.

Conversion is not an event, rather, it is a generational process (Hefner 1993; Kipp 1995).[8] Theoretically, the introduction of Catholicism and Protestantism to Desa farmers — and eventually their conversion—occurred through several phases. The first phase involved the advent of the external stimulus and the introduction of stress. Protestant missionaries from Pontianak city—the capital of West Kalimantan province—were able to reach Ne' Gambang Village in the early 1990s. Their mission journey was relatively easy compared to that of the friars because a new trans-village mud road built by a palm oil plantation company facilitated their transportation. The Ne' Gambang Dayak farmers were also more receptive to these missionaries because of their past experiences with the Dutch Catholic friars. However, the Protestant denominations making these mission trips changed rapidly. The first of these missionaries, from Gereja Bethel Indonesia (Bethel Church of Indonesia), stopped their once- a-month mission trips after several years. In the early 2000s, Gereja Persatuan Pengabar Injil (Church of United Evangelists) missionaries restarted the Ne' Gambang mission, but they stopped after about two years due to a decision to move their area of focus some six miles downriver to Kunyil Village. At this phase, only a handful of individuals began to transform their pre-existing belief about *jubata*[9]. Unfortunately, it is not recorded whether or not the missionaries used violent force to convert Desa farmers. There are reasons to believe, however, that a small number of people freely agreed to be converted—although possibly unknowingly due to lack of information—and, by doing so, were labeled deviants by other members of their village.

innermost villages. To do so, the friars employed a "moving back strategy"—an approach developed to continuously establish new mission outposts as they moved further inland to the forest (Steenbrink and Aritonang 2008). In 1928 the friars reached Sanggau, the last port town before entering Meliau sub-district. Here, the friars had to race against Methodist missionaries coming from Java and Moslem traders for religious influence over the Dayak who lived beyond the town borders. Eventually, the Methodists had to stop their mission due to their leader's being sent back to the United States. The Moslem traders were able to maintain control of Sanggau through their ability to establish a profitable NTFP trade network between local Dayak groups and Chinese traders in the bigger seaport cities (Daulay 1996). The friars—although able to establish only a small amount of Catholic influence in the town—immediately resumed their mission to move inwards toward Meliau sub-district.

8 Unfortunately, I don't have any exact data to further elaborate the dogmatic differences each mission carried and how were they accepted by the Desas.

In 2004 a reformed church, Gereja Kristen Setia Indonesia (The Church of Faithful Christian Indonesia) sent missionaries to Ne' Gambang. Its mission strategy proved effective. They recruited one Desa farmer, Sengki, and trained him to be a congregational leader. With his kin-ties, Sengki was able to lure other farmers to convert to Protestantism and establish a church across from that of the Catholics. Such was the second phase of conversion. This phase involved ever greater numbers of Desa farmers shifting away from their prior beliefs to begin experimenting with entirely new types of bodily practices, such as changing their dietary pattern, limiting use of intoxicants, prohibiting tattoo-making, and engaging in new sexual practices. Desa farmers also began to embody the concept of sin as constructed by Catholic and Protestant belief systems, rejecting their own pre-existing belief regarding jubata and all other traditional elements related to ancestral worship (see Robbins 2004; Meyer 1999; Keane 2007; Kuipers 1998). All of these shift were reflected in Sengki's statement *"Orang Protestan kan harus semakin maju, orang dulu belum mengerti Yesus, makanya mereka sembah apa yang mereka buat itu kan. Sekarang ya seharusnya kita semua puji Tuhan saja, nenek moyang itu sesat bah"* ([We] Protestants have to be more advanced, our ancestors did not understand Jesus, that's why they worship what they made. Now, we should all praise the Lord, our ancestors were misguided). As more and more farmers came to share Sengki's views and reject their pre- existing belief, the basic coherence of the entire group began to fragment, and people began to accuse one another of being either heathens or traitors.

Aside from following their already converted kin, I think another reason behind the sustainability of Desa farmers' conversion to Catholicism and Protestantism was a perception of the two world religions as forms of progress and modernity—ideas coming from the Java world. Desa farmers' worldview was subject to tension from the introduction of modern technology and information. The state-controlled television stations broadcast many Java productions—with Bahasa Indonesian subtitles—that portrayed a very different way of life from that of Desa farmers.

The third phase involved renewal proper of the new Catholic and Protestant beliefs, or revitalization (Wallace 2003). During this stage, an entirely new set of beliefs and concomitantly a new orientation of social life proper were adopted. Following Wallace's theoretical framework (Ibid.), as an increasing number of people adopted this new set of beliefs, an entirely new culture began to emerge. In the last phase, this new order became normalized and routinized in Desas' daily life, thus completing the conversion and transformation cycle to one filled with new ritual forms and new possibilities for sociality (Vokes 2007). Such is the condition of the Desa farmers today. Conversion to Christianity entailed less of an inward belief and more of a godly-proper practicality. Sundays became a day of worship during which work is prohibited. Another example is a change in the nature of work performed by the farmers. As the missionaries left church operational and maintenance processes to the Desas, funding became a problem due to the fact that most of the Desa farmers were living in a zero to minimum wage. To cover the church's needs, Sengki encouraged plantation work as a way of earning more money and thus contributing more to the church on a monthly basis.

9 For the Desas, Jubata is believed to be the originator, the creator, and the keeper of the universe's life. Jubata is omnipresent—both here and there simultaneously. All Desas' morals are judged by Jubata, and it is to Jubata the Desas' life belongs. The Desas, as well as other Dayak subgroups, have a famous saying "Basengat ka' Jubata," meaning their breath of life is dependent to Jubata. For a more detailed account of Jubata- related Tapang Madu belief, see (Simanjuntak 2018).

Evidently, the mass religious conversion among the Desa farmers was not made possible by the rigorous work of missionaries and priests alone. The New Order Indonesian government (1966-1998) implemented a policy mandating all citizens to carry a personal identification card indicating their religion—a form of human engineering program through godly means (Bertrand 2004; Aragon 2000). Without an identification card, the Desas' access to government institutions—even schools—would be limited. The policy resulted in mass religious conversion in 1965 to the five official religions of the state: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. This rule was made to further identify and blame supporters of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) who were depicted as atheists. Most of the older farmers I met in Ne' Gambang claimed to previously having been scared of the possibility of being convicted as a supporter of the Communist Party 1965, as the state— through military intervention—had killed more than 500,000 convicted Communist Party supporters in an anti-Communist purge in many Indonesian rural areas.

Conversion to Christianity legitimated state-church relationship into a symbiosis that subordinated the Desa farmers. The church legitimated the state by giving it an otherworldly authority, while the state legitimated the church by providing it a construction of the godly-proper with an institutional basis in empirical reality (see Berger 1990). As Weber (2012) and Tawney (1984) suggest, as a result of the state-church dialectic, the religious conversion to Christianity solidified the moral foundation for the final massive land-use change—transition to the palm oil plantation, the fields of God. Working in the plantation is now more than a function of economic accumulation *per se*; rather it is a moral compass of good-ness or bad- ness. This change was the backdrop in which palm oil fetishization came into being. Not only did palm oil bring immense economic gain for Desa farmers, but also it subjugated them, without their realizing it, as their life became fashioned by palm oil market price fluctuations. The history of Desa farmers' dispossession, in which they no longer had control over the mode of production, was complete.

Living with Palm Oil
Third World Cult of the Modern



Fig. 1. The Distribution of Palm Oil Plantation Companies in West Kalimantan in 2006[10]

Palm oil plantations have expanded rapidly in West Kalimantan in the last three decades. One half of palm oil companies in Indonesia are located in the province, as can be seen in the plantation concession map in Figure 1.

By 2005, 152 palm oil companies had been established, covering 3.2 million hectares (BAPPEDA Kalimantan Barat 2006). Within five years, the number of companies rose to 326, covering 4.8 million hectares (Setra 2013), or about one third of West Kalimantan's territory. These numbers will only increase for years, as the West Kalimantan provincial government is planning to expand the land concession for palm oil plantations by five million hectares, resulting in more plantation areas than in any other province in Indonesia. Over two decades, palm oil plantation expansion has played such a huge part in the national economic growth that the national government even participates in international lobbying to other nations to maintain current trade deals.

My research site lies in the Buayan river area, roughly 500 km2 wide and located along the Buayan river and its tributaries, the Melawi and Rosan rivers. The area comprises one third of Meliau sub-district which is 1495.7 km2. In this area, at least 20,443 hectares of previous forest and farmland have been converted to palm oil plantations, with the concessions owned by two private sister companies, PT Harapan Desa (HD) and PT Surya Pratama (SP), as can be seen in figure 2.

Dayak farmers first encountered palm oil trees in the early 1980s. At the time, State Plantation Company (PTPN) XIII in Meliau sub-district, was granted a lease of 5700 hectares of government land to establish a palm oil plantation (PTPN XIII 2008; Colchester et al. 2006; Rufinus et al. 2011). This concession included the former NV Kapoewas land that was nationalized and handed over to Indonesian military-owned NV Agris in 1957. In the 1980s, NV Agris gave its land concession to the PTPN XIII (Semedi and Bakker 2014;



Fig. 2. Palm Oil Fields Distribution in Buayan River Area[11]

[10] Source: Bappeda 2006, Inventarisasi Kegiatan Pemanfaatan Ruang Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, Laporan Final, Bappeda-Kalbar, Pontianak. (Note: red lines show boundaries of existing palm oil plantations, yellow areas are production forest, green areas are protected forest, and red blocks are nature reserves.)

Colchester et al. 2006). For most Dayak farmers, whose ancestors had been living in the area and producing export commodities for hundreds of years, it was the first time they ever encountered palm oil *(Elaeis guineensis)*. Immediately after the plantation's establishment, the state company started offering local Dayak farmers opportunities to work as wage labor. Initially, a large majority of Dayak farmers refrained from plantation work, as they would not have enough time to work on their own fields (Semedi 2014).

However, after nine years of total state-controlled operation, palm oil production in West Kalimantan began to shift to a private sector-oriented operation. In its 1989 report, the World Bank noted that the management capacity of Indonesian state-owned companies was low due to slow financialization to the companies (The World Bank 1989). The World Bank urged the Indonesian government to encourage the establishment of more private companies and let them eventually lead the national palm oil production. The Indonesian government took the report seriously and decided to follow the World Bank's suggestion.

Three years later, in 1992, PT HD and its sister company PT SP established themselves in the Buayan area as a response to the World Bank's encouragement of more private companies and the ever increasing demand for palm oil from both domestic and international markets.[12] These companies were funded by various private sectors nation-wide. The government gave PT HD and PT SP the right to open approximately 39,000 hectares of palm oil plantation as part of their initial establishment plan. However, since the companies did not own any land in the area, the property was obtained from local farmers through land grabbing, or the large scale acquisition of land or land-related rights and resources by the government, to then be sold or leased to corporate entities (Borras et al. 2011; White et al. 2012). The land grabbing in Meliau sub-district—locally known as *serah kebun* (field handover)—was legitimated by government intervention through Agrarian Law No. 30/1960 that classifies Indonesian lands into private and state property. The law mandates that land not privately owned—as proven by land certificates issued by the National Agrarian Ministry—is categorized as state or government land. Due to the inability of most local Dayak farmers to prove their ownership of cultivated land (because of its joint ownership by the village), the government confiscated the farmers' land. Eventually the government leased this government- claimed land to PT HD and PT SP to develop palm oil plantations.

In practice, the land grabbing was made possible by the government's nation-wide regulation for rural land management called Nucleus Estate and Smallholder (NES) scheme, through which palm oil companies receive "free" access to land. Under the NES scheme, a private or state-owned plantation company establishes a nucleus estate and palm oil mill and provides services to surrounding smallholder plantations called "plasma" (Barlow et al. 2003; McCarthy 2010; McCarthy et al. 2012). The scheme was initially designed to centralize the role of private plantation companies in developing the land surrounding

[11] Source: Semedi and Prasetya 2014, Oil Palm versus Rubber: GIS Empirical Check for Land Grabbing in West Kalimantan. (Note: Yellow areas are palm oil plantation land concession owned by PT HD and PT SP, green areas are production forest, and red lines are companies' axis roads.)

[12] It is estimated that in 2010 the total production of palm oil plantations in Meliau sub-district was 20,000–30,000 tons of fresh fruit per month, equivalent to $2,354,000-$3,532,000 of cash. Palm oil produced in Indonesia is used as cooking oil in the domestic market (26%), 73% is exported, and small amounts are used in processed foods, cosmetics and as a biofuel. (1.3%) (Obidzinski et al. 2012).

their nucleus estate. Plantation companies are required to provide input, credit, and technical advice, as well as to collect and process the palm oil fruit (Cramb and McCarthy 2016). Thus, NES can be considered a form of contract farming[13] in which landholders (farmers) forfeit plots of land for the plantation company to develop, receiving a part back to manage.

From the government's point of view, implementation of the NES scheme was a necessary development strategy for improving the socio-economic livelihood of the poor rural population, most of which lived in the outer islands (Cramb and McCarthy 2016; Zen et al. 2016; Mubyarto 1992). The government perceived the Dayak farmers in West Kalimantan, in particular, as people living in severe poverty and exposed to devastating environmental problems, as most of their area was covered by the economically useless creeping grass *alang- alang (Imperata cylindrica)*—a "Third World Cult of the Modern" deemed to be less developed (Taussig 1987a; Tsing 1993). The government viewed this open area as the legacy of deforestation by timber companies and illegal loggers in the early 1990s, and of clearing for the purpose of food crop cultivation in transmigration schemes (Dove 1986). The frequent burning of both alang-alang and useless timber during the dry season posed an environmental hazard through smoke and haze which damaged the health of residents (Zen et al. 2016).

By arguing that such land had been degraded and was not suitable for use as a reserve forest or protected area (Hall 2013), the government justified the need to re-utilize the land for palm oil cultivation, transforming it into an area of extractive practices (Tsing 2003, 2005; Eilenberg 2014; Peluso 2017; Peluso and Lund 2011) which would bring rapid economic growth for West Kalimantan. With this justification, the state issued 25-30 year lease titles *(Hak Guna Usaha)* for new plantations. I suspect the government's inclination toward continuing the NES scheme was inseparable from the World Bank's insistence on "creating a dynamic partnership between private capital and smallholders …[to encourage] technology transfer, innovation, and market growth" (Baumann 2000).

In the mid-1990s, the NES scheme required farmers to forfeit 7.5 hectares of their land to the government. Ideally, farmers would get back 2 hectares of land for plasma fields, while the nucleus estate would retain 5 hectares. Infrastructures such as roads and mill facilities would be developed on the remaining 0.5 hectares.[14] During the first four years, a plantation company engaged in the NES scheme would have to clear the plasma land, plant the palm oil tree crop, and handle administrative matters regarding the field development while maintaining the growth of its own nucleus estate. Smallholder farmers were required to reimburse the plantation company for every service it provided to set up the plasma field during the four years, through deductions from their monthly income from selling the harvested fruit (Gaiser 2009). The program was termed "Interest During Construction" (IDC),[15] reflecting the farmers' obligation to pay interest as well. According

[13] On the national level, the government adopted this form of land scheme from the 1970s (termed Perkebunan Inti rakyat or PIR) and formed a key part of its transmigration program (PIR/Trans) from the mid-1980s, often with financial support from the World Bank.

[14] Point 5 of Sanggau district head (Bupati) Decree No. 525.26/647/Disbun/1996.

[15] The IDC consists of five cost categories: processing (including general production payment, mill staff salaries and allowances, direct production cost, maintenance, and packaging), marketing, transportation to the harbor, factory depreciation, and indirect operation costs. (Gillespie 2011)

[16] Regulation Number 33/Permentan/OT/140/7/2006 and Finance Regulation Number 117/PMK/Kpts/1/2007.

to the national regulation on plantation revitalization,[16] smallholder farmers had to pay 15.5% per hectare developed, which amounted to roughly Rp. 24,980,000 (equivalent to $1,764). After the four years, it would be up to the smallholder farmers' cooperative to administer the entire plasma development and decide whether or not to continue the contract with the plantation company (Zen et al. 2016).

When Suharto, the then president of the New Order regime, announced that 2000 would be the year when Indonesia would *"tinggal landas"* (take off) economically, his statement helped heighten the Desa farmers' expectations and anxieties about the new millennium. They began to hear rumors of new plantation companies being built close to their villages, new job opportunities, and the amount of money flowing into their area. Yet at the same time, they realized the possibility of losing their land, as it slowly trickled out of their hands and into the grip of these companies. In the Buayan river area, development seemed to be perennially on the threshold—always about to come. The future not only was characterized by economic progress and technological advancement but also implied a new society (Bubandt 1998, 2015; Tsing 2015), one composed of development-oriented people who had voluntarily moved out from their underdevelopedness.

From the 2000s onwards, the government continued to fully support the rapid plantation expansion into the depths of Desa farmers' forest territory. As exemplified in the words of the former Indonesian minister of agriculture Bungaran Saragih, "the agribusiness system approach is chosen … primarily to protect, facilitate, and promote our small family farmers' better livelihood along with their fellow landless laborers. Since the beginning, our primary intention is to uplift the well-being of the poorest segment of our country … the majority of our people" (Bissonnette 2013). The government has maintained the decade-long economic development rhetoric, positioning Desa farmers as a vulnerable society in need of saving through plantation intervention.

Struggles of the New

The new society that the New Order regime imagined turned out to be hard to achieve. It was not easy to convince the Desas to believe themselves to be underdeveloped, let alone to welcome palm oil plantation companies into their territory. However, their attitude towards this "inevitable" expansion has changed over time.

Regardless of the farmers' rejection of the development of PT HD and PT SP, by the early 2000s the two companies had succeeded in establishing their combined plantation of 12,000 hectares. Two decades into their operation, the companies together were able to establish some 20,000 hectares, or 53% of their initial plan. They utilized a number of strategies to implement their business, both soft and hard campaigns. The soft campaign included at least two actions. First, companies raised local farmers' interest in participating in the plantation expansion through presenting a calculation of risks and benefits, citing high prices that the palm oil fruit could be sold for, in sessions called *sosialisasi* (socialization). As many Desa farmers said, during such *sosialisasi,* companies' representatives often promised development in the form of public infrastructures (i.e., roads, schools, clinics, and churches) which often failed to be met (Marti 2008). Of course, the representatives were doing no more than selling dreams and promises of instantaneous wealth to the farmers, while harboring the farmers' belief that they would remain the owners of their own land. Second, companies hired village heads to encourage farmers to join the plantation projects while also bribing authoritative local officials to award expansion permits (Marti 2008; McCarthy and Zen 2009). Both actions proved to

be somewhat successful.

The realization of their lands' being expropriated and themselves being cheated impelled Desa farmers to employ subtle resistance techniques, described by Scott (1990) as "infra-politics," against the plantation companies. Some farmers were willing to sell their land and not join the crop conversion project. Others set up their own plantation, even though doing so was not permitted (Forest Peoples' Program 2005). Still others combined their plantation work[17] with swidden farming. Such subtle subversions were overpowered by the companies through hard campaigns which involved police and military backed intimidations as well an outright takeover (Potter 2008). Farmers resisted by blocking plantation roads, damaging company infrastructures, and even taking up arms. Nonetheless, slowly but surely, Desa farmers began to realize the inevitability of the plantation expansion into the depths of their primary forest.

Yet, as I witnessed in the research field, participation in palm oil plantation work has brought local Desa farmers immense economic gain through more stable and continuous cash revenue. In 2010, the entire Buayan area received approximately Rp. 21,000,000,000 of gross revenue (equivalent to $1,484,300) from palm oil alone, which was distributed among 30 hamlets (Semedi 2014; Semedi and Bakker 2014). According to several farmers, life today is better than ever, as they have a dependable source of income which opens up new opportunities to markets and other public facilities in town. Thanks to the palm oil money, farmers can now buy motorcycles, modern house appliances, and the latest model of mobile phone and laptop; they can also afford to renovate their houses. Some farmers even manage to buy trucks to start a transportation business. Farmers do recognize the destructive impact that the plantation development has brought, but they choose to focus more on the economic gain.

Fig. 3. West Kalimantan Palm Oil Plantation Expansion[18]

[17] Plantations employed smallholders as laborers until their holdings became productive, after which they had to repay the cost of land preparation and credit for fertilizer and other inputs.

To maintain such a comfortable living condition, Desa farmers are becoming less and less hesitant to sell their remaining land to plantation companies. Those who have enough funds buy others' plasma fields and open their own small-scale estate of 5 hectares. During my first field visit in 2014, selling plasma land to investors from urban areas such as Pontianak, Ngabang, and Tayan city became common. Desa farmers whom I met in several villages said that they had sold their remaining plasma fields to urban investors who usually own a "mini palm oil estate" concession of 20–100 hectares.[19] Farmers are aware of the social and cultural costs of the plantation, but they no longer resist the presence of PT HD and PT SP. As one farmer said, *"lahan Klemantan ni' masih luas, masih bisa buat sawit banyak gi!"* (Kalimantan's land is still widely available, [we can still use it] for more palm oil!). Even more, the selling price of para-rubber has been dropping gradually since 2002, prompting the Desa farmers to pause their rubber farming activities and focus more on their palm oil plantation work. It seems that for Desa farmers, bureaucratic processes and economic pressure lead to a more flexible landscape which eventually provides a structure to their territory-making and re- making process. What was once a "trial and error" crop has turned into a dominant element of the Desa's ecological landscape, gradually replacing pre-existing territorial regimentation of their land.[20]

Unlike earlier forms of organization, which joined farmers into direct relationships for production and exchange (often predicated on their control over the means of production), the market has interposed itself between farmers, mediating direct awareness of social relations by the abstract laws of relationships between commodities (Taussig 1980). In a plantation- dominated life, Desa farmers do not directly relate with one another. This leads to a rise of different social spheres (Habermas 1993) where farmers interact differently depending on the rise or fall of palm oil prices. In 2014, a kilogram of newly harvested palm oil fruit (FFB) was priced at Rp. 1,778. Desa farmers were enthusiastic with the high price, and talk of purchasing new plots of land was common. They joined farmers from other villages in week-long parties and feasts. Yet, in 2018, when FFB price fell to Rp. 1,578, I never heard any talk among the farmers other than complaints and frustration whenever they would gather in one of their houses after work.

The farmers' gratitude over plantation expansion cannot be separated from the promise of salvation that the church has promoted. Preachers believe that salvation can be achieved only through the extinction of elements viewed as traditional (Keane 2007; Schiller 1997; Robbins 2004). Hence, radical sermons that invoke people to leave behind their traditional elements—such as ritual practices and dietary choices—are held repetitively. Moreover, because the missionaries have perceived the Desas as sinful due to ancestral and current "heathen" practices, the Desas have been told to modernize themselves to be more like urbanites. One way to achieve modernity is to work in the palm oil plantations.

The new income gained from working as paid labor on the plantations, paired with

[18] Source: Greenpeace,org.

[19] Desa farmers have told me that they know several urban investors who own more than 300 hectares of "mini palm oil estate."

[20] For a more detailed account of the Desa and other Dayak subgroups' traditional territorial regime, see (De Vos 2016; Peluso 1996; Peluso, Vandergeest, and Potter 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Padoch and Peluso 1996; Wadley 2003; Wadley and Colfer 2004; Padoch, Harwell, and Susanto 1998; Dove 1998, 1993; Harwell 2010; De Vos 2016)

institutionalized loan sharking through credit unions[21] (CU) and a large influx of "Western" commodities to local markets, have led Desa farmers to disproportionate material desires and consumption, without mechanisms to channel their wealth into savings. For the farmers, modern media—TV, radio, cell phones, etc.—structured their perception of reality in advance and rendered reality indistinguishable from the "aestheticized" image of it (Debord 2012). When asked why a young farmer bought a sports motorcycle/bike, he answered *"[Karena] keren! Kayak di TV!"* ([Because it is] cool! Just like on TV). At first glance, this phenomenon might not be any different from other modern societies' model of consumption. The problem, however, is that the farmers' excessive consumption of modern appliances is not supported by properly working apparatuses. They routinely endure failing rural electrification, bad signal reception, unpaved roads, high gas prices, and similar problems in infrastructures.

Another example of a secularizing influence is the bulldozer, introduced in 1992, used to create logging roads through the rainforest. That the bulldozer operator could fell trees and clear land without first consulting *jubata* (the one most powerful spiritual being), getting *jubata's* permission, or observing any omens, was, on one side, a challenge to Desa farmers' traditional belief system; yet on the other side, it stimulated awe regarding the efficiency and "Westernized" value that it represented.

Indeed palm oil plantations were organized to further alienate the Desa from the things they produce. Yet, such alienation—which comes with cloned palm oil tree stock, coerced labor, conquered and thus open land—lead to unprecedented profits for the farmers, economy- wise and belief-wise. Once central mill operations were started, all operations had to run on the time frame of the mill—farmers' lives are fashioned by palm oil production, which in turn contributes to the survival of palm oil plantations (Tsing 2015; Thompson 1959). In other words, Desa farmers and their palm oil plantations are entangled in a symbiosis that goes beyond economic growth *per se*. Nowadays, such symbiosis shapes the dream of the Desa and the Indonesian state, although previously their dreams were not in line with each other. Notably what both call progress and modernity is characterized by continuous capitalist development.

Such was the condition when I encountered the Desa farmers. Rows of palm oil trees neatly lined the muddy trans-village road. Farmers efficiently planted one tree after another to minimize—even eliminating—unproductive gaps between them. They did all

[21] According to Kawai and Inoue (Kawai and Inoue 2011) the Credit Union (CU) institution was introduced into Indonesia in 1970. CU financial cooperatives are categorized as semi-formal financial institutions because both are regulated by cooperative law in Indonesia. Originally, CUs were spread by small entrepreneurs in urban areas and small farmers in rural areas on their own initiative, as a cooperative movement to cope with the threats posed by large capitalists and loan sharks. The two main principals wereself-help and self-governance. After the end of the ORBA regime and the emergence of the Reformation regime, CUs were free to organize and carry out education in both urban and rural areas. From that time, CU activists begin to nurture the seeds of CU activities throughout Indonesia (CUCO 2011a.) In 2009, there were 47 CUs that served398,190 people in Kalimantan (CUCO 2011b.) Today, there are at least 51 CUs in West Kalimantan alone that serve 800,000 people (Source: pontianakpost.co.id.) In the Meliau area, the development of CUs is well supported by Catholic and Protestant churches, with some of the congregation leaders appointed as CU advisors. Most Desa farmers take out loans to pay primarily for their daily needs, including their children's school tuition, chemicals for their plantation work, and repair of their broken motorcycles.

of this work while envisioning how tall the trees and how long the leaves would grow in the next four to five years when all their labor would come to fruition. Although most of the fields were not their own, working intimately with the palm oil trees had provoked their imagination of emerging wealth—that having more palm trees was and would always be better. This belief is why farmers utilize the smallest amount of open space they have, even the slightest gap between their houses, to plant palm oil trees. In Buayan river area, Desa farmers boast not about the size of their smallholder plantation land but about their quantity of palm oil trees and the profit they will get. In fact, during my fieldwork, this topic was the only one I heard farmers talk about in their daily social spheres. A magic of capitalist accumulation is at work here, invoking farmers' imagination of possibilities, thus driving them for more and more palm oil trees.

Fetishizing the Palm Tree

The Capitalistic Desire

As more palm oil is produced, it is as if the very quality of wanting more gets "caught up" in it, constantly changing the farmers' drive to grow palm trees and expand their fields. Desa farmers' appetite for palm oil—possessing it and being possessed by it, greed and fancy— emerges within a material dialectic between their sensory routines and the "objects." In return, a new imagination surrounding palm oil agribusiness emerges, as if it is trying to veil and protect the continuation of production. The continued conversation between Yami, Victor, and their son Secung on a strikingly hot day in Ne'Gambang in 2016 highlights this process:

Secung had just returned home from work. All of the sudden, his mother became angry.

Yami: K*enopay nda' kerja perusaha ko tu?* (Why don't you work at the plantation company?)

Secung: *lebih untung ngereke' bah ma', banyak duit tu bah* (It's more profitable to work in the gold mines mom, there's a lot of money there)

Yami: *Gila ana' tu ngereke' terus dia, nda' kerja perusaha! Kerja ja sama Semon!* (That kid is crazy, [he] only works in the gold mine, not at the plantation company! Go work with Semon!)

Victor: *ada pilihan opay gi'? kerja di perusaha tu pilihan terbai' nyaman bah! Sawit mensejahterakan kita am."* (What other options are there? Plantation work is the best option, it's good! Palm oil enrich us.)

Secung was correct, (illegally) working in the gold mine is more profitable than plantation work. On a daily basis, if he is lucky enough and willing to work from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m., Secung could return home with one gram of gold, priced at Rp. 420,000 per gram (equivalent to $29.60). There were weeks when Secung was able to bring home three to six grams of gold—a considerably high weekly income. Yet Yami and Victor's response indicated the direct opposite desire. They wanted Secung to work in the plantation just like his brother Semon. However, plantation work, as described by Semon, was less profitable than gold mining. After a month of contract farming, Semon was paid Rp. 1,000,000 (equivalent to $70.50) from which 60% was deducted to repay his debt to the farmers' cooperative for "operational cost." In the end, Semon was able to bring back only Rp. 400,000 (equivalent to $28.2). He lamented, *"Stress bah, apalagi karena sudah berkeluarga. Makin banya'*

pengeluaran. Dudung bah nda' pernah minta kue macam-macam, tapi aku kan nda' tega" ([It's] stressful, moreover because I have a family. The expense is even bigger. [My son] never asked for food or anything, but I don't have the heart [to not spoil him]). If Yami and Victor's consideration to have Secung work in the plantation were for an economic reason per se, they certainly were not correct, let alone calling him crazy for working in a more profitable sector.

Victor's statement about plantation work's being the single best option is the imagination veiling the palm oil agribusiness. Other Desa farmers shared the same belief, that for them accumulation of wealth could be achieved only through plantation work alone. Indeed, historical reasons might contribute to the reason that plantation work became the best option for the farmers—for example, profitless modern NTFP trade, gradually declining para-rubber price, and massive land conversion to palm oil plantations. However, for the plantation work to gain a certain quality—a "good-ness" as Victor puts it—that drives the Desa farmers to work only in the plantation, shows how palm oil trees, to some extent, may produce values of their own. In turn, this value might triumph Desa farmers' reasons—if there are any—not to work in the palm oil plantation.

I suggest that such a value, a "good-ness," is the product of the magic of capitalist accumulation. The magic itself is desire, an interminable becoming-more without being, an on- going process of becoming that is the becoming of reality anchored in the act of collective palm oil production (Deleuze and Guattari 2004; Lazzarato 2017). In a capitalist mode of production, desire can be understood as a proliferation of possibilities that comes with a continuous production of commodities. To satisfy the desire, every day the Desa farmers would have to consume palm oil trees and produce palm oil even more than the day before. Yet concurrent with the emerging possibilities that palm oil brings (i.e. power, growth, and expansion) is the impossibility of production: satisfaction. Desire—posited as synonymous with production— endlessly explores reality for a satisfaction that is never forthcoming. Hence, palm oil production is an inherently paradoxical process—it satisfies and dissatisfies desire at the same time.

The Fetishistic Reality

The Desa farmers' reality is characterized by a lack of satisfaction over a capitalistic palm oil production. *"Lebih banya' lebih bai'!"* (More is better!) one farmer said eerily to another after a day of laboring for one and a half tons of palm oil fruits. Indeed the farmers feel the irony in their own work, as is apparent in their remark *"nda' habis-habis bah"* (it never ends), referring to the abundance of palm oil trees to be harvested. The notion of lack presumes a dialectic production relationship in the farmers' daily life, with dissatisfaction as one of its elements, producing an everydayness that they perceive as somewhat natural. As I observed, resistance on various scales, from questioning to rejecting to subverting, against this everydayness is relatively rare.

Yet the reality of "lack" is never directly itself. It presents itself to the Desa farmers through a symbolic cosmology of figurative embodiments of horror-excess that both promotes and threatens the integrity of palm oil production. It is two sides of the same coin—the god in the form of palm oil fetishism worship and the devil in the form of an eight-legged black dog phantom (Lacan 2006; Fink 1997; Žižek 1994b; Graeber 2002).

The church is the proper place for the "mystical" confrontation between god and the devil. Because the palm oil commodity provides the necessary fetishistic supplement to the

"official" spirituality, it may well be that the "official" belief of the modern Desa farmers is Christian spirituality, but its actual foundation is, nonetheless, the fetishism of the palm oil.

However, this is not to say that palm oil fetishism replaces Christianity. The fetish is as crucial to the operation of industrial capitalism as are beliefs in the divinity of sovereigns to tribute- based agricultural communities. In short, there is no "pure" spirituality separate from the obscene realm of the mystified matter. Indeed, although the sensuous object—the palm oil tree—exist apart from the farmers, the supra sensible object form of the commodity—the god form—exist intimately within them. One Sunday church sermon in 2016 highlights this production dialectic.

After his sermon, the priest stepped down to the altar, stood aside a young palm oil tree that was about to be planted, and asked the congregation to pray.

Priest: *"Mari kita berdoa ke sawit, minta' ja' agar dia tu banya' buahnya bah. Supaya banya' hasil, kita ni sejahtera. Kan nyaman kalo rumah nanti diperbai', sekola ana' bah."*
(Let us pray to the palm oil tree, let us ask that it produces many fruits. So that our harvest would be abundant, we will be prosperous. It would be good if we can repair our houses, for our kids' education [fee])

The priest then continued with the prayer, and the congregation followed it in their hearts.

Such abstraction of the palm oil tree, materialized through the act of worship is an attitude that shows itself to be deeply mystical (Taussig 1980; Mulhern 2007). Due to losing their original connection to social life as new social organization is created, Desa farmers think of these abstractions of commodities as animate entities with a life of their own, akin to spirits or gods. For this reason, what was once a product of the interrelations of persons is no longer seen as such. Instead, these animated entities are perceived to be things that stand over, control, and to some extent may produce values of their own. The palm oil trees are exalted and thereby transcend their sensuous environment, into one that is supra sensible. Desa farmers end up treating their own creations as if these creations have power over them; farmers fall down and worship those very commodities which they have produced (Graeber 2005; Stallybrass 1998; Ellen 1988).

In the dialectic of production, worshipping the palm oil tree becomes a way to deny the intrinsic dissatisfaction of desire, effectively calling the Desa farmers' desire to a standstill. By worshiping the palm oil tree, farmers understand the peril of possible production depletion and are driven to produce more. Less production, and thus less income, would lead to real social life problems. More importantly, less production would be problematic for their desire over lack. In other words, the Desa farmers "are the offspring of [their own] work" (Latour 2010). The tendency to produce more is not only a characteristic of the capitalist market; it also becomes the farmers' attitude towards their own production model.

The confession of Mak Sengki and Mak Orin, two Desa farmers, during one church sermon provides an insight about the Desas' eight-legged black dog phantom, or the devil.

The priest has invited anybody from the congregation to confess their sins. Immediately Mak Sengki stepped up, followed by Mak Orin.

Mak Sengki: *"Kemarin saya dicobai sakit ketika meladang sawit. Ada hantu anjing hitam bah! Ini teguran Tuhan karena sudah dua minggu saya tida' bersa'si. Jadi sebagai ana' Tuhan, bai'lah kita bersa'si setida'nya dua minggu sekali."*
(Yesterday I was tested by illness during plantation work. There is a black dog phantom! This is God's warning because I have not confessed my sin for two weeks. As God's children, we have to confess our sins at least once every two weeks.)

Mak Orin: *"Kemarin hantu anjing hitam kembali menggoda Ogen di ladang. Langsung ia datang ke rumah dan minta berdoa sama aku. Anjing itu roh jahat. Mohon doanya dari semuanya agar ta' terjadi agi. Cucu kamek, kiting, juga sering sakit."*
(Yesterday at the plantation, a black dog phantom bedeviled Ogen. She immediately returned back home and asked to pray with me. That dog is the devil. I ask for your prayers so this will never happen again. Our grandson Kiting is frequently sick [because of the black dog phantom])
The congregation went silent in fear. Koci, the village elder, stepped up to the altar and tried to calm the people.

Koci: *"Anjing hitam itu kuasa setan yang sering ganggu ana' Tuhan. Kita doa untu' usir setan itu!"* (That black dog is the devil who frequently haunts us, children of God. Let us pray to drive out that devil!)



Fig. 4. Painting of the Eight-legged Black Dog Phantoms Surrounding a Palm Oil Tree in One Farmer's House.

The Desa farmers believe that the devil lurks in their plantation field, threatening the plantation's productivity. The priest told them to run for safety if they spot the devil, albeit with the consequence of getting cursed (usually in the form of illness). However, the priest reassured them that if they were ever trapped and cornered by the devil, they should take up their "Godly war equipment."[22] Thus far, however, farmers have told me more stories of fleeing from the devil and getting cursed compared to directly fighting it.

Whether or not the devil materially exists is a matter of no importance for me. The fact is, the very notion—or rather the symbol—of the devil haunts the Desa farmers during and after plantation work, day and night. The devil is that which is neither present, nor absent,

neither dead nor alive, arriving from the past and appearing in the present (Derrida 1994). I cannot say, however, that the devil haunting the Desas belongs to the past, nor that the devil- belief belongs to the present, as I have no data on the topic of the devil's origin. Yet the appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of the devil in the farmers' daily life renders temporality paradoxical—it appears in a fractured timespace (Buse and Stott 1999). Almost every week during fieldwork, I would see a group of farmers scrambling around the Ne' Gambang village, looking for a shaman to cure one of their friends from the devil's curse.

The devil's paradoxical temporality resonates with Secung's story of "lack," to the extent that I suggest it is the symbolic reflection of the lack. The naturalness in how farmers live their "today," is not a simple matter. In fact, they were never simply given the present moment (Deleuze 1990, 2004); rather, the "lack" synthesizes and thereby retains the past within the present which in turn creates an expectation of a time beyond this present, namely the future. Expectation of the future is at the epicenter of palm oil production. The desire to fulfill the "lack" of palm oil satisfaction through continuous production is challenged by the devil's presence. As taught by the priest, the devil must be avoided or defeated.

What then might the devil represent? I suggest that the devil is an empty representation of total production satisfaction—the other element of the dialectic of production that is impossible to reach and therefore should be maintained in order for production to keep on going. In a Derridean sense, the devil is of aporetic character; it is in itself empty due to its non-origin and non-substantiality, yet painful and troubling if experienced by the farmers (Derrida 1993; Berns 2004). The farmers' physical sensations of experiencing the devil might as well have other plausible explanations. However there are no neutral, objective explanation of human experience that supersedes the perceiver's supra sensible biases or their culturally and historically specific assumptions about what is valuable, about what or who is in charge of their lives (Matory 2018)—palm oil trees.

In the end, I agree with Krips (1999) that the fetish is pleasurable/worship-able precisely insofar as it prevents the subject—in this case, the farmers—from reaching its total desire, total palm oil production satisfaction. It is exactly the impossibility of the satiable that supports the Desa farmers' fetishistic every day. By placing the palm oil tree between the Desa farmers and the emptiness of pure desire, farmers avoid both their own dissatisfaction over stagnant or even declining production and confrontation with desire's impossible production satisfaction. In between the grip of dissatisfaction and satisfaction, lies the ambivalent capitalist social reality of the Desa farmers—to produce more but never too much so that the "production gap" is maintained.

[22] The "Godly war equipment" that the priest spoke about refers to a scripture from the bible, taken from Ephesians 6:10-17. " [10] Finally, be strong in the Lord and in his mighty power. [11] Put on the full armor of God, so that you can take your stand against the devil's schemes. [12] For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms. 13 Therefore put on the full armor of God, so that when the day of evil comes, you may be able to stand your ground, and after you have done everything, to stand. 14 Stand firm then, with the belt of truth buckled around your waist, with the breastplate of righteousness in place, 15 and with your feet fitted with the readiness that comes from the gospel of peace. 16 In addition to all this, take up the shield of faith, with which you can extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one. 17 Take the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." (NIV)

Conclusion

The Desa farmers' experience with agrarian transformation to palm oil plantation is as much metaphysical as it is biophysical. In the structure of the commodity form, the palm oil tree, it is possible to find the metaphysical subject. Yet to discover the god within the commodity, one first must go through the history that led it into becoming an object of high value. Such god—the supra sensible and worshipped subject—is a product of subjugation of the farmers' cognate mind to the commodity produced through different modes of production. The subjugation-domination relation between palm oil trees and the Desa farmers, is the principle of commodity fetishism. Concurrently, it is important to be sensitive towards the godly subject's—the Desa farmers'—reaction toward such change.

In this paper, I have shown how thinking of the godly subject within the palm oil tree as a commodity fetishism is productive for illuminating the workings of a mystifying capitalistic belief in a farmer community living in a resource frontier area. Understanding such belief can clarify how farmers perceive and make sense of the capitalistic relations that have subjugated their life under an alien mode of production. Following Feuerbach's famous saying that truth is profane, while its' obscurity is sacred (Feuerbach 1881), I suggest the importance to focus not only on the materiality of capitalism but also on its cognitive immateriality, not only on the sensuous commodity but also its transfigured supra sensible god-form. After all, the "making-sense" strategy that I am concerned with in this paper—and aim to further pursue—Is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the critical mind of the farmers.

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The 2019 Arryman Symposium

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Cultivating Pembangunan: Rice and the Intellectual History of Agricultural Development in Indonesia, 1945-65[1]

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Abstract

Indonesia had dealt with the problem of rice related to economic recovery and development since the declaration of independence in 1945. This paper traces the process of understanding rice during the first twenty years of independent Indonesia which created various meanings of *pembangunan* (development). I argue that this process of understanding rice made possible for Indonesia's leaders, intellectual, and policymakers to cultivate *pembangunan* (development), moulding a condition for the seeds of the idea to grow. By understanding rice as an instrument for independence, a part of economic contestation, an object of scientific and technological intervention, and an ideal picture of society, *pembangunan* became a versatile and adaptable idea, both definitive and obscure. Because of such characteristics, *pembangunan* idea represented a shifting concept that slowly became integrated into the narrative of New Order economic change.

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Introduction

In 1969, Soeharto, the second president of Indonesia, attended a ceremony in Jakarta to start the Five-Year Development Plan I (REPELITA I, 1969-74). The first agenda of REPELITA I was to increase food production by intensifying rice yields, targeted at a forty-six percent increase.[2] The ceremony marked the beginning of the developmental programs taken by the New Order regime. Sixteen years later, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) based in Rome celebrated an achievement of Indonesian development: rice self-sufficiency. During a commemoration of the FAO founding, Soeharto proudly shared the success story of Indonesian agriculture and even announced that Indonesia would donate 100,000 tons of unmilled rice to countries in Africa.[3] The Director-General of the FAO, Edouard Saouma, presented the president with a gold medal featuring a picture of Soeharto and his name on one side and a picture of a farmer planting rice, with the inscription "From Rice Importer to Self-sufficiency" on the other.[4] Saouma said that Soeharto was the symbol of international agricultural development.[5] As the image of rice became identical with that of the president, rice became central to the narrative of New Order agricultural development.

The association between rice and economic development was neither a sudden nor even a novel invention of the New Order. Indonesia had dealt with the problem of rice related to economic recovery and development since the declaration of independence in 1945.[6] But why did the New Order development put rice at the centre of its development narrative? How was rice previously understood and conceptualized such that the New Order regime could continue a narrative around it? What can rice tell us about the course of development thinking in independent Indonesia?

In this paper, I argue that the combination of ways of understanding rice during the first twenty years of independent Indonesia made possible for Indonesia's leaders, intellectual, and policymakers to cultivate *pembangunan* (development), moulding a condition for the seeds of the idea to grow. By understanding rice as an instrument for independence, a part of economic contestation, an object of scientific and technological intervention, and an ideal picture of society, *pembangunan* became a versatile and adaptable idea, both definitive and obscure. Because of such characteristics, *pembangunan* idea represented a shifting concept that slowly became integrated into the narrative of New Order economic change.

The importance of rice in this study revolves around the aspects of the economy, social change, and ideology. *Oryza sativa*, the domesticated rice species, has long been a dominant food staple and agricultural product in Southeast Asia. By the fifteenth century, rice was the preferred crop in the region, and by the sixteenth century people all across Southeast Asia had practiced "shifting cultivation on low slopes; broadcasting seed on a floodplain; and transplanting seedling into a ploughed and bunded field."[7] By the early

2 K. H. Ramadhan and G. Dwipayana, Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, Dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 238-299; Indonesia, "Rentjana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, 1969/70-1973/74," (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I., 1969), 28.

3 Robert Elson, Soeharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 235.

4 Taufik Abdullah, Indonesia: Towards Democracy (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 429.

5 K. H. Ramadhan and G. Dwipayana, 4.

6 Tuong Vu, "Of Rice and Revolution: The Politics of Provisioning and State–Society Relations on Java, 1945–49," South East Asia Research 11, no. 3 (2003): 237-67.

1800s, rice accounted for about 65 percent of Java's per capita calorie supply.[8] Indeed, rice yields since the early 1900s experienced ups and downs. From the period 1895 to 1930, an increasing number of farm households in Java started to cultivate upland fields with non-rice food crops. Nonetheless, rice remained attractive for farm households because, despite the greater amounts of required labor, its cultivation was a more profitable use of land.[9] In Java alone, by the late 1930s, rice occupied 68 percent of the cropped area in the western part of the island, 45 percent in the central part, and 28 percent in the eastern part.[10]

On the social aspect, historians have discussed how the societal adaptation and cultural environment of the region shaped the ecological relationships between human and rice, including the social transitions and changes of the society.[11] The "ecosystem of rice" explains not only the encounter of the rice societies with the wider market economy but also their responses which changed the patterns of agrarian production.[12] The socioeconomic studies on rice provide an important account to understand not only societies and their transformation across time, but also the character of rice and its environment which makes it appealing for humans to cultivate it.[13]

Moreover, rice offers a material basis for the construction of ideology. For example, in the case of Japan from 1870 to 1940, Japanese intellectuals responded diversely to the rural condition of wet-rice agriculture and the modernization of rural society. Their responses further developed into "something of a silent partner" of ultra-nationalism during the Second World War.[14] The ideology of "agrarian nationalism" provided not only clarification for the Japanese agrarianism during the transition from the Meiji restoration to the wartime period, but also offered a moral compass for collective self-identification in which agriculture was the "common denominator of the Japanese as a people."[15] As intellectuals perceived and understood rice as the economic and cultural backbone of people's livelihood, rice was essential in the survival of a nation.

By considering this importance of rice, this paper offers a historical narrative to engage with the discussion of *pembangunan*. On the one hand, a political-economy approach

7 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), 19.

8 Pierre Van Der Eng, "Food for Growth: Trends in Indonesia's Food Supply, 1880–1995," Journal of Interdisciplinary History XXX, no. 4 (2000): 598.

9 van Der Eng makes the interpretation that farm households cultivated and sold rice to access cheaper food and increase cash surplus. Ibid., 176.

10 Vernon D. Wickizer and Merrill K. Bennett, The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia (California: Food Research Institute, 1941), 34.

11 Lucien M. Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1972), 69- 163.

12 Ibid., 2; Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852- 1941 (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011 [1974]).

13 See also Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Francesca Bray et al., eds., Rice: Global Networks and New Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

14 Thomas R. Havens, Farm and Nation in Modern Japan: Agrarian Nationalism, 1870-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 320.

15 Ibid., 317-18.

offers a seemingly linear historical transition of Indonesia's development policy. For example, political-economy scholar Ian Chalmers periodizes Indonesia's development policy in 1945- 65 into three phases: the period of populist development (1940-50); the era of burgeoning economic nationalism and the recourse to statism (1950-58); and finally, the advent of an authoritarian political system of the guided economy (1959-65).[16]

On the other hand, a semantic approach portrays Indonesia's development as a problem of language operation. *"Pembangunan"* is a noun rooted in a verb "bangun" which has two meanings. The first one relates to the activity of construction (building/houses/bridges, etc.); and the second one relates to the "activity of changing something or to a person changing from a state of sleeping/lying down/unconsciousness to becoming awakened."[17] *Pembangunan* in the pre-New Order era arguably had different meanings to development; *pembangunan* meant "to arouse national consciousness; to bring about an independent Indonesia; and to *modernize [memperbaharui]* the way of life of a society which had formerly been colonized."[18] During the New Order, the word *"pembangunan"* semantically inclined to the more economic meaning which bore an ideological burden.[19] Heryanto argues that the growth of the system of meaning given to the word *"pembangunan"* is planned and controlled by the wielders of authority, which makes the word an important product of the development process and a core element for development practice.[20]

Both frames, however, omit the process of the making of development as an idea. They appear to assume that the dynamic of *pembangunan* was a given and then jump to its political trajectory and semantic contradiction. This paper aims to contribute to the discussion by showing the historical contingency of *pembangunan* idea. Instead of discussing the different and shifting meanings of *pembangunan*, I focus more on the way intellectuals created and negotiated the idea based on rice problems.

Additionally, this study also engages with the Indonesian historiography of the 1950s and early 1960s. Historians have portrayed the first twenty years of Indonesia's independence as a period of either economic failure or political tension due to ideological conflict among national leaders and groups. For economic historians, the implementation of fiscal and monetary policy during the period was a failure that hampered Indonesia's economic development.[21] For political historians, it was the ideological contrast among various political groups and constant changes of the political system that created a series of crises and confusion.[22]

The debates about economic policy during the first two decades of independence were "a zone of contestation among nationalists, technocrats, and populists, and the social forces they represented and who viewed its goal, respectively, as the creation of [a] national

16 Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 6-10. More contemporary scholars even invoke the taken-for-granted notion of New Order "developmentalism," arguing the current regime's development policy as a "new developmentalism." For example, see Eve Warburton, "Jokowi and the New Developmentalism," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 52 (2016): 297-320.

17 Ariel Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development'," Indonesia 46 (1988): 9.

18 Ibid., 10, original emphasis.

19 Ariel Heryanto, "Language of Development and Development of Language: The Case of Indonesia," (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University 1995).

20 Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development'," 23.

economy."[23] The binary divisions of groups—"administrators" versus "solidarity makers," "economics-minded" versus "history-minded"—showcase the tension in the debates about development; that is, each group had its own economic image of post-revolutionary society and spoke of development in its own way.[24] The need to balance the contending political and ideological forces shaped the regime's version of development.[25]

Rice undoubtedly plays a part in both kinds of story, but it is more as supporting subject than main one, to emphasize the economic trajectory (e.g., food price, export-import policy) and the political tension among elites regarding rice supply and provision. This study shifts the frame of narrating the first two decades of independent Indonesia, showing it as a period of idea cultivation. This study demonstrates that through debates regarding economic structure, errors in policy implementation, and competition with other political agendas, the idea of *pembangunan* apparently obscured the difference between nation-building and economic advancement.

Additionally, this paper takes the background of the Cold War in which rice was pertinent in the foreign policy of both the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the U.S. project of the Green Revolution began with the emergence of the worldview that regarded hunger and poverty as a threat to international stability, followed by the U.S. interest to "display the fruits of modernity to be a powerful weapon against communism" in Asia.[26] The U.S. agricultural initiative in the 1950s and early 1960s, which took its organizational form in the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Manila, Philippines, included a mission to develop high yield varieties of rice seed. The deployment of the result— the "miracle rice"—in the late 1960s became a symbol of transition from stagnation to progress, from traditional to modern.[27] On the other hand, the Soviet Union used trade agreements to deal with the rice problem in Asia. In 1954, when Burma faced difficulties in selling its rice surplus due to the declining price of rice in the global market, the Soviet Union offered to buy a large portion (between a third and a half of the country's export).

[21] J.A.C Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, An Equinox Classic Indonesia Book (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009 [1967]), 35-64; Anne Booth, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities (Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 163-177; Jan Luiten van Zanden and Daan Marks, An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2012 (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 133-166; Thee Kian Wie, Indonesia's Economy since Independence (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), 37-45.

[22] Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development (New York: Institute of Pacific's Relations, 1957), 102-106; Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox, 2007 [1962]); M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200, Third ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 261-341; Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 1-21.

[23] Bradley R. Simpson, "Indonesia's 'Accelerated Modernization' and the Global Discourse of Development, 1960-1975," Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (2009): 467-86.

[24] Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 19-37; Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development, 102-06.

[25] Joshua Barker, "Beyond Bandung: Developmental Nationalism and (Multi)Cultural Nationalism in Indonesia," Third World Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2008): 526.

[26] Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 161.

[27] Ibid., 159-80.

[28] The Cold War provides a transnational context for understanding development in Indonesia, showing the "local complexity" of rice which has shaped the on-going debate about the power and fallibility of development.[29]

This paper chronicles the story of rice in the making of the *pembangunan* idea in 1945-65. The first part briefly narrates the role of rice in Indonesia during the Japanese Occupation that shaped the postcolonial discourse of Indonesia's economy. I summarize the implementation of Japanese policies in controlling and mobilizing food stuffs during the war, and the discussion among the Sanyo Kaigi, Indonesian political advisers to Japan, regarding the rice problem.

The second part tells the story of rice during Indonesia's early struggle of independence. With the return of the Dutch, the new independent government deployed a series of efforts in the struggle for independence in which rice was the auxiliary instrument. I also discuss how colonial scholars like J. H. Boeke, J. S. Furnivall, and Egbert de Vries commented on the new state's economy, contrasting their concern with the Indonesian leaders' concern regarding rice and the national economy.

The third part focuses on the debate among economists in the 1950s regarding *pembangunan* in which rice was part of their ideas. I use the academic works of Indonesian intellectuals, focusing on Mohammad Hatta, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and Aidit, as well as Western economists like Benjamin Higgins among others, to explicate their contestation on Indonesia's macroeconomic situation vis-à-vis the government's burgeoning initiative of rice self-sufficiency.

The fourth part tells a story of how agricultural scientists, supported by the government, articulated *pembangunan* through scientific and technological intervention in rice production. I delve into a publication of the Ministry of National Research—*Research di Indonesia 1945- 1965 III Bidang Pertanian* (1965)—and a periodical magazine published by the Central Bureau of People's Food—*Madjalah Pertanian* (1960-65). By incorporating these sources, I focus on how the making of *pembangunan* required a series of technicalities in which science and technology were the tools to improve the quality of living.

The fifth part explicates the story of rice society as an idealistic picture of society constituted through the works of sociologists and anthropologists. This part shows how Soekarno, Hatta, and Indonesian intellectuals articulated *pembangunan* through the notion of *gotong rojong* (mutual cooperation) based on their perceptions and sometimes observations of rice society and villages. I use Hatta's monograph on cooperatives and works of scholars such as Koentjaraningrat, Soedjatmoko, and Selo Soemardjan to understand the way these intellectuals noted and interpreted village lives.

The final part looks at the incorporation of rice in Indonesia's foreign policy and aid negotiation. I utilize an English-language semi-official Indonesian newspaper—*The*

[28] Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), 20; Matthew Foley, The Cold War and National Assertion in Southeast Asia: Britain, the United States and Burma, 1948-1962 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 121-22.

[29] Jonathan Harwood, "Global Visions Vs. Local Complexity: Experts Wrestle with the Problem of Development," in Rice: Global Networks and New Histories, ed. Francesca Bray, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 41-55.

Indonesian Herald (1961-62)—which had a section on economic development and was vocal in endorsing Soekarno's foreign policy regarding West Papua. This part shows the way Indonesia's government dealt with the problem of rice and national sovereignty, which created a dilemma of precedence.

This is a story of rice as an object of abstraction, a target for intervention, a stimulus for ideal visions of society, *a thing* that informs us that development is but a grain of power.

Mobilizing and Controlling: A Brief History of Rice Policy During the Japanese Occupation

When the Sixteenth Army of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) invaded Java in 1942, the region was barely self-sufficient. The military government considered the need to increase food production its most serious problem.[30] According to Aiko Kurasawa, under the slogan of "Multiply Production," the Japanese authority imposed foodstuff programs to increase the production of rice, from introducing new seed varieties and cultivation techniques, constructing irrigation and clearing forest, to education and propaganda.[31] However, rice production consistently declined, from 8.3 million tons in 1942 to 6.8 million tons in 1944 due to various factors such as climate, cattle shortage, infrastructural deterioration, and a lack of spirit among the farmers.[32]

Kurasawa notes that although the statistics of production indicated an adequate amount of supply and calories, the real problem stemmed from the issue of distribution. Maximization of production had to be parallel with maximation of collection. Thus, besides encouraging domestic production, the Japanese also imposed a "forced delivery" system in which peasants had to deliver certain portions of their production to the government at a meager price.[33] The Japanese took over the Dutch office for rice distribution and established Office of Food Supply *(Syokuryō Kanri Zimusho,* SKZ) at the Department of Economic Affairs.[34] Resembling the Dutch system, SKZ had the function of handling foodstuffs through purchase and delivery, including stabilizing the price of rice by drawing up a detailed program of rice distribution to the urban population.[35] The difference between the SKZ and the Dutch system related directly to the "structural reform of the local administration" in which the Japanese abolished the provincial structure and gave residencies stronger power over administrative matters.[36] SKZ functioned together with rice mills and rice merchants associations *(kumiai)* and local authorities *(pangreh praja,* village leaders) in collecting paddy from farmers in residencies and distributing it.[37]

The implementation of this system was difficult. SKZ experienced problems in holding the increasing amounts of rice for distribution to the Japanese army, government officials, Indonesian civil servants, forced labors, the police force, camps of POWs, and the urban

30 Aiko Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945" (Cornell University, 1988), 35; Aiko Kurasawa, "Transportation and Rice Distribution in South-East Asia During the Second World War," in Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 32-66.

31 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 33-61.

32 Ibid, 62-68. 33 Ibid., 113.

34 In 1939, the Dutch established the Food Stuffs Fund (Voedingsmiddelenfonds, VMF) that handled rice supply and price by controlling the rice market through excess purchase. Pierre Van Der Eng, "Food Supply in Java During War and Decolonisation, 1940-1950," in MPRA Paper (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2008): 5.

35 Ibid., 119.

population.[38] Historians share the view that, in practice, there was no uniform purchase and distribution policy because authorities in the residencies had different methods of assigning the quota at lower levels.[39] These authorities in the residencies, however, were prone to abuse the system. Corrupt *pangreh praja* often increased the quota to hold onto rice supplies and then sell them in the black market, or they colluded with rice millers and traders to increase the price.[40] Additionally, the Japanese authorities lacked coordination, knowledge, and experience, resulting in a malfunctioning delivery system and peasant uprisings.[41]

Because of this lack of knowledge, the Japanese asked the Sanyo Kaigi (Indonesian political advisers to the Japanese) for a solution regarding the rice problem. The Sanyo Kaigi comprised members of the national intelligentsia who, according to Benedict Anderson, for the first time faced the basic problems of Java "not simply as social critics but as part of the governmental apparatus."[42] Members of Sanyo, like Soekarno and Hatta, assessed the "unsatisfactory results of the [paddy] collections." [43] Their assessment then stretched to an overview of the social and economic conditions in rural Java. However, they confined themselves to "consideration of improvements in the instrumental rationality of Japanese policy, not its substantive validity."[44] For example, in replying to Soekarno's question of how to address the Japanese military authority about the rice problem, Hatta suggested "an easier method on collection" in which the government should take rice only from villages that had a rice surplus.[45] Anderson notes that the ruling intelligentsia saw the critical conditions in the villages as temporary due to war and not as "deep-rooted malformations of [the] agricultural economy."[46] Although the members of Sanyo were critical and concerned with the methods of mobilization, they supported the idea behind the government's control over rice production and distribution.[47]

Even at the end of the war in 1945, the Japanese distribution mechanism still did not work properly. Historians have identified multiple factors for the failure, including not only the government control over distribution but also low purchase prices, a deteriorating production process, and impediments to transportation.[48] Rice remained an urgent issue, pushing politicians and bureaucrats to think about solutions that were acceptable for people in both urban and rural areas.

[36] Shigeru Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994): 128.

[37] Ibid., 121; Van Der Eng, "Food Supply in Java," 8-9.

[38] Van der Eng, "Food Supply in Java," 9.

[39] Ibid., 10-11; Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 128-32; Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, 128-35.

[40] Ibid., 12; Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 165-74.

[41] Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, 137-38.

[42] Benedict Anderson, "The Problem of Rice (Stenographic Notes on the Fourth Session of the Sanyo Kaigi, January 8. 2605, 10:00 AM)," Indonesia 2 (1966): 79.

[43] Ibid., 86. [44] Ibid., 81. [45] Ibid., 105-06.

[46] Ibid., 81; Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, 138-44.

[47] Ibid.; Shigeru Sato, "Oppression and Romanticism: The Food Supply of Java During the Japanese Occupation," in Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia. Studies in the Economies of East and South-East Asia, ed. Kratoska P.H., Studies in the Economies of East and South-East Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 183.

[48] Van der Eng, "Food Supply in Java," 38; Kurasawa, "Transportation and Rice Distribution in South-East Asia During the Second World War," 643-45.

Rice and Independence: The Struggle for National Sovereignty

The rice problem which continued after the Japanese Occupation kindled discussion of the development of the new independent state. Rice played a significant role in Indonesia's struggle for independence, and making *pembangunan* was part of searching for recognition of national sovereignty.

After the Second World War, the Dutch was lack of foreign exchange. As the Dutch struggled to recover from a huge deficit in balance of payments, the colonial administration aimed to re-establish the "task which Dutch colonial politics had imposed upon itself before the war."[49] With support from the Allies, the Dutch wanted to resume colonial extraction.

The Netherlands East Indies, however, had proclaimed its independence as the Republic of Indonesia in August 1945, in the voice of its nationalist leaders Soekarno and Hatta. [50] Their priority was foodstuffs. After the Japanese left, the purchased stocks of paddy held at the merchants' storage failed to reach the rice mills and urban areas due to confusion among local authorities and lack of communication.[51] By September 1945, the stocks of rice at the mills was only 323,200 tons.[52] The new Republican government attempted to overcome the problem by copying the Japanese system of rice policy from the Occupation. It quickly established the Agency for the Supervision of the People's Food Supply *(Djawatan Pengawasan Makanan Rakjat,* PMR) under the Ministry of Welfare. With a similar function to that of SKZ, PMR's task was to stabilize rice prices and supplies by collecting over 20 percent of farmers' paddy harvest and distributing it. Rice traders still had to supply paddy for the rice mills. PMR would then distribute the rice from the mills to the armed forces, civil servants, and urban areas.[53]

In early 1946, the Dutch military re-occupied the capital city of Jakarta. The Republican government left for Yogyakarta, but still attempted to control the circulation of rice. Doing so was difficult. The inflow of armies and officials expanded the population, and an insecure situation and shortage of labor delayed planting for the wet season.[54] Nonetheless, the Republic leaders decided to resist the return of the Dutch through not only armed combat but also a series of diplomatic efforts to gain international recognition.

Rice, amid the issue of domestic circulation, was a part of the Republic's weapons for battling the Dutch. On May 7, 1946, the English newspaper in Mumbai, *The Times of India,* made public Jawaharlal Nehru's inquiry to Sjahrir, the Prime Minister. "I learnt through the press that you have been good enough to offer to send half a million tons of rice from Indonesia to India to relieve famine conditions here."[55] Nehru then asked if Sjahrir could give him further details on Indonesia's offer and discuss an arrangement. A few days later, a cable came from Sjahrir saying, "For the sake of mutual assistance between the two nations we should like to receive in exchange goods most urgently needed by the majority of the population, for example, textiles and agricultural implements."[56] Indonesia would trade its rice for India's textiles.

[49] Pierre Van Der Eng, "Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947-49," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 2 (1988): 337.

[50] The armed and diplomatic conflict between the Dutch and Indonesia, well-known as the "Revolution," took place in 1945- 50. See Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200, 261-86.

[51] Van Der Eng, "Food Supply," 46 [52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., 28, 38.

The Dutch dismissed this offer as propaganda and insisted that the Republic of Indonesia itself was facing rice scarcity. The Royal Consul-General for the Netherlands in India explained to the press that "it was most unlikely that Java increased its production in recent years" after the Japanese Occupation.[57] In a radio speech, Hatta disputed the Dutch authority, saying that "[The Dutch] will certainly lose their minds upon hearing [our offer to India]. With their control only on paper, they cannot make such an offer. But the Republic of Indonesia is able to offer paddy to India, which is facing famine."[58] For Hatta, the Republic's offer to India would stop the Dutch propaganda in foreign countries.

This offer was "a diplomatic salvo to assert internationally both the Republican government's effective authority over the country and the high moral standards of its foreign policy."[59] On the brink of armed conflict with the Dutch, Indonesia's struggle for independence was pivotal and "the control over rice became synonymous with control over territory."[60] The government's decision received support from the press. Some newspapers called the decision "a gesture of thanks to humanity; a move that caused a stir in the world; a powerful slap at the Dutch."[61] Additionally, a song titled *Padi untuk India* (Paddy for India) was popularized to represent the government's goodwill in supporting India as a friendly nation as well as to "recall solidarity" among Indonesians.[62] On August 19, 1946, Indonesia's government delivered the first two shipments of rice from the promised 500,000 tons to Madras (eastern India) and would deliver the rest at the end of the month.[63] With the success of this offer, rice became valuable as the symbol of authority and sovereignty that Indonesia needed.

The Republic's effort to gain international recognition did not appeal to colonial scholars. As they already had experience in the region, these scholars were focusing their attention on the economic condition of the new state. In a journal article, J. H. Boeke, a Dutch economist who worked for the colonial government in the 1910s, wrote: "The nationalist leaders have relatively little interest in economic affairs. Only purely political problems appear of first importance to them."[64] Coming from Boeke, this comment was not unexpected. Reflecting his former position as a senior economist of the colonized Indies, he blamed nationalist leaders and their mentality for the underdeveloped economy of independent Indonesia.

54 Ibid., 43.

55 "Indonesia's Rice Offer to India," The Times of India, 7 May 1946, 3.

56 "Java Rice Offer to India Materialise: Dr. Sjahrir's Cable to Pandit Nehru," The Times of India, 24 May 1946, 7.

57 "Rice Position in Indonesia: Dutch Consul Explains," The Times of India, 31 May 1946, 3.

58 'Pidato Wakil Presiden tentang pengiriman beras ke India,' Antara, 22 June 1946 in Tuong Vu, "Of Rice and Revolution," 250.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri, "Lekra and Ensembles: Tracing the Indonesian Musical Stage," in Heirs to World Culture: Beung Indonesian 1950-1965, ed. Jeniffer Lindsay and Maya H.T. Liem (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 432. Yuliantri could trace the name of the songwriter (A. Alie) but not the year when the song was composed. Nonetheless, according to the memoir of Francisca Fanggidaej, an Indonesian journalist, this song was popular in 1946. Hesri Setiawan, Memoar Perempuan Revolusioner: Francisca C. Fanggidaej (Yogyakarta: Galangpress, 2006), 109.

63 "Java Rice Shipments for Madras," The Times of India, 21 August 1946, 7.

64 J. H. Boeke, "Economic Conditions for Indonesian Independence," Pacific Affairs 19, no. 4 (1946): 396.

Since the late period of Dutch colonial rule, Boeke maintained his concept of "dual economies," contrasting Western-type enterprise on the islands of Sumatera, Borneo, and Celebes with Javanese agriculture. For Boeke, rice policy in the mid-1930s Netherlands-East Indies had provided a policy lesson: rice export for Java and self-provisioning for the other islands were required in tandem with improving production of other cash crops like rubber and tobacco.[65] The development of Indonesia into "a truly independent state," he suggested, must accept Western capitalism, at least as an "inevitable stage of transition."[66] J. S. Furnivall disagreed. "He speaks with an authority to which I cannot pretend," said Furnivall, commenting on Boeke's position. He continued, "Yet I cannot help feeling that he overstates his case."[67] Furnivall was well known for his account of the "plural society" which resembled some of Boeke's ideas on the different characteristic of Indies societies and their economic embeddedness. Furnivall, however, did not adopt a rigid system of economy like Boeke. Looking at colonial policy, he focused instead on different social orders based on racial lines that performed different kinds of economic function. In the field of production and distribution, each racial group had its distinctive role to play in the market, as there was no common "social will."[68] Thus, the cause of lack of progress among the Javanese, Furnivall concluded, "seem[s] to lie in their history rather than in their mentality."[69]

The situation on the ground during their conversation was undeniably pressing. By early 1947 the PMR still could not function, despite the success of the Republic's rice offer to India, and the outcome of the rice purchasing system was not as expected. The government faced a fiscal crisis and had to change the floor and ceiling prices of rice, thus pushing down the price. And with a low price, farmers refused to sell their rice to the government.[70] Additionally, the process of collecting rice had many obstacles, as the central government could not control the clash on the ground. The competition over rice "was not in marketing or sale, but in obtaining the necessary licenses from military commanders and other relevant [regional] government offices to buy food."[71] As historian Tuong Vu notes, during those years, rice was part of an armed and bleak contestation, held by "a man thinking with a Japanese head but walking with Javanese legs."[72] In this context, Boeke's comment was condescending and Furnivall's response did not provide a solution to the food problem in Indonesia.

In the midst of the rice supply and distribution problem, another Dutch economist, Egbert de Vries, also offered an interpretation of Indonesia's economic problem: a choice between growing food crops and cash crops.[73] De Vries argued that direct participation in the export trade of cash crops was desirable for a country such as Indonesia. Repeating Boeke's concern about the nationalists, yet in a more modest tone, he stated: "Even in Republican circles, there seems to be recognition of the fact that, under present conditions, some kind of estate agriculture is indispensable to the economic welfare of the country."[74]

[65] J. H. Boeke, The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946), 112-15.

[66] Boeke, "Economic Conditions for Indonesian Independence," 399-401.

[67] J. S. Furnivall, "Capitalism in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 20, no. 1 (1947): 68.

[68] J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 446-459; J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 304-312.

[69] J. S. Furnivall, "Capitalism in Indonesia," 68. 70 Tuong Vu, "Of Rice and Revolution," 246.

De Vries was an agronomist graduated from a Dutch agricultural school in Wageningen. He once led the commission that designed the Bogor agricultural faculty in the 1940s. In 1949, he supported the scheme of international aid offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and endorsed the growing idea of international development promoted by the U.S.[75] With this view, De Vries was aware of how the choice to improve cash crops for export clashed with the urgent need for food. He continued that the problem of rice shortage in 1946-47 made the issue of employment pertinent for Indonesian agricultural workers. He concluded, "The Indonesian labourer will generally accept employment only if assured of a rice allowance; otherwise he prefers to use his time in clearing a field and growing his own food or even in improvising a diet of roots and leaves."[76] Nonetheless, de Vries suggested the importance of new capital which "[would] have to come from abroad."[77] The most critical factor in this situation was "the attitude of the Indonesian nation and government toward foreign investments."[78] Economic development required foreign capital or enterprises; and to flow in, the capital required political affirmation.

Soekarno had another agenda. Instead of relying on foreign sources, he aimed for a self-sufficient economy. "Why should we talk about political freedom if we are not free in matters of rice, always having to ask neighboring countries to buy rice?" asked Soekarno rhetorically in his 1952 speech.[79] He was concerned with domestic rice production, laying out some solutions and government initiatives to improve it. Near the end of his speech, he encouraged his audience: "Be the heroes of *pembangunan*. Make your nation strong, an independent nation in the sense of true freedom."[80] For Soekarno, full control over rice—which should be achieved by self-sufficiency—would lead to the truest meaning of national independence. Rice was seemingly the foundation of Indonesia as a nation.

Through rice, *pembangunan* entered the narrative of Indonesia's struggle of independence. It was not an easy path. Not only did the Republican government have to manage the rice supply and distribution for the population, but it also had to deal with the return of the Dutch and assert its legitimacy as the new state on the international scene. In the middle of this struggle, colonial scholars focused on the inflow of foreign capital for the development of Indonesia's economy, while Soekarno aimed for self-sufficiency in which domestic production was the key to national independence.

71 Ibid., 253.

72 Ibid., 247.

73 Egbert de Vries, "Problems of Agriculture in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 22, no. 2 (1949): 130-43.

74 de Vries, "Problems of Agriculture in Indonesia," 133-34.

75 Harro Maat, Science Cultivating Practice: A History of Agricultural Science in the Netherlands and Its Colonies, 1863-1986 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 106-07. In this period, the Dutch government negotiated with the U.S., through the IMF and the World Bank regarding the Marshall Plan, a program that provided technical assistance to the Dutch to recover its economy. The negotiation of Marshall aid was heavily related to military tension and negotiation between the Netherlands and Indonesia regarding independence, resulting in a series of suspensions and a lower allotment of aid than the Dutch expected. Van Der Eng, "Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947-49," 335-52.

76 Ibid., 140.

77 Ibid., 143.

78 Ibid.

79 Soekarno, Pangan Rakyat Soal Hidup Atau Mati (Antara, 1952 [cited 13 January 2018]); available from https://megapolitan.antaranews.com/berita/1425/pangan-rakyat-soal-hidup-atau-mati-petikan-pidato-bung-karno-tahun-1952. 80 Ibid.

Finding the Balance: The Debates on Rice and the National Economy

By the 1950s, the question of national independence centred on how to achieve self-sufficiency. The search for a self-sufficient economy comprised debates on multiple economic issues around rice such as fiscal condition, supply and distribution, the role of the state, and land distribution. In this economic sense, the idea of *pembangunan* was contentious.

In the early 1950s, the attempt to establish a national economy came from the pressure to mobilize indigenous enterprises against Dutch domination of trade. What was the point of choosing food crops and cash crops when the Dutch still controlled the trading houses and flow of goods? Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who served as the Minister of Trade and Industry, launched the *Benteng* program to facilitate bumiputra businesses to import foreign goods by opening access of low credit through a state-owned bank channel. As a trained economist from the Rotterdam School of Commerce who had already been involved with the Republic's economic policy since 1946, Sumitro took the initiative against the Dutch economic interest. He saw the *Benteng* program more as a political countermeasure against Dutch interests than as an affirmative action to protect Indonesian enterprises. He wrote, "I didn't believe in policies such as quotas and quantitative restrictions, but neither did I believe in leaving the market as it is."[81] For Sumitro, the *Benteng* policy was a mere transitional policy for rural business activity to move to the non-farm sector. The long-term objective was to diversify the pattern of production to include rapid industrialization.

Sumitro's attitude regarding the *Benteng* policy was a reflection of his long resentment of Boeke's dualism. He rejected the argument that "Indonesians or the 'Eastern races' can never improve their situation because they have different values."[82] Sumitro disagreed with Boeke's assumption of the static character of the native economy which was seemingly shared by the "anthropologists of the old school."[83] He bitterly wrote, "They always tell me you can't do this or that, because it will make people unhappy! They always want to justify and preserve the status quo. They don't seem to understand that people respond to outside challenges."[84]

Sumitro clearly wanted to take Indonesia's economy in a different direction from the Dutch style of management. But Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the then Minister of Finance, disputed this view. Sjafruddin, who had previously worked as an assistant Inspector of Finance during the Dutch period, was more sympathetic to the Dutch ways of managing the economy and was even against the Indonesian takeover of the Dutch enterprises.[85] He recalled the *Benteng* program as mistargeted, because it could not accommodate most people in agriculture. "I was against the Benteng Programme of Sumitro," stated Sjafruddin. "[W]e should assist [people in agriculture], and industry should be based on agriculture and on the natural resources found in Indonesia."[86] Industrialization, Sjafruddin noted, cannot bypass education in management and technology. He was concerned with the implementation of the *Benteng* program which was prone to the practice of *ali baba*, a derogatory term for a "pseudo-joint venture between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese."[87] This practice generally created a rent-seeking operation because the ethnic Chinese encountered a bottleneck when attempting to access sufficient foreign exchange to import.[88] He asserted, "If we did not educate first we would just create Ali Babas!"[89]

[81] Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Recollections of My Career," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 22, no. 3 (1986): 35. 82 Ibid., 31.

The disagreement between Sumitro and Sjafruddin was indeed significant for the macrostructure of Indonesia's economy.[90] Yet, Sumitro concurred with Sjafruddin on balancing the amount of rice import with domestic production. They agreed that during Sukiman's cabinet (April 1951 - February 1952) the government put too much attention on rice trade instead of increasing rice production. In 1951 and 1952, respectively, the government imported 530,000 tons and 760,000 tons of rice, both of which were nearly three-quarters of the value of all food imports.[91] In 1951, forty percent of the rice import came from Burma.[92]

Sjafruddin observed that the increase in foreign exchange in 1950, which boosted the government's capacity to import, was not the result of domestic policies. Thanks to the Korean War boom, the demand for oil and rubber increased Indonesia's exports. But, continued Sjafruddin, the government could not repeat such capacity and use import as a justification to lower rice prices anymore. The government had to think about crops production in order to ease the need for import. Sumitro had a similar concern, saying that Indonesia's exports were highly dependent on particular commodities like rubber; the government was negligent in the production of other crops. Additionally, better use of government expenditures in productive activities was desirable. Sjafruddin suggested the rehabilitation of irrigation facilities and opening up new *sawah* (wet-rice fields), and Sumitro, taking a macroeconomic view, highlighted better fiscal and monetary policies.[93] In the debate between Sumitro and Sjafruddin, rice was part of the contest to control fiscal expenditure and to boost (indigenous) industrialization.

In 1952, the cabinet changed and Benjamin Higgins, a development economist from the U.S., started his work as an advisor to Sumitro. As the debate on rice ensued, he enjoyed the luxury of *rijstaffel* (rice table) during lunch in the Hotel des Indes.[94] Since the launch of the Special Welfare Program *(Rentjana Kesedjahteraan Istimewa,* RKI) in 1949/50 under the Department of Agriculture, the government had encouraged technical research on rice seeds, production organization, and fertilization to intensify domestic rice production. The government aimed for food self-sufficiency by 1956; thus, it required proper budget management. In the new cabinet of Wilopo (1952-53), Sumitro—who now served as the Minister of Finance—formalized development planning and established the

81 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Recollections of My Career," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 22, no. 3 (1986): 35.

82 Ibid., 31.

83 Ibid. Sumitro referred to the Dutch "Indologs," scholars who trained in Leiden University.

84 Ibid.

85 His sympathetic attitude toward the Dutch is evident through his saying: "I still had confidence in the judgement and sincerity of the Dutch. I felt I had fought not against the Dutch but against their regime, I didn't hate them—I never hate anyone." Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Recollections of My Career," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 23, no. 3 (2006): 104-05. 86 Ibid.

87 See J. Thomas Lindbald, Bridges to New Business: The Economic Decolonization of Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Pr ess, 2008), 131-32.

88 Ibid.

89 Prawiranegara, "Recollections of My Career," 105.

90 Their debate on the nationalization of Java Bank shaped the course of Indonesia's financial structure and macroeconomic policy. See Thee, Indonesia's Economy since Independence, 24-68.

National Planning Bureau *(Biro Perantjang Negara)* to integrate food self-sufficiency into the national investment budget. Higgins had the role of advisor to this new institution.

Higgins saw that food production would be a high priority in the short run as Indonesia was low on capital. For him, using the small amount of capital available in Indonesia for the improvement of food production was on point. "It makes good sense," he said, "[because] the supply of capital is so limited, the knowledge of industrial resources so incomplete, and technical skills outside agriculture so scarce."[95] In a journal article, D.W. Fryer, another economist from the U.S., shared Higgins' opinion and suggested heavy application of fertilizer and large-scale production to improve food production.[96] The government echoed this solution. It established the Five-Year Agricultural Plan to build a fertilizer factory in Asahan and a phosphate factory in Tjirebon, and the Five-Year Irrigation Plan to extend the irrigated area of rice-fields to 314,000 hectares.

The government did not achieve the target of rice self-sufficiency by 1956. But with the establishment of the National Planning Bureau, Indonesia entered a regime of planning, in which rice was a key target parallel to fiscal policy. "It is hoped that the 3 per cent annual increase in national income can be maintained during the planning period, 1956-1960. … With a marginal savings (and investment) ratio of 40 per cent, 0.52 per cent per capita national income can be set aside each year for new capital formation," wrote Higgins.[97] This capital formation would be used to increase rice production. For Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice- President and an economist, the implementation of the Five-Year Plan (of 1956/57-1960/61) could increase the production of rice by 2 million tons. "If we can do this," he said, "the welfare of the people will improve … [and] the state can save foreign exchange for rice import."[98]

Although Hatta was concerned with fiscal policy, he paid more attention to the management of rice supply and distribution. Perhaps his concern was derived from his experience during the Occupation dealing with the problem of rice. In his view, with the geographical challenge of Indonesia, where big and small islands were distant from each one another, the rice granaries became extremely important. Hatta wrote, in a poetic manner, "During the season of storm and high tide, when ships were troubled to drift on the shores, [people] suffered from hunger. No rice, and not all of their crops could be eaten, rotting as they could not sell them."[99]

91 United Nations, "Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1953," (Bangkok: Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Department of Economic Affairs, 1954), 72

92 Badan Urusan Logistik, "Seperempat Abad Bergulat Dengan Butir-Butir Beras," (Djakarta: Badan Urusan Logistik, 1971), 53.

93 The debate of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara is discussed in Thee Kian Wie, Indonesia's Economy since Independence, 38-65.

94 Benjamin Higgins, "The Ideological Factor: Indonesia, 1952-52," in All the Difference: A Development Economist's Quest (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 48-72; Rijsttafel (rice table) is a Dutch meal combining indigenous and European culinary styles. Rijsttafel emerged in the late nineteenth century and was associated with the luxurious life of Dutch colonials in the Netherlands-East Indies. See Fadly Rahman, Rijsttafel: Budaya Kuliner Di Indonesia Masa Kolonial 1870-1942 (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001).

95 Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development (New York: Institute of Pacific's Relations, 1957), 55.

96 D. W. Fryer, "Indonesia's Economic Prospects," Far Eastern Survey 23, no. 12 (1954): 178-79.

Rice granaries would save the situation. Each granary would store a minimum amount of rice supply for one year as a regional stock, namely the "iron stock" *(persediaan besi).* For example, if one village had a population of 1000 and each person required 100 kilos of rice per year, then the village would have to have a minimum of 100 tons of rice. If the accumulated rice from individual granaries were only 20 tons, the village granary would have to provide the remaining 80 tons. If there was a surplus, let's say of 25 tons, the village could sell its rice outside through a cooperative under the supervision of the village government. If the village could not achieve the minimum amount of rice supply, the village government would have to buy rice from another region through the cooperative. The granary-cooperative system had to be established "not only in the small islands … but in all area of Indonesia. Of each village, *nagari* or family!"[100]

Sumitro echoed Hatta's calculation on the different supply of rice between regions, yet unlike Hatta, Sumitro was not concerned so much with the organization of rice supply and distribution. He cared about the aggregate: the area size of cultivation, production, and calorie consumption. Using a calculation of rice consumption required by an individual, he estimated the number of families that could be covered by the accumulation of paddy fields, both wet and dry, in Java.[101] However, "95 per cent of farm families own too small a plot of land and are far from fulfilling their family's food needs … and land expansion in Java is no longer possible."[102] He later suggested increasing production through the expansion of paddy fields to the islands outside Java.

Sumitro and Hatta's different emphases in thinking about rice reflected two meanings of *pembangunan*. Hatta was straightforward: *pembangunan* must concern first the fulfilment of the primary needs of the people. The goal of rice self-sufficiency was not limited to the expansion of paddy fields, but also involved building roads, irrigation systems, fertilizer factories, and good management of distribution. Sumitro took a more academic approach. He explained *pembangunan* by initially laying out a comparative notion of an "underdeveloped economy," arguing that in Indonesian context, economic development meant a "balance." In Sumitro's account, this balance was between an increase in food production and population; in the distribution of population among Indonesian islands to create a balance between people and their area's natural wealth; and between agriculture production and industrial development.[103]

Hatta and Sumitro, nonetheless, shared the same view on two outlooks. First, *pembangunan* was the state's responsibility. To achieve rice self-sufficiency "so that *pembangunan* runs effectively based on the principle of 'achieving maximum results with minimum costs in the shortest time possible,' firmly, without hesitation we must carry out a guided economy," said Hatta during the 1957 National Conference of Development.[104]

97 Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development, 55.

98 M. Hatta, Beberapa Fasal Ekonomi I: Djalan Keekonomi Dan Pembangunan (Djakarta: Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, 1960), 179.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., 180-81. Hatta was born in Minangkabau family, and "nagari" is a term for regional administrative unit of Minangkabau people.

101 For Sumitro's reference see Nathan Keyfitz and Widjojo, Soal Penduduk Dan Pembangunan Di Indonesia, Pustaka Ekonomi, No. 1 (Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1955).

102 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Ekonomi Pembangunan (Djakarta: PT. Pembangunan Djakarta, 1955), 170.

103 Djojohadikusumo, Ekonomi Pembangunan, 143.

Similarly, Sumitro argued that the government played an important role in achieving the balance of economy and, more importantly, in ensuring the balance of payment from international trade. Sumitro disagreed with implementation of trade based merely on comparative (dis)advantages which ignored "the fact that there are strange differences between continents regarding the level of technology, production, development, and progress. These differences are caused by structural factors."[105] For Sumitro, the state, thus, must oversee its foreign exchange because it was important to change structural factors in order to implement development. Sumitro concluded, "*Pembangunan* means that the state has an obligation to directly and indirectly monitor how factors of production are used."[106]

Second, *pembangunan* was not about the rivalry between agrarian production and industrial development. Hatta explained industrialization in the contexts of unequal distribution of population. For him, industrialization alone was not sufficient for Indonesia where many still living in villages with low purchasing power and dominating in Java. He added that industry should be happened in populated areas where labor and market could exist, hence transmigration program—moving population from Java to another islands—was important in pursuing the national prosperity.[107] Similarly, Sumitro emphasized a "balanced development" in which agrarian production complemented industrial structure: "improvement in the agrarian production would open possibilities for industrial development."[108] He shared Hatta's idea of domestic migration to move labor from more populated areas to less populated areas. With more equal distribution of population, labors working in agriculture sectors could slowly shifted to non-agriculture sectors.[109]

On the matter of agrarian relations, D. N. Aidit, the leader of the Communist Party, was vocal, as the problem behind low production of rice and general agricultural goods was the feudalistic land relations in villages. Unstable rice prices were a result of "the mismanagement of bureaucrat capitalists and the manipulation and monopoly of village devils *(setan desa)* over agricultural products."[110] Using his research findings in Javanese villages, Aidit strongly criticized economists who undermined the impact of high inflation on farmers, arguing that, indeed, "inflation fastens the process of land concentration."[111]

Aidit disagreed strongly with Sumitro's account of the absence of a massive class of landlords in villages and that the problems of farmers were merely related to urban trade capital. Speaking in front of Indonesia's economists, he expressed his snarky remark, "[Sumitro's statement] was indeed a false conclusion and covers up the reality in our villages. … Yes, what can we say, if we carry out an analysis like Sumitro who did not first confirm what is meant by the word 'landlord.' It is an empty analysis and completely unscientific."[112] For Aidit, shifting consumption from rice to corn and banning rice imports were only a short-term solution. The long-term solution for Indonesia's self-sufficiency was to free productive agricultural labors from feudalistic relations of production through agrarian revolution and land reform.[113] Rice, in Aidit's mind, corresponded with the overall relations of land and labor production, and although he did not use the word

104 Hatta, Beberapa Fasal Ekonomi I, 274.

105 Djojohadikusumo, Ekonomi Pembangunan, 308. 106 Ibid., 309.

107 Hatta, Beberapa Fasal Ekonomi I, 164-67.

108 Djojohadikusumo, Ekonomi Pembangunan, 342.

109 Ibid., 343.

pembangunan extensively, he always referred to Soekarno's Economic Declaration to achieve a socialist economy when talking about economic problem.

Rice became an object of economic contestation over balancing its availability and affordability, and import and domestic production. Additionally, rice was an object in pursuing as well as in questioning a self-sufficient economy. For intellectuals like Hatta and Sumitro, *pembangunan* was about not only valuing the rice, overseeing its flow, and keeping it manageable for the betterment of society, but also putting *pembangunan* in the hands of the state. In addition, *pembangunan* also related to the mode of industrialization which was inseparable from labor question, i.e., the distribution of population. Communist intellectual like Aidit saw rice cultivation in the context of land relations; thus, *pembangunan* referred to the agenda of a socialist economy in which the unequal distribution of land became a priority. Rice played a central role on the unceasing tug of war between the free market and the controlled economy.

Making Better Rice: The Scientific and Technological Intervention of Rice Production

The economic debates around rice revolved around the macro-condition of the state and the population. Although contentious, *pembangunan* became the government's main narrative to achieve a self-sufficient economy through increasing domestic rice production—a process which required technical instruments. By the end of the 1950s, science and technology were the important tools for improving the quality and quantity of rice, and therefore the quality of living.

In 1952, at the opening of the Faculty of Agriculture, Universitas Indonesia, President Soekarno emphasized the importance of the food issue as "the life and death of a nation."[114] He stated his concern about the increase of population, low calorie consumption, and an inadequate aggregate supply of rice.[115] The food problem in Indonesia, Soekarno argued, was "objective" because of the imbalance between production and consumption. His question about how to harvest more rice as fast as possible was inseparable from the questions of improving seeds quality and cultivating methods.

In the political vision of Soekarno, scientific and technological endeavors were the vanguard of increasing food production and therefore promoting economic prosperity. "Science has no worth if it does not become applied science," said Soekarno.[116] Thus, Indonesians "have to expand agricultural areas and intensify our work, especially through selection and fertilization."[117] Yet he was aware that paddy varieties could not be easily replicated. He suggested that "paddy type first must be 'regionalized.' Before *Bengawan* paddy [variety] can be applied across the Indonesian archipelago, it is necessary to establish regional selection centers in multiple places."[118] The regionalization of paddy

[110] D. N. Aidit, Pemecahan Masalah Ekonomi Dan Ilmu Ekonomi Dewasa Ini (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), 24. The "seven village devils" were exploitative elements in the relations of rural agricultural productions, such as landlords, officials who defend the interest of landlords, idjon dealers (mortgagee, middlemen), bureaucratic capitalists who exploited farmers, villagers who collaborated with landlords, money lenders, and usurers.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid., 13.

[113] Ibid., 11.

[114] Soekarno, Pangan Rakyat Soal Hidup Atau Mati (Antara, 1952 [cited 13 January 2018]); available from https://megapolitan.antaranews.com/berita/1425/pangan-rakyat-soal-hidup-atau-mati-petikan-pidato-bung-karno-tahun-

would not stop with centers, he continued: "organizations must also be established to disseminate the results of the regional centers directly to the farmers."[119] Additionally, Soekarno pointed out the importance of change of farmers' mentality. Passionately he said, "Farmers must be awakened by attention [of education] from these selection centers; farmers must be revived, must be 'fired up.'"[120] Soekarno's technical and political visions were clear that people's prosperity began with seeds and the peasants' way and mentality of cultivation.

The government had the will to improve the quality of seeds—to have superior seeds *(benih unggul)* adaptable to the environment and more resistant to pest or diseases. The General Agricultural Research Station in Bogor managed several implementation bureaus, one of which—the Agricultural Technology Research Center *(Badan Penyelidikan Teknik Pertanian,* BPTP)—was responsible for conducting research on food and cash crops. One of the leading scientists on rice seed breeding was Hadrian Siregar, a graduate of the Dutch Secondary Agricultural School *(Middelbare Landbouwschool,* MLS), who had been a breeder at the General Station since the early 1930s.[121] He was well-known for his experience in producing and testing the propensities of *indica* and *japonica* varieties, two main groups of paddy varieties in Indonesia.

In 1955, Siregar decided to separate rice seed research from that of other food crops by establishing a special center for paddy research *(Balai Penjelidikan Padi)* under BPTP's food crops division. Under this center, the main efforts to improve varieties were selection and hybridization. Breeders selected superior varieties from the two main types of paddy, awnless *(indica* type, *cereh)* and awned *(sub-japonica* type, *bulu).*[122] After the selection, these paddies were planted in rice fields as a demonstration project for farmers who then would multiply the hybrid seed through their own use. These seeds were called, among other names, *Baok, Brondol Putih 277, Gendjah Ratji, Tjina, Untung, Latisail*. Some years later, a researcher recalled this process: "New results, which after being tested in regional experiments turned out to be superior, were immediately released for implementation and usually replaced what previously had been the superior varieties."[123]

Up to the mid-1960s, the General Station produced new superior seeds, such as *Sigadis, Remadja, Djelita, Dara Sinta,* and *Dewi Tara*. Summarizing research on rice, the Chief of the Research Bureau of the Department of Agriculture said that "among the activities and

115 The Faculty of Agriculture Universitas Indonesia was the embryo of Bogor Institute of Agriculture.

116 Soekarno's speech (1963) in Soekarno, Ilmu Dan Perjuangan: Kumpulan Pidato Ketika Menerima Gelar Doctor Honoris Causa Dari Universitas Dalam Negeri (Jakarta: Intri Idayu Press - Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno, 1986), 36.

117 Soekarno, Pangan Rakyat Soal Hidup Atau Mati.

118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid.

121 S. Sumardi, "Dr. Hadrian Siregar: Hasil Karya Dan Pengabdiannya," ed. Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Jakarta: Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, 1983), 20-22.

122 Awnless and awned paddy are different in nature. Awnless varieties perform relatively well in poorer soils and are resistant to unfavorable environments and diseases because they have a rigid stem structure. However, they had low propensity to cross- pollinate and form natural cross-breeds, resulting in limited number of natural varieties. Awned varieties, although they were not as adaptive as awnless varieties, have lower sensitivity to the change of season, resulting in fast maturation and earlier harvest. Additionally, awned varieties had a

of research on paddy, the most prominent is in the field of breeding."[124] The breeding results activities were not just for wet paddy, but also for dry paddy *(padi gogo rantjah)*. Independent research institutions, such as Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture and Planting in Klaten and Research Institute of National Agriculture in Yogyakarta, also produced dry land paddy varieties. Jagoes and Martief Jemain, researchers from these institutes, introduced dry paddy varieties like *Radjalele* and *Padi Marhaen*.[125]

Rice breeding was not the only technical attempt to improve production. With the introduction of new varieties, researchers also paid attention to other factors, such as planting method and fertilization. They navigated their way to intervention in rice production through cultivation experiments and improving scientific skills. For example, paddy researchers had noted that different varieties had their own characteristics, age, and color, even though the seeds were produced in the same station. Their subsequent experiments showed that "for the variety of Bengawan paddy, which is known as an easily falling type, planting as deep as 7.5 cm reduces the falling percentage, but also reduces the yield."[126] For fertilization, phosphate and nitrogen gave more benefits to wet paddy, while potassium was not good for wet paddy but beneficial for dry paddy. For unfertilized soil, the yield of awnless paddy was usually higher than that of awned paddy. The selection of green or synthetic fertilizer had to correspond with the variety used.[127]

Scientific research on seeds, soils, fertilizers, and all technical efforts to produce more and better rice, however, would be of no avail without guidance to farmers and villagers. In 1950, the Ministry of Agriculture had established the Agricultural Extension Service and built Center of Rural Community Education *(Balai Pendidikan Masyarakat Desa,* BPMD) in each sub-district to implement rural education.[128] An official from the Ministry said, "This center will be used as a place to increase awareness and activities of villagers, especially for farmers to improve their technicality and social economic [condition]."[129] Each BPMD would serve approximately 15 villages and should be located in a place accessible to most farmers.[130] The building had 2.5 to 5 acres of land to demonstrate farming methods, a building to facilitate meetings, and materials such as seeds, tools, fertilizers, and insecticides.[131] BPMD was a place to demonstrate the "how" and "why" of the cultivation, of not only crops but also livestock and poultry.[132]

In 1958, the government asserted more control over rice production through the establishment of the Agency for Food Production and Dry Land Opening *(Badan Perusahaan Produksi Bahan Makanan dan Pembukaan Tanah Kering,* BPMT), with the main objective of rice self-sufficiency within three years. Its program, the Paddy Center *(Padi Sentra)*, gave rice farmers easy access to credit to buy seeds and fertilizers. For wet-rice, the

high propensity to cross-pollinate, so farmers could choose from a wider range of natural cross-bred varieties. Pierre van Der Eng, Agricultural Growth in Indonesia: Productivity Change and Policy Impact since 1880 (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 82-85.

123 Sadikin Sumintawikarta, "Tjatatan Tentang Penelitian Tanaman Pangan Antara Tahun 1945-1965," in Research Di Indonesia Iii: Bidang Pertanian, 1945-1965, ed. M. Makagiansar and Sadikin Sumintawikarta (Djakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1965)," 70.

124 Ibid., 69.

125 Ibid., 71.

126 Hadrian Siregar, "Sedikit tentang rabahnja pertanaman padi dan usaha-usaha kulturtehnis untuk mentjegahnya," Tehnik Pertanian 4: 172-180 in Ibid., 72.

127 Ibid.

Paddy Center would supply the seeds, but dry lands on the islands outside Java needed to utilize regional seed centers *(Balai Benih)* and village seed gardens *(Kebun Bibit Desa)* to multiply the dry land seeds, as the Research Center could not provide the full supply.[133] In supporting BPMD and the Paddy Center program, farmers, who also became breeders, had to be aware, too, of the quality of seeds, their yields, and storage.

During the late 1950s, these technical interventions and guidance to increase rice production through farmers were intensified by the expansion of military education.[134] Due to the existing political tensions among political groups, including the army, and the regional movement of the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic *(Pemerintah Revolusi Republik Indonesia,* PRRI) against Soekarno, the previous structure of parliamentary democracy shifted to Guided Democracy. Arguably, one of the characters of this regime was the rise of the army.[135] In 1959, the government initiated a coordinating body of Prosperity Operation *(Operasi Makmur)* and established the Centralized Food Command *(Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur,* KOGM). The first task of KOGM was to mobilize the population through student and farmer organizations, based on the principle of mutual cooperation *(gotong rojong).* Changing the agricultural method of rice farmers and making them modern was the final purpose of the operation. "Agricultural revolution was necessary," said Brigadier General Azis Saleh, the Junior Minister of Agriculture under the Ministry of Production. He meant a revolution in agricultural methods; through the Paddy Center, the government had attempted to modernize rice cultivation.[136]

The implementation of rice self-sufficiency, however, went awry. From 1958 to 1961, the rate of increase of rice production was up to 1.2 per cent a year, with a total of 292,000 tons; meanwhile, the population was increasing at the rate of 2.3 per cent a year.[137] This situation increased concern about the rice supply and also raised the general issue of food self- sufficiency. In a meeting in 1962, the Regional Bureau of People's Food in West Java decided that, aside from rice self-sufficiency, food self-sufficiency was essential. The reasons were first, rice was not the main staple food for several regions (e.g., villagers in Central Java were more accustomed to *gaplek*); and second, regional climates had to be accommodated (i.e., long dry season).[138] Subsequently, the nutrient content of other staple foods became important, as the purpose was to balance the intake of calories and protein. The Bureau of People's Food Improvement *(Lembaga Perbaikan Makanan Rakjat)*, together with the Division of Technology of the Research Bureau of the People's Plantation *(Lembaga Penelitian Perkebunan Rakjat),* attempted to find the solution through,

128 Soekandar Wiriatmadja, "Penelitian Pertanian Zaman Perang Kemerdekaan (1945-1950)," 112-13.

129 Wakil Kementerian Pertanian Bagian Rantjangan Kesedjahteraan, "Rentjana Kesedjahteraan Istimewa 1951-1956 (1950)," in 70 Tahun Penyuluhan Pertanian Di Indonesia 1908-1978, ed. Departemen Pertanian (Jakarta: BPLPP, 1978), 67.

130 R. Soewardjo, "BPMD: Balai Pendidikan Masjarakat Desa - Village Educational Center," ed. Djawatan Pertanian Rakyat - Extension Service Pusat (Djakarta, Indonesia: 1953), 6-7.

131 Ibid., 7.

132 Ibid.

133 Mh. Tjoehaja, "Pedoman Untuk Menghasilkan Bibit Padi Unggul Di Balai-Balai Benih Dan Kebun-Kebun Bibit Desa," Madjalah Pertanian 3 (1962): 50.

134 Farabih Fakih, "The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition During the Early Independence Period, 1950-65" (Leiden University, 2014), 86-88

among other approaches, making dry *gethuk* (cassava snack) from sweet potatoes.[139] With simpler cultivation methods and shorter growing cycles, corn and sweet potatoes could ease the pressure on the food supply.

Given the wide range of research on paddy and rice cultivation, agricultural scientists did not explicitly define *pembangunan* the way economists did. The scientific and technological interventions regarding rice—through seed breeding, cultivation methods, and farmers' education—were attempts to improve the quality of rice as well as its growing factors, such as planting method and farmers' working spirit. The policy priority of the government might change, but in this story pembangunan was about improving the quality of living in which science and technology were ready to be the tools.

A Spoonful of Rice: The Ideal Picture of Society

The efforts to improve rice was inseparable from the lives of farmers and village society, and Indonesia's intellectuals and bureaucrats were aware of this. Their dream of a just and prosperous society made it possible for them to envision an ideal Indonesian society. *Pembangunan* was the vision of rice society and village community.

The association between rice, farmers, and village community was a "seductive mirage" for intellectuals, politicians, and government bureaucrats.[140] "I was happy to be among so many passengers," said Amal Hamzah's protagonist of the short story, "Spyglass." "There were all sorts of conversations, but the majority of them revolved around the issue of rice." Rice was ubiquitous. "Rice, rice from the city this four-letter word which here means existence, life or death, had been with me." He turned his sight to the window. "I could see the [people's] paddy fields filled with green rice plants. In two more months at the most it would be ready for harvest." He hoped for a prosperous life. "Thank God, let them be wealthy again with the paddy which they reap."[141]

Amal's protagonist expressed only what he heard and saw, but he directly associated the green wet-rice field with the prosperity of farmers during the harvest season. Through his protagonist, Amal showed a romantic gaze toward the village. Yet, his view was far from surprising. Coming from a royal family in Langkat, North Sumatera, Amal was an intellectual figure with a legal and literary education in Jakarta. He actively wrote prose and poems in 1948-1952, and after publishing a number of books and literary essays, he worked for the Indonesian embassy in Bonn, West Germany from 1953 to 1958. In Amal's educated and literary mind, wet-rice field depicted the future welfare of the people.

135 For more details see Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia; Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 1966 [2009]).

136 "Agricultural Revolution Necessary," The Indonesian Herald, 22 November 1961.

137 "Rice Production and Imports," 48.

138 Esuk, "Swa Sembada Bahan Makanan (SSBM) Sebagai Pelengkap Swa Sembada Beras (SSB)," Madjalah Pertanian 5 (1962): 109-13.

139 Ibid., 112.

140 "Seductive mirage" refers to the "ways the village ... has been represented and acted upon at a number of levels by both outside observers and agencies of government and administration." Jeremy Kemp, Seductive Mirage: The Search for the Village Community in Southeast Asia (Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications, 1988): 1. For similar discussion on the construction of the "village" concept, see Jan Breman, The Shattered Image: Construction and Deconstruction of the Village in Colonial Asia (Dordrecht, Hollan: Foris Publications, 1988).

The association between rice cultivation, rural life, and an ideal picture of welfare also appeared among Indonesia's national leaders and scholars. In relation to rural society, Soekarno was in favor of the term and concept of *gotong rojong*. Variedly translated, the general meaning of this term is mutual cooperation among members of a community, yet Soekarno utilized the term as the foundation of the Indonesian nation-state. According to Denys Lombard, a historian of Indonesia, Soekarno leveraged *gotong rojong* as a national slogan for overcoming all economic difficulties. In doing so, Soekarno "flattered tradition for the sake of village solidarity and delayed its destruction."[142]

Hatta agreed with Soekarno, but as an economist he tried to differentiate between social and economic cooperation. On the one hand, Hatta thought that social cooperation was the older, traditional type of mutual assistance commonly found among Indonesian people. "In the traditional Indonesian villages all work which is too heavy for one person [including tilling the rice fields] is done with the aid of fellow villagers."143 For Hatta, this social cooperation was performed without exact economic calculation; the common people lived by mutual assistance. Thus, Hatta understood Soekarno's use of *gotong rojong* as social cooperation, the type of social interaction that makes "a strong feeling of *solidarity*, a feeling of harmoniously belong[ing] together."[144]

On the other hand, economic cooperation aimed to improve the welfare of the people by their working together. Solidarity was necessary, but economic cooperation also attempted to get maximum results with the means available. Organization had to be the foundation of the cooperation by uplifting the weak and assembling scattered economic forces. For Hatta, to be able to do these things, economic cooperation also required another feeling: *individuality*, "a conscious self-respect in relation to one's fellow members [which] creates confidence in one's ability to do things."[145]

Hatta's further explanation on cooperatives in the rice sector was based on his observation regarding the *idjon* system, a practice of mortgaging crops before harvest time. Hatta did not provide details about who conducted the mortgage and usury in villages, referring to them only as *tukang idjon* (mortgagee), but he aimed for cooperatives to free farmers from such practices of extortionate usury. When members of a rice cooperative needed credit, they would be given a loan of money from the proceeds of the sale of the rice. Later they could pay off their debt with rice. Rice cooperatives were "perfectly adapted to the exigencies of the villages, … [T]he people are learning by joint enterprise to improve their economic situation, which languished under the evil of *idjon* system."[146]

For Hatta, the traditional Indonesian villages ignored individuality in favor of traditions and customs; the general, collective opinion always came first. Yet cooperatives, in Hatta's

[141] Amal Hamzah, "Spyglass," in Indonesian Writing in Translation ed. John M. Echols (Singapore: Equinox Publishing 1956 [2009]), 105-08. The short-story was originally written around 1948-1949.

[142] Denys Lombard, Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya, Bagian III: Warisan Kerajaan-Kerajaan Konsentris trans. Winarsih Partaningrat Arifin, Rahayu S. Hidayat, and Nini Hidayati Yusuf (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2005), 89. For Lombard, Soekarno's account was intriguing, because when Soekarno first used the term in 1942, it coincided with the decline of collective property rights; the communal land had drastically decreased in size and been turned into private land.

[143] M. Hatta, The Co-Operative Movement in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), 1.

[144] Ibid., 2, original emphasis.

[145] Ibid., 3.

view, could not be successful without both solidarity and individuality. He asserted, "[I] f we want to develop our villages into cooperatives, we must teach new ideas."[147] These activities of education should be demonstrated by leaders with idealism, in whom the people could have faith.[148] Hatta desired community development in which all members shared responsibility.

Hatta highlighted that building up cooperatives required constant striving for improvement. Education of villagers, in Hatta's mind, required patience and the conviction that the ideals would be accomplished. The government echoed Hatta's stance on village education as an instrument to build farmers' knowledge and mentality regarding rice cooperatives through the role of the Agricultural Extension Service, the establishment of BPMD in sub- districts, and the publication of *Madjalah Pertanian* by the Central Bureau of People's Food. Staff of the Agricultural Extension Service *(para penjuluh)* had a leadership role in educating farmers in villages. Not only did they have to have certain technical knowledge of rice cultivation, but also they needed people-oriented skills and organizational skills.[149] "[BPMD] was designed so a new modern peasant soul can be built in accordance with the call for independence," said a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture.[150] He continued that the total *pembangunan* of the farming community needed to be carried out as thoroughly as possible, and it was for both the physical development of farmers and that of their mind and character.[151]

Hatta was attentive to the mind and character of farmers as well. He said that Indonesians "should adopt an attitude of humility" by using an analogy of rice: the riper the rice, the more it bends down.[152] He added that all explanations about community and the principles of cooperatives should be incorporated in "attractive stories of daily life."[153] In 1962, when the government pushed forward its agenda of rice self-sufficiency, *Madjalah Pertanian (Agricultural Magazine)* published short moral stories about rice alongside scientific articles.

One short anecdote was titled "The Hidden Treasure."[154] It started with an old farmer lying on his bed, waiting for his time to die. He called his two sons, expressing regret that he could not give them anything except a portion of land. "If you are diligent, you will find a big hidden treasure inside that land." After the father died, the two sons started digging the land to find the treasure; they worked the land, day and night. The treasure wasn't there, but the soil became fertile and the paddies grew well with satisfying yields. Another story was titled "The Story of Areca Tree and Paddy," a moral tale about the utility of rice for human beings.[155] The areca tree, big and tall, looked down on the noble and humble paddy for being small and weak, but in the end, it was the paddy that was more useful for people than the tree. These efforts considerably materialized Hatta's ideas not only to provide education and guidance but also to fuel morality and working spirit of rice farmers and villagers.

146 Ibid., 15. 147 Ibid., 4.

148 Ibid.

149 Atilla Garnadi, "Penjuluh Pertanian," Madjalah Pertanian 1-2 (1962): 21-22.

150 BPLPP, "70 Tahun Penyuluhan Pertanian Di Indonesia," ed. Departemen Pertanian (Djakarta: Departemen Pertanian, 1978), 66.

151 Ibid., 66-67.

The entanglement of Hatta's cooperative and Soekarno's *gotong rojong* vis-à-vis agricultural society, however, irritated intellectuals like Soedjatmoko. He had an interest in democratic socialism and developed his understanding by travelling to Western and Eastern Europe. He was eventually disappointed in both West European democracies and the Communist states of Eastern Europe due to the "striking disparities between ideologies and performance in all of them."[156] Although this disappointment led to no answer he had sought, Soedjatmoko was increasingly interested in the issue of development, even establishing the P.T. Pembangunan publishing house that printed social science books.[157] With his enthusiasm for development issue yet an uneasy relationship with Soekarno, Soedjatmoko was damning about the "superficial similarity between the functioning of a cooperative and the practice of *gotong rojong*."[158]

Soedjatmoko argued that the similarity "obscures the significance of the changes resulting from the establishment of a co-operative in a village, and not infrequently this very similarity becomes an obstacle to the success of the co-operative."[159] He argued that *gotong rojong* was rooted in the feudal-agrarian structure and, in practice, many village cooperatives were no more than "associations of the local feudal elements [used] as a new means of perpetuating the traditional power over the poorer villagers."[160] For Soedjatmoko, the key to the success or failure of a village cooperative depended not only on the leaders and members to provide organization but also on sociocultural changes. He suggested that "[W]e must align our thoughts and actions and production relations with the new factor of the machine that we introduce into our existence."[161] Soedjatmoko wanted a complete absorption of the machine into social structure, a cultural co-evolvement of human and technology, because the "machinery and technology used by any people are an embodiment of, and are inseparable from, the culture of that people."[162]

Soedjatmoko did not draw his conclusion from direct observation of rice cultivation and farmers, but from his understanding of progress in human history and modernity. He said that "the conquest of nature by man is possible and it constitutes a legitimate purpose in life. ... In order to achieve mastery of nature, man must first gain knowledge of the laws of nature."[163] He did not advocate mere scientific and technological adoption in agricultural society, but suggested that society must develop culturally together with the machine and

152 Hatta, The Co-Operative Movement in Indonesia, 63.

153 Ibid., 5.

154 F. Sudarto, "Harta Jang Terpendam," Madjalah Pertanian 1-2 (1962): 17.

155 F. Sudarto, "Tjeritera Pohon Pinang Dengan Padi," Madjalah Pertanian 5 (1962): 144.

156 George McT. Kahin and Milton L. Barnett, "In Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922-1989," Indonesia 49 (1990): 134.

157 Ibid. One of the books published by P.T. Pembangunan is Sumitro's Ekonomi Pembangunan (1955).

158 Soedjatmoko, Economic Development as a Cultural Problem, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958 [1954]), 5. Soedjatmoko had a close link with Sjahrir, the first Prime Minister, and was a very loyal friend; Sjahrir's democratic socialism was influential on Soedjatmoko, although he soon established his own intellectual perspectives. Kahin and Barnett state that "Soedjatmoko never could quite sort out his feelings towards Sukarno. He was impatient with [Soekarno] and often intensely critical of his shortcomings." Kahin and Barnett, "In Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922-1989," 132-39.

159 Soedjatmoko, Economic Development as a Cultural Problem, 5.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., 6.

162 Ibid.

technology. What he meant was changes in the way of living and thinking, as "besides the diverse technical and economic aspects, there is also the human dimension to economic development."[164]

Subsequently, Soedjatmoko shared a particular idea of Hatta: he echoed the importance of education. While Hatta focused on education about the principles and practices of cooperatives, Soedjatmoko emphasized philosophical education regarding development in each phase of formal education. For example, in elementary school, children must be familiar with the "conviction that [they] can better the conditions of [their] environment by a subsequent contribution to the increase of production."[165] At the more advanced level, higher education must adjust to the "demands of social progress and [become] an instrument of reconstruction and development."[166] For Soedjatmoko, readjustments in the basis of education would produce a new outlook among the personnel of the state apparatus: people who would "see [themselves] as an instrument contributing toward realization of [Indonesia's] aims of development."[167]

Unlike Soedjatmoko, who was concerned with long-term cultural change, Koentjaraningrat paid attention to the practice of *gotong rojong*. He was trained at Yale University in anthropology and was familiar with the Javanese kinship system. He was concerned with *gotong rojong* as a social reality, not as a mere concept for social change.[168] He cited his fellow anthropologist, Bachtiar Rifai, who said that *gotong rojong* was a too perfect imagination of people who did not participate in it.[169] Drawing from his ethnographic study in two villages in southern Central Java, Celapar and Wajasari, Koentjaraningrat presented the multiple practices of *gotong rojong*. He noted the various intensities of gotong rojong in agricultural activities.

> "In the easy intervals, a *tani* [farmer] can cope with the work alone or with the assistance of members of his immediate family. But in the busy period he needs additional help. … The phases in land cultivation for which *grodjogan* [the local term for mutual cooperation] assistance is usually asked are: hoeing, planting of rice seedlings and care of the young shoots, and weeding the *sawah* while the rice plants grow *(matun)*."[170]

He concluded his study by saying that "[*gotong rojong*] is a feature of any social order based on agriculture."[171] Should his impression prove to be true, he added, the practice of *gotong rojong* would diminish as the influence of urban life increased.

163 Ibid., 9.
164 Ibid., 16.
165 Ibid., 19.
166 Ibid., 20.
167 Ibid., 21.
168 James J. Fox, "In Memoriam Professor Koentjaraningrat 15 June 1923 - 23 March 1999," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 157, no. 2 (2001): 241. The Southeast Asia Studies Program at Yale University published his MA Thesis, A Preliminary Description of the Javanese Kinship System (1956), was published in 1957 as a Cultural Series Report.
169 Koentjaraningrat, Gotong Rojong: Some Social-Anthropological Observations on Practices in Two Villages of Central Java, trans. Claire Holt (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 1961 [2009]), 2.
170 Ibid., 49-50. 171 Ibid., 60.
172 Ibid.

Despite his initial scepticism, Koentjaraningrat apparently advocated *gotong rojong* as an ideal form of Indonesian society, not exclusively to rural areas. He asserted that *gotong rojong* could be a "feature of the personality … the character of all the Indonesian people"[172] The spirit of *gotong rojong* and its idealistic meaning should be imbued in the majority of the Indonesian people—for them to serve society and not be concerned only with individual interests.[173] With such statements, Koentjaraningrat was inclined toward Soekarno's ideal of *gotong rojong*.

The association between rice cultivation and the social structure of villagers also correlated with programs of community development. In the early 1960s, the central government deployed three programs of community development under the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Cooperatives.[174] As each ministry had determined its own system, Indonesia's community development programs became pluralistic in philosophy, approach, and objective.

A sociologist, Selo Soemardjan, assessed these programs by capturing the everyday lives of villagers. Social change was at the center of his concern. Soemardjan had previously worked as an officer of the Dutch administrative service in Yogyakarta and then trained as a sociologist at Cornell University. He was extremely familiar with the administrative issue of top-down policy implementation and the process of social change.[175] He already had experience working in villages for more than twenty-five years, and was qualified to see the sociological connection between the government and society.[176]

In 1962, endorsed by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Soemardjan conducted research in Banyumas, Central Java and Bojong, West Java to assess the government's community development programs. Soemardjan started his report with his review of the three systems of community development deployed by the Indonesian government.[177] He said that although there were multiple systems of community development, "there are no necessarily conflicting differences … [t]hey can even be mutually supporting."[178] For Soemardjan, the different results of each system were dependent on the particular features of each village community.

For example, in Banyumas, the community development program of the Ministry of Education worked through village officials. During his visit, "most of the new organizations for community development … were in the process of being established, while some

[173] Ibid.

[174] The Ministry of Education, through the Department of Community Education (Djawatan Pendidikan Masjarakat) launched a program called Pen-Mas; The Ministry of Social Affairs created Village Social Institution (Lembaga Sosial Desa); and the Ministry of Cooperatives had village community development program under the Bureau for Village Community Development (Biro Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa). Selo Soemardjan, The Dynamics of Community Development in Rural Central and West Java: A Comparative Report, Cornell Indonesia Modern Project Monograph Series (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 1-12.

[175] His dissertation on villages in Jogjakarta was also published with the title Social Changes in Jogjakarta by Cornell University Press in 1962.

[176] George McT. Kahin, "Preface," in Selo Soemardjan, The Dynamics of Community Development in Rural Central and West Java, iii-iv.

[177] Ibid.

were still in planning."[179] Once some consolidation had been reached, villagers took up new activities of *gotong rojong* work that was already in place. He noted the women's organization, *Ikatan Kartini*, which engaged in *beras djimpitan*, a mechanism of collecting rice from each household. "[E]very member [of the organization] is expected to set aside a spoonful of rice every time before cooking the family meal."[180] Each week, the leader of the lowest administrative body in the community, the *Rukun Tetangga*, would collect this rice and sell it at lower than market price to those designated as poor by the government. The village youth organization, *Taruna Karya*, also worked to increase rice productivity by "spreading the use of artificial fertilizer and new high-powered rice seeds."[181] In Bojong, Soemardjan found a similar practice of *beras djimpitan*, namely *beras perelek*, in which almost every *Rukun Tetangga* had collective rice storage to be used in critical periods and to help needy people. The rice cooperative abolished the practice of pantjen duties in Bojong (similar to the *idjon* mortgage system) and replaced it with cash-payment by the cooperative.[182]

Soemardjan's comments were policy oriented. He noted that "if a government wants to establish a program of community development it should determine what attitude its executive agencies ought to assume towards the communities to which the program is to be applied," that of either authoritative agency, educator, or consultant.[183] Each attitude, he explained, had its own system and strategies, and establishing the attitude was necessary before the government identified the program.

Soemardjan, however, continued his explanation by showing how the features of a community's social response also played an important role. In Banyumas, the Ministry of Education, whose staff had "Western-oriented educational backgrounds," prepared the community to "understand and eventually to utilize influences of Western origin in the social and economic sectors of life."[184] Whereas in Bojong, Soemardjan did not see the enforcement of "alien cultural elements … upon the community; only a reshaping of existing institutions is endeavored. … The movement is directed inward."[185] Soemardjan did not come up with a final, ideal system of community development. He rather raised an open-ended question: "Which system is better? The answer is: Better for what?"[186]

This conceptualization of rice society and village life by intellectuals implies visionary meanings of *pembangunan* regarding society: a *gotong rojong* society, a cooperative society, a technologically modern society, or a society that is culturally responsive to external influences (i.e., policy). It was not clear which society was the ideal one, as intellectuals had their own consideration and vision, driven by their assumptions and observations about rice societies and village life. For sure, the discourse of "community development" was not alien for these intellectuals.[187]

[178] Ibid., 12. [179] Ibid., 21. [180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid., 28.
[183] Ibid., 31-34.
[184] Ibid., 40
[185] Ibid. 186 Ibid.
[187] For an example of the history of "community development" and the connotation attached to the term see Daniel
Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015);

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The ideas of realizing a dream of a just and prosperous society, however, entangled with the question of foreign aid and the emergence of another political agenda. *Pembangunan* became increasingly vague and obscure, as the government was juggling different national priorities.

Soekarno's vision of economic independence during the 1950s was not a sign of isolation from foreign cooperation. Indonesia played an active role in foreign relations with other countries and international organizations. In 1952, Indonesia hosted the Third Session of the International Rice Commission (IRC) of the FAO in Bandung after the previous two sessions held in neighboring countries, Thailand and Burma. The session was technical. The delegates of Indonesia, who were mostly staff of the General Agricultural Research Station and officials from the Ministry of Agriculture as well as the Ministry of Economic Affairs, discussed Indonesia's concerns and progress regarding domestic rice production and further cooperation with the members of the Commission. During the welcoming speech, the Minister of Agriculture expressed Indonesia's vision to be a self-supporting country, and stipulated that the recommendations of the Commission "must be translated into nation-wide movements in every country."[188]

In the global context of the Cold War, Indonesia's agreements of cooperation with other countries were flexible and dynamic. By the early 1960s, Indonesia appeared to have received substantial aid or offers of aid. From January 1956 to the end of 1962, this assistance came in the form of grants and loans totalling over $2.7 billion, which became a major supplement of the government's total income.[189] The Indonesian government used this aid to overcome the shortage of basic goods, including rice. From 1956 to 1961, the U.S. sold 661,000 tons of rice to Indonesia; China, in 1958, provided a loan of $20 million for the import of rice.[190]

Indonesia negotiated aid and trade not only with the Western bloc but also with the Communist bloc. Indeed, the relationship between Indonesia and the U.S. was uneasy. As noted by Suzanne Moon, a historian of Indonesia, the U.S. and Indonesia conflicted ideologically over how to achieve development.[191] When the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower rejected Soekarno's request for a loan in early 1956, Soekarno signed an agreement with the Soviet Union's leader, Nikita Khrushchev, for the exchange of experts and trainees.[192] The ratification of the Indonesian-Soviet agreement in 1959 initiated seven years of rapid aid from the Soviet Union. From 1959 to 1965, Indonesia was the largest recipient of Soviet aid (mostly loans) in Southeast Asia, receiving double the amount of aid to North Vietnam and one-third of all Soviet aid to Asia.[193]

The Indonesian government, however, still attempted to get a loan from the U.S. In 1958, the Minister of Public Works sent a request to the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to sell Indonesia 500 tractors on credit—insisting that with or without U.S. help, Indonesia would embark on the self-sufficiency program.[194] Moon notes that U.S. officials did not see Indonesian self-sufficiency as necessary as long as it could

188 FAO, "International Rice Commission Report of the Third Session," (Bangkok: FAO, 1952), 1.

189 Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications," Pacific Affairs 36, no. 2 (1963): 111.

190 Ibid.

purchase staples from the U.S. or other rice-surplus countries like Burma or Thailand.[195] For the U.S. officials, Indonesia's rice self-sufficiency was a mere quick solution; it was "a struggle for the Indonesian mind," a gradual change through technical training and proper farming management and control that had to be pursued. Yet for Indonesia's officials, self-sufficiency was an attempt to gain economic independence as soon as possible.

In the early 1960s, the vision of self-sufficiency in Indonesia's foreign policy started to crumble. Rice prices inflated, and the government had to deal with the Dutch attempt to create an independent state in West Papua. The central government broke off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, mobilized considerable military force to West Papua, and undertook a political campaign under Soekarno's operational command. Military expenditures increased rapidly, by 75 per cent of the national budget, contributing to a huge budget deficit in 1962.[196] This political dispute over West Papua created a dilemma for the Indonesian government: economic recovery or national sovereignty.

Nonetheless, the government needed a new way to communicate its political goals to the world. With an endorsement from Indonesia's Foreign Office, Arifin Bey, an Indonesian journalist who had just completed his PhD at Georgetown University, came back to Indonesia and became the editor of the new English language daily newspaper *The Indonesian Herald* which declared itself "the messenger of the nation's identity."[197]

The new messenger did its work. News and updates on West Papua as well as Indonesian leaders' statements asserting Indonesia's position and criticizing Western countries and the United Nations dominated *Herald* columns. The editorial team often used a confrontative tone for its pieces—"Is Uncle Sam Aware?" "The Enemies Within," "Brother How Could You," "The Angry Young Man"—to communicate the government's political agenda to push the U.S. and the UN in negotiations with the Netherlands.[198] The newspaper also routinely published editorials that conveyed government opinions and analysis regarding Indonesia's foreign affairs, as well as provided updates on the government's economic development program and cooperation. The news coverage on the agricultural program for economic development was similarly assertive, with titles such as "Agricultural Revolution Necessary" and "Revolution in Food-stuff Supplies Necessary."[199]

As the political condition in West Papua was affecting Indonesia's economy, Soekarno, proclaiming himself as the Supreme War Administrator, went on the offensive in addressing the economic situation. A few days before Christmas in 1961, the front page of the *Herald* delivered the message, "may the light of peace guide us all." On the same

191 Suzanne Moon, "Take-off or Self-Sufficiency? Ideologies of Development in Indonesia, 1957-1961," Technology and Culture 39, no. 2 (1998): 187-212.

192 Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 3 (2008): 116.

193 Ibid.

194 Moon, "Take-off or Self-Sufficiency?" 197. 195 Ibid.

196 Fakih, "The Rise of the Managerial State," 110; Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, 67.

197 "The messenger of the nation's identity" is the slogan of the Herald newspaper.

198 "Is Uncle Sam Aware?" The Indonesian Herald, 02 December 1961; "The Enemies Within," The Indonesian Herald, 05 December 1961; "Brother How Could You," The Indonesian Herald, 11 December 1961; "The Angry Young Man," The Indonesian Herald, 18 December 1961.

199 "Agricultural Revolution Necessary," The Indonesian Herald, 22 November 1961; "Revolution in Food-Stuff Supplies Necessary," The Indonesian Herald, 05 December 1961.

page, the newspaper reported Soekarno's demand of the death sentence for people who disturbed the country's economy.[200] "We have proofs of these attempts [of disturbing the economy]. … We are now in a revolution which is reaching its highest integrity, and [people] … are hoarding rice excessively causing [a] rise in prices."[201] The *Herald* editors echoed Soekarno's concern: "We hope that in the present period of implementing the [People's] Command, the government will be successful in securing control [over] those bent at disturbing the smooth running of our economic life."[202]

With the bombardment of the West Papua issue, the *Herald's* agricultural update was limited. The "Economic Development" column communicated mostly trade agreements or industrial activities and plans. Soekarno's intensified agenda toward West Papua was at the center of Indonesia's foreign affairs, and the *Herald* had to follow the agenda of the central office. Nineteen sixty-one became the year of command, in which coverage of food and clothes in the *Herald* was not in the context of self-sufficiency or economic growth but in the context of Indonesia's military logistics and mobilization to secure West Papua.

Amidst the tension at Indonesia's center, the U.S. attempted to mend its relationship with Indonesia with the agreement Food for Peace.[203] In February 1962, the *Herald* reported that this program would provide 192,000 tons of rice ($24.5 million); 195,000 tons of wheat flour ($15 million); 242,000 bales of cotton ($36.3 million); 5,000 tons of tobacco ($10 million); and an additional $6.9 million for ocean transportation, as shipping on U.S. vessels was required.[204] In the same year, President John F. Kennedy commenced the Economic Survey Team which, after observation, provided a recommendation: "since [the] long-run influence of aid is likely to be greater the more fundamentally it is related to the promotion of Indonesian national objectives, [the U.S. government] should be willing to support these objectives."[205] Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Subandrio, expressed his pleasure with the food aid agreement and the hope that the agreement would overcome food shortages. He added, "Indonesia at present is able to contribute to efforts for defending world peace and for creating understanding among all nations in the world."[206] The economic relations between Indonesia and other countries were, after all, an instrument of the revolution.[207]

This narrative of revolution, however, could not stem the import of rice. Since 1960, the government had imported up to one million tons of rice, equivalent to about six per cent of the national calorie consumption.[208] In 1963, the government cancelled the Paddy Center program. The credit system was prone to fraud and the system to repay the credit using rice paddy did not work because the purchase price was always lower than the market price. The government attempted another program of Mass Guidance *(Bimbingan Massal,* BIMAS) in 1964 and imposed an import ban to incentivize domestic production, which in one year the government compromised. In early 1965, it signed an agreement to purchase 80,000 tons of rice from Burma.[209] "In the long run there seems no reason why the necessary increase in domestic production should not be achieved," said one

200 "President's Instructions: Death for Economic Violators, Be on Guard against Enemy," The Indonesian Herald, 23 December 1961.

201 Ibid.

202 "The People's Command and Economic Sector," The Indonesian Herald, 27 December 1961.

203 "Rice from U.S.A," The Indonesian Herald, 15 February 1962.

economic report, "though 'standing on our own feet' may not always be interpreted as implying self-sufficiency in foodstuffs."[210]

This final part of the story shows how rice became a secondary priority when in the 1960s the government prioritized another agenda. The central authority was juggling the rhetorical narrative to gain political sovereignty over West Papua and a series of diplomatic agreements to access foreign rice aid and technical assistance. *Pembangunan* was a catch-22: a dilemma that perpetually asked how to use outside resources without compromising independence.[211]

Conclusion: Cultivating *Pembangunan*

This study has traced how the multiple understandings of rice during the first twenty years of independent Indonesia created the idea of *pembangunan*. After the Second World War, the rice problem remained a pressing issue for national leaders, intellectuals, and policymakers. The full control over rice, domestically and internationally, against the return of the Dutch fuelled *pembangunan* as part of Indonesia's struggle of independence. Indonesia's economists responded to the notion of economic freedom as the true independence by debating rice issues in relation to the national economy. They defined *pembangunan* not only as part of the valuing and managing rice for the betterment of society, but also as part of the state project, with an aspiration for a self-sufficient economy.

The aspiration regarding the national economy required technical intervention. The government needed an instrument to advance the economic condition of the people by increasing the quality and, later, the quantity of rice. Science and technology played a role in this part through seeds breeding and experiments on cultivation methods. The guidance to farmers by the government pushed these scientific and technological interventions on the ground, with the specific purpose of improving farmers' working methods and spirit.
211 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007 [1976]), 19-41.

Intellectuals did not stop at macro and technical issues. They also envisioned ideal pictures of Indonesian society based on their observation and understanding of agricultural and rural society. The relationship between villagers around rice cultivation and distribution provided materials for intellectuals to think about social changes and seek their own version of Indonesian society. From *gotong rojong* to cooperatives society, from technologically modern society to culturally responsive society, these intellectuals implied visionary outlooks of *pembangunan*.

204 "New Long Term Food-for-Peace Agreement Signed," The Indonesian Herald, 20 February 1962.

205 United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, "Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for Unites States Economic Aid, a Report for the President of the Unites States," (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1963).

206 "New Long-Term Food-for-Peace Agreement Signed."

207 "Economic Relations Tools of Revolution," The Indonesian Herald, 23 March 1962.

208 Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, 114.

209 The official amount of rice imported from Burma in 1965 was 81,500 tons. Badan Urusan Logistik, "Seperempat Abad Bergulat Dengan Butir-Butir Beras," 74.

210 "Rice Production and Imports," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 1, no. 1 (1965): 65.

In this story, rice became a weapon of struggle for independence, an object of economic contestation modified through scientific and technological intervention, and an ideal picture of society. Errors in policy implementation and competition with other priorities added complexity to these processes of abstracting rice. The government's policies on rice waxed and waned with the top-down political ambitions and manifestations. *Pembangunan* was, therefore, versatile and adaptable, making the idea simultaneously definitive and obscure.

When the regime officially changed in 1967 after the political turmoil related to the Indonesia Communist Party, Soeharto, the predecessor of Soekarno, named his regime the "New Order" and his first cabinet "Kabinet Pembangunan." The regime continued the program of rice self-sufficiency as well as economic policies to control the price of rice through balance of payment and a distribution mechanism. He quickly recruited economists like Sumitro, created the Five-Year Development Plan with rice production as one of its priorities, continued the 1964 program of BIMAS, and intensified the role of the Ministry of Agriculture and its research bureau. [212]

While Soeharto's regime continued and intensified *pembangunan* through institutionalization, it was during the first decades after 1945 that the idea of *pembangunan* was slowly growing and finding its root.[213] As Farabih Fakih argues, the roots of the New Order should be sought in the 1950s and early 1960s, the periods when "ideologies and discourses on efficiency, development, and modernity" legitimated the creation of institutional order.[214] Clearly, the making of *pembangunan* was not total. The process of abstracting and conceptualizing rice occurred in a difficult time when the regime was facing numerous policy failure and a dilemma of priority. Nonetheless, this process made it possible for Indonesia's leaders and intellectuals during this period to cultivate *pembangunan*, a living and growing seed of idea.

Just like the concept of "revolution," the meaning of Indonesia's *pembangunan* and its desire to improve is no longer singular, nor static.[215] It is, then, left for future work to dig deeper into the intellectual anxiety and struggle of Indonesia's leaders and society in defining national development. *Pembangunan*, in the end, is like a stalk of rice: dependent on the climate and technical change, alterable to the wind of new regime.

[212] Booth, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 178-86; van Zanden and Marks, An Economic History of Indonesia, 185-88; Alexis Rieffel, "The Bimas Program for Self-Sufficiency in Rice Production," Indonesia 8 (1969): 103-33; Leon A. Mears, "Rice and Food Self-Sufficiency in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies XX, no. 2 (1984): 122-38; C. Peter Timmer, "Does Bulog Stabilise Rice Prices in Indonesia? Should It Try?" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): 45-74.

[213] On New Order development (and its critiques) see, among others, John J. MacDougall, "The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order," Asian Survey 16, no. 12 (1976): 1166-83; Chalmers and Hadiz, eds., The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia; Michael T. Rock, "The Politics of Development Policy and Development of Policy Reform in New Order Indonesia," in William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 632 (2003); Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008); Tania Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007); Elizabeth Fuller Collins, Indonesia Betrayed: How Development Fails (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007).

[214] Fakih, "The Rise of the Managerial State," 352.

[215] For a concise discussion of the Indonesian national revolution see Norman Joshua, "State and Revolution in the Making of the Indonesian Republic," Jurnal Sejarah 2, no. 1 (2018): 64-76.

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