POLITICS OF PREMATURE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION: THE CASE OF INDONESIA[1]

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Abstract: The available literature on the issue of premature deindustrialization in developing countries has been mainly economic, i.e., explaining the economic causes of the phenomenon, such as trade liberalization (e.g., Bogliaccini 2013) and technological progress (e.g., Rodrik 2016). The literature generally understands deindustrialization as an inevitable trend of current economic development. This paper utilizes Indonesia's experience with premature deindustrialization to argue that the current established literature overlooks political causes--such as the weakening of state capacity and authority, on the one hand, and the reconsolidation of capital, on the other; and failure in tackling the economic-political reform dilemma during the democratic transition. Moreover, using a counter-factual comparison with other countries handling of the IMF situation during the 1997 crisis and with Indonesia's own handling with a previous commodity boom, this paper argues that premature deindustrialization would have not occurred if the economic causes existed, had the political causes not also occurred.

Key words: *Premature deindustrialization; State-Capital relation; Democratic transition*

I. Recent trend of premature deindustrialization: A background

1 This is still a draft in progress and will be presented at the 2018 Arryman Symposium at Ford Foundation Auditorium, Jakarta. Earlier drafts were submitted for Professor Riedl's Comparative Politics Proseminar II, Winter 2018, and presented at Evanston Arryman Symposium, May 12, 2018. I thank Professor Riedl for helpful reading materials, Professor Winters and Professor Nelson as my academic mentors for comments on earlier drafts, Carol Yoken, Ph.D., for proof-reading, Zhihang Ruan for being a critical discussant during the symposium at Evanston, and the audience at the symposium in general for the helpful discussion. I also thank Rakhmat Syarip for the willingness to be the discussant for the Jakarta Symposium.
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Over the last several decades, countries have experienced the phenomenon of deindustrialization—starting with developed countries in the 1970s and continuing with less developed ones into the current era (Tregenna 2015). Even though deindustrialization is not a particularly recent phenomenon—it also happened in the colonies during the era of colonization (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1998)—a new characteristic has arisen with this recent deindustrialization, i.e., that the overall economy continues to grow despite the diminishing share of the manufacturing sector (World Bank 2018), as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.[3] This new characteristic is at odds with the widely agreed understanding among economists and political scientists that manufacturing is the engine of sustained economic growth—whether for the old industrializers in 19th century northwestern Europe or for the late and late-late industrializers in most part of the rest of the world which gained independence following World War II (e.g., Kaldor 1966; Szirmai 2012).[4]

Figure 1. World's manufacturing, value added (% GDP) 1995-2015



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2017)

Figure 2. World's GDP (constant 2010 US$) 1995-2015



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2017)

3 The data shown are from 1995-2015 which are the only data available for the "World Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)" variable in World Bank's DataBank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS.

4 It is important to note that manufacturing (ISIC 15-37) is a subsector of the sector of industry (10-45) which also consists of mining and construction. For full definitions of ISIC go to https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesM/seriesm_4rev4e.pdf. Deindustrialization here is understood is simply the diminishing role of manufacturing sector in an economy.

While deindustrialization in developed countries could mean a maturation of the economy as the bulk of industry shifted from shop floor factories to high-tech research and development and finance, deindustrialization in developing countries is mainly perceived unfavorably as it brings many issues such as a constantly depreciating and volatile exchange rate in Indonesia (Nurunnisa & Hastiadi 2016), rising inequality in many countries, both developed and developing (e.g., Grabowski 2017), and widespread job loss in India (e.g., Kumar 2017).

In this trend of premature deindustrialization in developing countries, Indonesia is not different. Since the initial years following the 1997 financial crisis and the concomitant 1998 fall of authoritarianism, the manufacturing sector has also been diminishing, at least until about the year 2010, as measured by its share in export and gross domestic product (GDP)—reversing its previous steady rise since 1965, shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.[5] As a result, the country has been becoming increasingly dependent on the export of non-manufactured commodities led by palm oil and coal (Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010; Papanek et al. 2014) for its high and fast-rising GDP, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, the level of inequality has also reached an historic height (World Bank 2016) while the shift to a formal economy has stalled for a time (Nazara 2010)—arguably, all effects of the deindustrialization.

5 The data on Indonesia's Manufacturing (% GDP) are available only from 2010-2016 in World Bank's DataBank newest 2018 edition. Fortunately, I managed to save the 2015 edition in which the data are available from 1967-2014. The two editions, 2015 and 2018, are then put together to show the full 1967-2016 data. The data of Indonesia's Manufactures Exports (% of merchandise exports) are the same in the 2015 and 2018 editions: available from 1967-2016.

Figure 3. Indonesia's manufacturing, value added (% GDP) 1967-2016



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2015; 18)

Figure 4. Indonesia's manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 1967-2016



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2018)

Figure 5. Indonesia's GDP (constant 2010 US$) 1989-2016



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2018)

Figure 6. Value of Indonesia's export of goods 1989-2016



Source: UN Comtrade Database (2018)

Figure 7. Indonesia's Gini Index 1964/5-2013



Source: Papanek et al. (2014)

Figure 8. Shares (%) of Indonesia's formal and informal sector based on main occupational status 1986-2013



Source: Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics (2018)

However, the available literature on the issue of premature deindustrialization in developing countries comes overwhelmingly from an economic point of view, i.e., explaining the *economic* causes of the phenomenon, such as trade liberalization (e.g., Bogliaccini 2013) and technological progress (e.g., Rodrik 2016). The literature thus generally understands deindustrialization as an inevitable and secular trend of current economic development at the global level. By looking at why and how deindustrialization occurred in the Indonesian case, my research argues that the current established literature overlooks the crucial role of power struggles among and between political actors and economic actors in causing deindustrialization—the *political* causes.

To explain these political causes, I observe what has changed—and what has remained—of the power structure of state and capital, arguably two most vital institutions in affecting economic development, in Indonesia since the end of the authoritarian era; and how those factors have particularly caused the economy to deindustrialize prematurely. This research suggests two developments as politically causing the matter in hand: the changing balance of power between state and capital; and the unsuccessful, partial reform during the democratic transition period. These two developments explain why certain external, chronologically intervening variables, i.e., financial crisis and commodity boom, were handled differently compared to other countries (those impacted by the 1997 crisis) and another era (Indonesia's New Order) and led to the occurrence of deindustrialization in this period in Indonesia. The model of analysis is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Model of analysis



II. Causes of premature deindustrialization in developing countries: A missing piece of puzzle in the literature

Since the 1970s, assertions have been made of a phenomenon of deindustrialization occurring in the industrial centers of the developed world. Frobel et al. (1978) point to this phenomenon as part of a grander trend of what they call "the new international division of labor" in which manufacturing activities shifted to less-developed countries. Corden & Neary (1982) also touch on the issue of deindustrialization when they analyze the pressuring results of a booming sector, either extractive or not, on the displacement of manufacturing as the older industry. Davis (2009) represents another argument for the cause of deindustrialization in developed countries, in addition to offshoring and an economic boom: that it occurred because of the rise of finance in the economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1997) considers the kind of deindustrialization which occurred in the developed world favorable because it indicates the maturity of those economies; they do not even have to weigh the burden of manufacturing activities, such as environmental pollution, within their own territories anymore.

Rowthorn and Wells (1987), however, distinguish the kind of deindustrialization which occurred in the developed economies and the kind which is occurring in the developing economies. They label the latter phenomenon negative/premature deindustrialization, as it indicates the poor performance of such economies.

Rodrik (2016) is arguably among the most cited regarding the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization. He argues that globalization/trade openness and labor-saving technological progress are behind this phenomenon. Bogliaccini (2013) similarly blames trade liberalization for the deindustrialization which occurred in Latin American countries. Mansur (2008) and Priyarsono et al. (2010) also posit a similar narrative about globalization and trade being the cause of deindustrialization in Indonesia. Tregenna (2015) categorizes these types of causes as policy-related, pointing specifically at austere macroeconomic policies as having negative effects more on the manufacturing than financial sector of an economy. Akinrinade & Ogen (2008) adds a twist to this story of globalization: that deindustrialization in Nigeria is also specifically a Chinese policy of export competitiveness.

There has been, however, more than an exclusively Nigerian encounter with the rise of China. Jenkins (2015) illustrates a similar argument regarding the trade relation between China and Brazil. On one hand, imports of manufactured products from China weakens the competitiveness of Brazilian counterparts. On the other hand, huge demand from China traps Brazil in specializing its export in commodities. Coxhead & Jayasuriya (2010) address the impact of the rise of China and India as the main manufacturing hubs of the world on competitive pressures of trade and on the commodity boom. Both impacts have negative results on the industrial development in resource rich countries with weak institutions.

Although not looking for the causes, Castillo & Neto (2016) shine a light on an important trend related to the trade with China—that premature deindustrialization incorporates the element of trade-specializing in primary goods/commodities. Clavijo et al. (2014) treat Dutch-disease and economic boom, in their case energy-mining, as factors accelerating the secular trend of deindustrialization in Colombia. Palma (2014) conceptualizes Dutch disease as a factor putting into place an excess of an already ongoing trend of classical, 'inverted-U' type deindustrialization as introduced by Rowthorn (1994).

From this review, it is obvious that the available literature on the question of "what causes premature deindustrialization in developing countries" is filled primarily with economists' proposing their economic explanation of the phenomenon. The main camp explains policies undertaken that embrace globalization, liberalization, and trade openness as the cause. The other two big camps bring up the rise of China and commodity boom as causes. There are, of course, several other alternative explanations such as labor-saving technological progress (Rodrik 2016), rising inequality which reduces demands for manufactured products (Grabowski 2017), and domestic outsourcing which causes a statistical illusion of overestimated deindustrialization (Tregenna 2015). But they also do not depart from the category of "economic explanation."

The contribution of political scientists in attempting to address the issue is still very minimal, even though we should have recognized that industrialization as we know it is among the most impactful variables on our current modern political life. Deindustrialization has also revealed its impacts on social and political situations in both developed and developing countries. Political scientists concerned with development have also generally been aware that economic development does not happen in a vacuum. It is a manifestation of conflicts and compromises of clashing interests; it is sometimes results from policies ruled out by political actors; and it always impacts the condition of the society in general. In other words, we can understand economic development, whatever its appearance, as a mixture of both economic and political events: a coin with two sides.

I begin with the assumption that an explanation which tells only one side of the story, in this case the economic side, necessarily lacks nuance and even strength in uncovering the working reality beneath the surface. Moreover, such an assumption may result in incomplete or even false prescriptions for action in overcoming the problem at hand. Therefore, I attempt to position this research to show the other side of the story, i.e., the political explanation of premature deindustrialization. I do so by arguing that Indonesia would not have experienced premature deindustrialization, even with the economic causes, had not the political causes occurred. A categorization of the literature is suggested in Figure 10 to show the missing piece of the puzzle that this research addresses.

I attempt to go further than the development economists who indeed have touched on the problems of the role of government and industrial policies in causing premature deindustrialization. Chaudhuri (2015) prescribes a specific role of government to overcome premature deindustrialization, that is, to establish an integrated set of industrial policies. Further, Nazeer & Rasiah (2016) point out the failure of industrial policies as the cause of premature deindustrialization in Pakistan. Yet as we develop a more complex understanding that the actions of government itself are structurally constrained, we need to take a bird's-eye perspective, not that of governmental advisor, to contextualize government within the schematic of forces impacting the outcome of economic development. Particularly, I situate the state vis a vis capital as the two main societal forces whose actions, relation, and balance of power are the constitutive formula of economic development, in this case, premature deindustrialization.

Figure 10. Categorization of literature on premature deindustrialization in developing countries

Economic causes (Established)	Main camps	Globalization Rodrik 2016; Bogliaccini 2013; Mansur 2008; Priyarsono et al. 2010; Tregenna 2015
		The rise of China Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010; Jenkins 2015; Akinrinade & Ogen 2008
		Commodity boom Palma 2014; Clavijo et al. 2014; Castillo & Neto 2016
	Alternative arguments	Technological progress Rodrik 2016
		Rising inequality Grabowski 2017
		Domestic outsourcing Tregenna 2015
Political causes (Proposed)		**Uneven balance of power of capital over the state**
		Unsuccessful reforms during democratic transition
Impacts	Labor market	Job loss Kumar 2017; Dasgupta & Singh 2007
		Job informalization Nazara 2010; Dasgupta & Singh 2007
		Labor defeminization Greenstein & Anderson 2017
	Others	Exchange rate Nurunnisa & Hastiadi 2016
		Inequality Grabowski 2017; Bogliaccini 2013; Papanek et al. 2014
Prescriptions		Industrial policy Chaudhuri 2015; Nazeer & Rasiah 2016

Source: Author

III. The economic causes of premature deindustrialization in Indonesia: A historical overview

From Figure 3 on the share of manufacturing value added in GDP and Figure 4 on the share of manufactures in merchandise exports, it can be assumed for the sake of clarity that the agreed timeframe of premature deindustrialization in Indonesia started about 2000/2001 at the peak of manufacturing's importance in the Indonesian economy and continued until 2011 when the share of manufactures' export began to rise again—or until at least 2016 if measured exclusively by the share of manufacturing in GDP.

Before the Asian financial crisis in 1997, especially during the reign of the authoritarian New Order regime (1967-1998), Indonesia could be seen as exemplary in following the prescriptions of structural change in the economy from agriculture-based to manufacturing-based. This structural change can be seen, for example, by the continuously rising share of manufacturing in GDP (Figure 3) and in export (Figure 4). However, the aftereffects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis suggest that this structural change, or industrialization, was not built on a solid basis.

Economic liberalization, financial crisis, and capital Flight

Immediately following the 1997 crisis, Indonesia experienced capital flight from 1998 until 2001 (World Bank 2018), in which for four consecutive years, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) showed a negative inflow, as depicted in Figure 11. Furthermore, Asian Development Bank (ADB; 2015) records that in 2003 and 2004, FDI inflow was again negative. Chua (2008) traces Indonesia's biggest investors' moving their monies to more stable currencies as a reaction to the crisis.

It was these investors who gained the most from Indonesia's economic liberalization in the 1980s, following the end of the state-centered oil boom of the 1970s. After solidifying large amounts of capital, they liquefied it into the more mobile financial sector. The 1980s' liberalization not only gave way to a bigger role of private entities in the economy but also established the legal basis for opening of Indonesia's financial system. This move into the financial market by the biggest investors in Indonesia occurred under the context of the investment boom which exactly preceded the crisis—from 1994 until 1997 (Matsumoto 2007). This period can be considered the beginning of the rising decisive role of private capital in the Indonesian economy. The Indonesian financial market became, as a result of this financialization, more fragile. The economy became increasingly dependent on foreign debt and foreign exchange debt as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 11. Indonesia's net inflow of FDI (US$ million) 1996-2002



Source: World Bank's DataBank (2018)

Figure 12. Dependency of Indonesia's corporate sector on foreign debt (FD) and foreign exchange debt (FED) (%) 1990-1997



Source: Matsumoto (2007)

Winters (1997) notes another ongoing development at the global level which also pushed the nature of capital in developing countries to become more mobile. As the Cold War ended at the end of the 1980s, the orientation of investments from both the USSR bloc and the US bloc became less toward a strategic/security alliance and more toward private profit. This latter kind of investment orientation is less committed than the former and thus is easier to move across countries, simply following market signals.

The 1997 crisis served as a second blow to the steadiness of capital in Indonesia's manufacturing sector, following the 1980s' liberalization as the first, preconditioning blow. In dire need of fresh money to keep the government running in a time of crisis, in his last days in office, Soeharto signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with the IMF to obtain loans accompanied by conditionalities in the form of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). Included in the LoI were reforms in the financial sector. Ramli (2002) records that two of IMF's suggested policies led to "mass bankruptcy in the corporate sector and the loss of thousands of jobs". These suggestions were 1) super-tight monetary policy which rocketed the inter-bank interest rate, causing a liquidity crunch and 2) recommendation to close more than a dozen banks, causing a bank run that resulted in sharp depreciation of the Rupiah (Indonesian currency).

The crisis, in addition to the loss of capital available to continued investment due to capital flight, also caused negative GDP growth, a six-fold burst of inflation, and three-fold depreciation of the Rupiah—all occurring in the single following year: 1998.

Figure 13. Immediate economic consequences of 1997 crisis 1996-2002

Year	1996	**1997**	**1998**	1999	2000	2001	2002
GDP annual growth	7.64	**4.7**	**-13.13**	0.79	4.92	3.64	4.5
Annual inflation	8.85	**12.57**	**75.27**	14.16	20.45	14.3	5.9
Annual official exchange rate / 1 US$	Rp 2342	**Rp 2909**	**Rp 10014**	Rp 7855	Rp 8422	Rp 10261	Rp 9311

Source: World Bank DataBank (2018)

In brief, post-crisis Indonesia suffered from the lack of funds to push the economy to function as it had before. As much as four and one half billion US$ left the economy in only one year—2000. Factories closed after they failed to obtain continuing investments from the banks as well as to continue exporting because the huge loss of value of the Rupiah. In a more indirect manner, factories' closing was another impact of increasing demand from workers for higher pay. This demand came from the deteriorating financial situation of Indonesia's poor and middle-class households—initial victims of the wider market reform that consisted of, among other measures, the rise of fuel and electricity prices. The government apparently did not have any other option except to raise those prices to deal with the problem of growing public debt caused by, again, IMF's suggested policies (Ramli 2002).

The enormous impact which Indonesia's manufacturing sector experienced from the shortage of capital in the early 2000s reveals the sector's vital reliance on foreign capital and the shallow nature of Indonesia's industrialization in general. If we observe the distribution of foreign investment in Indonesia, either during the New Order era or after the crisis, the manufacturing sector obviously attracted the biggest chunk of the inflow FDI as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15.

Figure 14. Foreign investment in Indonesia based on sectors (5 biggest) (excluding oil and banking) 1967-1980 (in US$ million)

Sector	Approved	Executed
Agriculture	193	64.8
Forestry	643.2	299.4
Mining and quarrying	1127.2	385.6
Manufacturing	**5807.9**	**2216.8**
Trade and hospitality	190.8	106.2

Source: Muhaimin (1990)

Figure 15. Foreign investment in Indonesia based on sectors 2004-2014 (5 biggest)

Sector	Amount (US$ Million)	%
Mining and quarrying	34888.89	17.6 5
Manufacturing	**79375.65**	**40.1 6**
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles; motorcycles; and personal and household goods	17651.6	8.93
Transportation, storage, and communication	24384.41	12.3 4
Financial intermediation	16573.85	8.39

Source: Bank Indonesia (2015)

However, if we look specifically at the sources of investment within the manufacturing sector, it is only recently in the Post New Order era that foreign capital has become the biggest source of investment as shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17.

Figure 16. Sources of investment in Indonesia's manufacturing sector 1975 & 1983 (in %)

Sources	1975	1983
Foreign	21	23
Domestic	51	57
Governme nt	26	15

Source: Hill (1990)

Figure 17. Sources of investment in Indonesia's manufacturing 2010-(2014 (in US$ million

2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	Sources
13019. 3	15858. 8	11770	6789.6	3373.3	Foreign
6072.7 1	6407.4 5	6568.8	5167.7 5	2817.5 3	Domesti c

Source: Investment Coordinating Board of Indonesia (2015)[6]

6 The amount of domestic investment was converted from Rupiah billion to US$ million according to 2015's official exchange rate in World Bank DataBank.

As the sector which most attracts foreign investment, it only makes sense that the manufacturing sector becomes the most vulnerable to the availability of foreign capital and thus is most impacted when there is a shortage of capital inflow. Such has been the situation since the New Order era. Hill (1990) provides a nuanced reading of his data as shown in Figure 16. That foreign capital was not the biggest source of investment, does not mean that during the New Order era, it was domestic capital which dominated investment in the manufacturing sector. First, there were many joint projects with mixed sources of investment, and in such projects the foreign party usually had greater power and took the leading role even if the domestic party provided the bigger part of the investment. Second, the "privateness" of the domestic sources of investment was questionable due to the close link between the domestic conglomerates and Indonesia's military generals who essentially were part of the government. Third, if we compare the kinds of corporations in terms of those owned by domestic investors and those owned by foreign investors, the former generally consisted of small corporations while the latter consisted of bigger ones—measured both by value added and employment.

Besides the historic reliance on foreign sources of investment, Indonesia's manufacturing sector, which bloomed during the 1990s following the 1980s' liberalization, has also suffered from a "shallow industrialization" (Dhanani 2000) in which the industrialization failed to establish further industrial linkages. Indonesia thus served only as an assembling hub, with most of the raw materials, intermediary inputs, and components for manufacturing coming from other countries and the products themselves exported back to foreign markets. Dhanani (2000) records the reliance of the subsector of electronics on foreign inputs was as much as 70%, while that of transport equipment was 56% and that of machinery was 53%.

From the discussion above we can see how the nature of economic liberalization which has been implemented since the 1980s in Indonesia has contributed to making Indonesia's economy, especially its manufacturing sector, dependent on foreign and mobile sources of investment. That liberalization has also failed to establish industrial linkages. It was not until the 1997 financial crisis that the consequences were revealed. Both capital flight and the IMF's monetary policies negatively affected the development of the manufacturing sector, diminishing its role in Indonesia's economy. Since then, Indonesia's manufacturing sector still has not fully recovered.

While the manufacturing sector is currently still in the recovery, the capital flight has ended, and foreign, mobile capital has once again flooded Indonesian economy. This return of capital should have re-boosted the manufacturing sector, but it has not. It is because the capital was not redirected to the manufacturing sector, but instead, this returning capital found a far more rewarding sector: extractives.

The China effect, commodity boom, and the palm oil factor

Starting in the early 2000s, the Indonesian economy experienced another phenomenon, this time an external one: a commodity boom. The boom occurred from 2001 until 2012 as shown in Figure 18 (Wihardja 2016). This was a global level boom, impacting not only Indonesia but also many other resource-rich countries, especially in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010).

Coxhead & Jayasuriya (2010) also point out that the surging demand from the rapidly-growing Chinese economy played the most dominant role in skyrocketing the commodity prices during the boom. China has been the world's main importer of palm oil, among other agricultural commodities. In addition, even though it extended the reach of trade as far as Latin America and

Africa to fulfill the demand for its industrialization, it is China's relation with economies inside Asia that has expanded most significantly. The reasons are geographical proximity, an already established trade network, and that the relation incorporates trade in both commodities and what is understood as "parts and components" of manufactured goods.

As the Indonesian case shows, Coxhead & Shrestha (2016) identify the boom as a natural resource export one. Figure 19 shows how the diminishing trend of manufacturing corresponds with the rising trend of raw commodities in Indonesia's export during the period of the commodity boom.

Figure 18. Coal and palm oil prices 1990-2015



Source: World Bank (2016) in Wihardja (2016)

Figure 19. Indonesian export shares (%) 1989-2013



Source: World Bank (2014) in Wihardja (2016)

As shown in Figure 19, when the private capital which once flew out of the economy returned, the investors restructured their investments into the then more lucrative sectors, i.e., commodities. To be exact, as Wihardja (2016) points out, the 1997 crisis, on the one hand, caused Indonesia's manufacturing firms to deteriorate due to the devaluated rupiah, a drop in the society's purchasing power, and the defaulting banking sector. On the other hand, some policy changes occurred, arguably both as a response to the rising price of commodities and as an effect of Indonesia's changing political regime. The newly decentralized provincial governments had new authority to issue license for extractive activities and the agreement system between the governments and the investors in the mining sector change from license-based to contract-based. These changes caused a striking rise in prominence of two commodities in particular in the Indonesian economy, especially its export, namely coal and palm oil, as shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Indonesia's top ten exported products in 2000 and 2014

Commodity groups	% in 2014	Commodity groups	% in 2000
Coal	11.82	Gas	10.66
Palm oil	9.91	Crude oil/ petroleum	9.80
Gas	9.75	Garments	7.62
Chemical materials	6.84	Chemical materials	4.53
Crude oil / petroleum	5.40	Electronic parts	4.28
Garments	4.40	Plywood	3.74
Other manufactured products	3.41	Computers, auto data process	3.71
Transport equipment	3.06	Paper and paper products	3.64
Rubber	2.73	Video and audio recorder	3.51
Electronic parts	2.44	Textile fabric	3.51
Total % of top 10	59.76	Total % of top 10	55.01

Source: Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics and World Bank staff calculations in Wihardja (2016)

Garnaut (2015) similarly explains that the international economic environment had changed dramatically when Indonesia came out of the 1997 financial crisis. While Indonesia's manufacturing sector was in the situation of deterioration, China had come to dominate the global market for manufactured goods, and the price of commodities had soared to an unprecedented height. I argue the latter as the effect of the former. Indonesia's comparative advantage then, after the 1997 crisis, reversed to resource-based commodities after being dominated by manufactured goods during the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, the diminishing importance of the manufacturing sector in the Indonesian economy occurred side by side with the rising importance of the commodities sector in the Indonesian economy, especially its export.

However, not all countries affected by the China effect and the commodity boom experienced the same problem as Indonesia. Comparatively speaking, the commodity boom affected the Indonesian economy the most compared to neighboring economies (Malaysia and Thailand) as shown in Figure 21. On the one hand, the export of agricultural products, natural resources, and vegetable oils (i.e., the least skill-intensive and capital-intensive products), rose more significantly during the commodity boom in Indonesia than in the other two countries. On the other hand, the export of other more skill-intensive and capital-intensive products rose less significantly in Indonesia than in the other countries.[7]

Figure 21. Average annual sectoral growth (%) of export values 2000-2007 in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand



Source: UN Comtrade (undated) in Coxhead& Jayasuriya (2010)

Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2010) also point out that previous Malaysian and Thai industrial structures had put these economies on different pathways from that of Indonesia, related to how China's rapid growth impacted them. With their higher level of skill endowment compared to China, the Malaysian and Thai economies were impacted by Chinese industrialization more positively than the Indonesian economy. While their lower-level labor-intensive sectors experienced competitive pressure from their counterparts in China, their higher-level skill-

7 In order from below, red represents Indonesia; yellow, Malaysia; and green, Thailand. Coxhead & Jayasuriya (2010) follow OECD's (2007) categorization of exported products based on skill-intensity with data from UN Comtrade (undated).

intensive sectors grow more rapidly, fulfilling the increasing demand for parts and components from China's more labor-intensive manufacturing.

A different story emerged in Indonesia (Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010). Because Indonesia's economy had been less skill-endowed than that of China, its manufacturing sector as a whole was squeezed by its more competitive Chinese counterpart. The abundance of natural resources, in this case exemplified especially by palm oil and coal, put greater pressure on the manufacturing sector in a Dutch disease kind of story, since the rapid growth of China occurred in the same time range as the commodity boom.

In addition, even though Indonesia and Malaysia are the first and second biggest exporters of palm oil, totaling around 85% of the world's export, the production of palm oil in the two countries has been executed differently. Arguably, Indonesia and Malaysia have an unequal yet interdependent relation in terms of palm oil production. While Indonesia supplies unskilled labor to Malaysian plantations (Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010), Malaysian corporations play a big role in expanding Indonesian plantations (Varkkey et al. 2018). Considering Malaysia's consistent commitment to its 50% forest cover pledge and Indonesia's lack of such a commitment (Varkkey et al. 2018), Indonesia's surpassing Malaysia in palm oil land area (Coxhead & Jayasuriya 2010) during the commodity boom, as shown in Figure 22, comes as no surprise.

Figure 22. Palm oil land area (thousand hectares) compared



Source: FAO (2008) in Coxhead & Jayasuriya (2010)

In short, this handful of related variables can be summarized as a "China-induced commodity boom." It acted as a second episode in the economic explanation of how the Indonesian economy ended up experiencing premature deindustrialization, following a first episode consisting of "liberalization-induced capital flight." The two episodes are distinct, but their linkage comprises the story of premature deindustrialization in Indonesia—from an economic point of view.

One could easily argue that without China's rapid emergence at the turn of the millennium—thus inducing a commodity boom, especially of coal and palm oil—Indonesia could have emerged from the crisis, even though still experiencing capital flight and a concomitant return of reconsolidated capital, remaining a member of the "East Asian Miracle," as the World Bank (1993) once called it. On the one side, the manufacturing sector could have become more vibrant as post-crisis governments deregulated the investment market in order to lure back the previously fleeing capital. The sector, however, most probably would have maintained its shallow character as a mere hub without many domestic linkages and also dominated by external investment. On the other side, without liberalization prior to and after the 1997 crisis, the 2000s commodity boom would have impacted the Indonesian economy in a way similar to how the 1970s oil boom impacted it, as will be further elaborated.

As the most central argument in this research, the next section deals with the political changes Indonesia has experienced since the 1997 financial crisis. I argue that these changes play the primary role as political causes for the Indonesian economy's premature deindustrialization.

IV. The political causes of premature deindustrialization in Indonesia: Proposed piece of puzzle to complete the literature

In addition to the operation of economic causes, as elaborated in the previous section, this research argues that there are also political causes in play regarding premature deindustrialization, at least in the case of Indonesia. Of course, the dichotomy between economic and political causes as proposed here is in the analytical realm. The two seem to be intertwined tightly, however, in the practical realm, such that an attempt to distinguish between the two may result in more confusion than clarity. The nature of a social phenomenon that includes economic and political causes is always multidimensional, incorporating various aspects in a single complex occurrence. Therefore, even though this research focuses on the economic and political causes, premature deindustrialization is also, for example, a legal as well as a cultural phenomenon.

The argument for political causes of premature deindustrialization attempts to go beyond offering a mere alternative point of view, rather, seeking to prove that these causes are as important and determinative as the already established economic causes in producing premature deindustrialization. The limitations of the economic-focused literature demand an analysis of the politics behind the occurrence of premature deindustrialization.

The understanding of politics here starts from one of its most classic definitions: "who gets what, how, and when" by Lasswell (1936). Contextualized in contemporary Indonesia, this definition is operationalized as the politics between, arguably, two of the most vital analytical actors involved in power struggles for resources in human society. These actors, within the specific spatiotemporal setting of the modern nation-state, are state and private capital—or capital, to be short. In addition, a specific moment of power struggle within a more diverse and nuanced set of actors surrounding the dyadic state-capital (i.e., post-authoritarian reform and democratization), is also discussed.

The weakening of the state

It is to be noted that by claiming that Indonesian state has experienced a weakening following the 1997 crisis, this research does not imply that the pre-crisis authoritarian state was a coherent, Weberian ideal type of modern state. If anything, this research would argue that the authoritarian New Order regime of Indonesia failed to benefit from its authority and capacity to establish a comprehensive industrialization project for the economy. Instead, it became, to use Winters (2018) words[8], a "leech state" as a better terminology than "octopus state" as what is more commonly imagined.[9] Winters (2018)[10] conceptualizes how the regime handled the economy and its resources as "an extraction out of extraction", referring to how bureaucrats and corporates extract resources for themselves from the activities of extracting Indonesian natural resources. Gellert (2010) also offers "Extractive Regime" as a concept in similar path of understanding on how the New Order state relied on extraction of resources.

Nonetheless, for better or worse, the previous regime still maintained relatively more political and economic capacity and authority vis a vis private capital, if we compare it with the post-New Order Indonesian state after the 1997 crisis. It is this erosion of political and economic capacity and authority after the crisis that this research frames as weakening of the state. Some of

8 In a face to face discussion.
9 Among those who uses the term "octopus" to define Indonesian state and its exploitative machinery is Aditjondro in *Debunking Cikeas Octopus: Behind the Bank Century Scandal* (2009) (title translated by me from Indonesian language).
10 In a face to face discussion.

them are indeed demands of reform from the society. But some of them are mere conditionalities from the IMF, while some others are somewhat combination of both.

The students movement of 1998, which undoubtedly played a crucial role in bringing down the New Order regime, called for six reform agendas consisting of 1) bring Soeharto and all his cronies to justice, 2) repeal the norm of "dual-function" of Indonesia's armed forces (significant involvement in civic and political life), 3) strengthen the supremacy of the law, 4) curb corruption, collusion, and nepotism, 5) amend the 1945 constitution, and 6) execute regional autonomy as extensive as possible. Since the emergence of the student movement on the surface of Indonesian politics, these 6 agendas continue to be used as a signifier of the *reformasi* agenda and spirit. Experts and scholars would use these points as a reference when they comment on the success or the failure of Indonesian *reformasi.*

They, however, also played the role of a legitimizing discourse for the neoliberal reform following the crisis. The actors of reform in Indonesia almost overwhelmingly agreed that to attack Soeharto-centered New order oligarchic networks, neoliberal reform contained in the IMF letters of intent is necessary and inevitable to conduct (Hadiz & Robison 2004). Therefore, it is not surprising that some economists who lose confidence in Soeharto, especially after he was reelected for a new term in early 1998 amidst the bad management of the 1997 crisis, accepted IMF's letter of intents which in large contains measures to cripple Soeharto's economic imperium. As many as 14 ministers responsible for economy-related fields in his new cabinet resigned only a day before Soeharto decided to announce his resignation in May 21, 1998.[11] During the time range of 1997-2003, as many as 24 letters of intent from IMF were signed by the changing Indonesian governments (Rizky & Majidi 2008).

11 "Kisah Soeharto Ditolak 14 Menteri dan Isu Mundurnya Wapres Habibie...", Kompas, May 20, 2018, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/20/08433451/kisah-soeharto-ditolak-14-menteri-dan-isu-mundurnya-wapres-habibie.

In the realm of politics, Chua (2008) sums up the changes in post-New Order Indonesian state as consisting of three components: democratization, decentralization, and deregulation. These three seemingly positive developments, however, have only reached an artificially institutional level without touching the structure of power among political actors in the country. The result is a fast and easy adaptation of Indonesian economic elites, in this case the Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates, to the new political realm. Democratization, consisting of among others the birth of new political parties and reembracing of Chinese-Indonesian ethnicity after a harsh ethnic riot during the 1997 crisis, was exploited for them to directly enter the field of electoral competition. While becoming *pariah* capitalists during the New Order because they could only operate in the economic realm and could only rely on patron-client relation with Soeharto in the political realm, they can now have direct relations with various politicians from various political parties. They can support different candidates, who need their economic resources for the costly electoral competition. This development led to democratization profiting more the economic elites rather than the masses.

Decentralization led to similar consequences. The patron-client relation with Soeharto at the capital city, Jakarta, has vanished and then the economic elites can and have to deal directly with provincial governments with far weaker network of power and bargaining position vis a vis the conglomerates. They have made the most of the new authority to issue investment permit, especially in extractive sectors, given to provincial level leaders. Moreover, these provincial leaders compete with each other to attract investors to secure their political position for the next elections, leading to a race to the bottom situation.

Deregulation gave them freer access to the market with special treatments to most of the Soeharto-linked *pribumi* (native Indonesian) conglomerates being curbed. Even while they themselves have enjoyed from special treatments from Soeharto in a different degree, they have been the ones who benefit the most from deregulations, as was the case both during the 1980s deregulation and the post-1997 deregulations.

Two other developments may need to also be highlighted other than three developments above, that are the step-siding of the military from the political arena, and the erasure of long-term planning of development (GBHN / Outline of the Course of the Nation). All of these five developments in the political field has led to the state's weakened position vis a vis private capital. The military now no longer has a representation in the legislative branch and incrementally their role as a specific capital-owning faction (Robison 1986) is diminished. The role of MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) in outlining the GBHN was also cut off to be more a ceremonial role of inaugurating a new president.

Aspinall (2013) frames post-New Order Indonesia as "a nation on fragments." He argues that the patron-client relation between business people with political authorities that has been established since the New Order era was maintained, adapting with new neoliberal order as a result of the combination between *reformasi* agendas and IMF's letters of intent. This intertwining between patronage and neoliberalism resulted in a pattern of political fragmentations, which was apparent in the decentralization of the state, the blossoming of new political parties (there were 48 parties participating in the newly democratic 1999 election), the blossoming of new non-governmental organizations (NGOs), many of which operated in a neoliberal fashion that is instead of representing people's demands and advocating them, they substitute many roles and duties of the state in providing certain basic needs of the people, and also the blossoming of new Islamic organizations with various, some of them new, currents, complicating the conventional divide between traditional vs modernist Muslims. He argues that this situation, instead of cutting off the deeply embedded patron-client style of relation, gave it new more channels to spread and be preserved. In this case, he seconded Winters' (2011) assessment that Indonesia went from having a tamed oligarchy to untamed oligarchy as the country enter the *reformasi* era and further assessed that it is this political fragmentation that made the un-taming of the oligarchy possible to occur.

In the economic field, the weakening of the state comes primarily from IMF's conditionalities. The first letter of intent on October 1997, responding directly to the 1997 crisis, consisted of implementation of fiscal austerity, commitment to abide by WTO's dispute settlement mechanism regarding the national automobile industry project under review, reviewing the national jet airplane industry project, and liquidation of insolvent banks. The second letter of intent, submitted in January 1998, contained a more aggressive pushes from the IMF due to Indonesian state's increasing need of fund. It consisted of the strengthening of the independency of the central bank, withdrawal from tax privileges for the national automobile industry project, withdrawal from credit privileges and budgetary supports for the national jet airplane industry project, elimination of monopoly on clove, eradication of cartels in the trade of cement paper, and pulp, erasure of limitation for investment in retail business, erasure of state's monopoly on the trade of daily basic consumption needs such as flour, sugar and soy, and elimination of government subsidy on fuel and electricity. On April the same year, a third agreement was reached consisting of state's divestment from several public companies, privatization of several SOEs, and introducing a new bankruptcy law and commercial court. (Rosser & Robison 1998).

The early reforms demanded by the IMF in the economic field thus can be categorized to 1) fiscal austerity, 2) halting national industry projects, 3) financial sector reform, 4) market and investment liberalizations, 5) elimination of subsidies, and 6) state's reduced role in the economy including privatization of SOEs. With the intention to curb Soeharto's economic imperium, the result of this neoliberal reforms is liberalized monetary and austere fiscal policies, the halting of state's industrial projects, liberalized market, and state's reduced role in the economy.

A weakened state's capacity and authority both in political and economic term here equals both a new relationship between the state and private capital, as well as a changing character f the state and the capital themselves. In direction, especially in economic field, this is a further weakening of the state and strengthening of capital since the 1980s liberalization. However, in political field, there are institutional changes that made these developments more a one-way change, a course harder to turn back from.

The return of reconsolidated capital

This return of reconsolidated capital really has to be read in conjunction with the weakening of the state, which is essentially the weakening of the state vis a vis private capital. In other words, the weakening of the state in this case necessarily means a stronger private capital over the state, while a reconsolidated capital was only possible in this case by a weakening of the state.

On one hand, these new post-authoritarian regimes[12] took steps to lure back the once vanishing capital to Indonesian economy. On the other hand, they were also bounded under Soeharto's agreement with IMF to get fresh fund to keep his government running after the crisis, to execute several economic and politico-legal reforms packed in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) as conditionalities for IMF's loan. This second side of the situation only opens a

12 Ir. (academic title for engineer) **Habibie**, the former vice president of Soeharto, first took office as Soeharto declared his resignation in May 21st, 1998. His main agenda was to hold election which resulted in KH. (honorary religious title) **Gus Dur** taking office from October 20th, 1999 to July 23rd, 2001 in which he was forced to resign and was replaced by his own vice president, **Megawati**. Megawati ruled the rest of Gus Dur term until election in 2004. It is during these three presidents' tenures that IMF's letters of intent were signed, and the Indonesian constitution underwent a process of amendments.

wider road for the capital to come back to Indonesia, now with far easier terms and more space to conduct business. Now, with Indonesian state opening its hands wider than ever, the capital came back to Indonesia more than happily and they even managed to grow stronger influentially, taking benefit from the new electoral competition system that the reform movement introduced. The nature of the oligarchy has changed, but the oligarchs were still there, and they even became stronger.

Habibie appointed personally James Riady, one of Indonesia's biggest conglomerate, to bring back investments to Indonesia. Gus Dur followed suit by appointing his own choice of Chinese-Indonesian conglomerate, William Soeryadjaya. This went on with the next presidents (Chua 2008). The conglomerates were eventually permitted to buy back their assets that have previously been confiscated due to their inability to repay their foreign debts which turned into public debts, in hope that this move would lure back international investors to come back to Indonesia. Due to their huge scale of economic activity, they even managed to take benefit from bank liquidation funds from the government to restructure their asset and expand their scope of investment. For example, Salim Group transformed a Rp 1.2 trillion loss in 1998 into Rp 209 billion gain in 1999 (Hadiz & Robison 2005). Perceived as being too big to fail, the governments decided to, instead of establishing punitive justice for their irresponsible investment attracting moves prior to the crisis, help them recover from crisis and even work hand in hand to fix the investment climate.

In the figure 23, we can see that the list of ten biggest Indonesian conglomerates prior to 1997 crisis is dominated by Chinese-Indonesian. If we look at Forbes' most recent list of Indonesian billionaires, we will still see some same conglomerates with that of prior to crisis such as Djarum, Sinar Mas, Gudang Garam, Salim group, and Lippo group.[13]

13 "Indonesia's 50 richest", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/indonesia-billionaires/list.

Figure 23. Indonesia's richest conglomerates prior to 1997 crisis

	Conglomerate	*Main owner*	*Chinese name*	*Established*	*Annual sales, tril. Rp/ bil. US$*
1	Salim	Soedono Salim	Liem Sioe Liong	1969	53.12/22.3
2	Astra International	P. Sampoerna/ Prajogo Pangestu/ Bob Hasan	Liem T.P./ Phang D.P./ The K.S.	1969	20.20/8.5
3	Sinar Mas	Eka Tjipta Widjaja	Oey Ek Tjhong	1970	20.19/8.5
4	Gudang Garam	Rachman Halim	Tjoa To Hing	1958	9.44/3.9
5	Lippo	Mochtar Riady	Lie Mo Tie	1976	9.03/3.8
6	Bimantara	Bambang Trihatmodjo	–	1981	4.29/1.8
7	Gajah Tunggal	Sjamsul Nursalim	Lim Tek Siong	1970	4.20/1.8
8	Ongko	Kaharuddin Ongko	Ong Ka Hwa	1971	4.18/1.8
9	Djarum	Robert Budi Hartono	Oei Hwie Tjhong	1951	4.03/1.7
10	Rodamas	Tan Siong Kie	Tan Siong Kie	1967	3.97/1.7

Source: Chua 2008

It is mostly about them when I refer to private capital in post-New Order Indonesia. Related to palm oil as one of main driver of Indonesia's economy during the rapidly growing yet deindustrializing period, it should not come as a surprise that among the biggest players in Indonesia's palm oil market are among its biggest conglomerates, such as Sinar Mas, Indogroup/Salim, Gudang Garam (Makin), and Astra International (Triputra Agro and Astra Agro) as shown in figure 24.

Figure 24. Ten biggest business actors in Indonesia's palm oil sector

Group or company	Country of ownership	Concession area (ha)	Planted area (ha)	Annual CPO production (tonnes)
Perkebunan Nusantara[a]	Indonesia	850,000	791,021	2,856,510
Sinar Mas	Indonesia	657,273	361,060	2,152,809
Wilmar	Singapore	599,055	183,469	1,778,882
Indoagri/Salim	Indonesia	492,370	254,989	836,000
Makin	Indonesia	310,000	129,300	168,000
Triputra Agro	Indonesia	309,000	109,796	204,044
Asian Agri/Raja Garuda Mas	Indonesia	303,255	160,000	900,000
Astra Agro	Indonesia	295,363	266,706	1,268,196
Bumitama/Bumitama Gunajaya Agro Group	Indonesia	191,561	87,581	345,111
Sampoerna Agro	Indonesia	178,770	65,034	334,675
Total		4,186,647	2,408,956	10,844,227

Source: Bisinfosus (2012) in Casson et al. 2014.

Unsuccessful Reforms during Democratic Transition

The reforms succeeded in changing the nature of Indonesian oligarchic system away from Sultanistic oligarchy. However, this has also led to a rent-seeking based political competition system masked in liberal democratic procedures. Even though democratization was kick-started and could be seen as a first step toward a deeper and more essential democracy, the members of the sultanist oligarchy in the past were virtually secured from pressures for democratization in the economic realm.

Hellman (1998) discusses the politics of economic reform in post-communist states. He challenges the conventional J-curve model of economic reform in which costs of transition initially emerge for short time, followed by benefits of transition for a longer period. In such a model, the problem of reform lies in how to endure the short transitional time, with its costs, to be able to enjoy afterward the longer period of benefits. The common prescription is to exclude the losers—such as workers and the unemployed—in the reform from the political process during the short time so they would not be able to backlash against the reformers; thus the reform agendas could continue.

From the cases of post-communist reforms, however, the challenge to the long-term reform did not come from those who suffer the costs—the losers—but precisely from the initial winners of the reform—such as state managers-turned-private owners and mafioso-turned-entrepreneurs. In these cases, the winners tend not to push the reform further but instead stall the equilibrium which benefits them—during the initial time of reform when it is only partial. This different outcome leads Hellman to suggest a counter-intuitive prescription to keep the reform process going: to include, instead of excluding, the losers in the reform from the political process. This solution, however, is not practical since the winners would not give the losers the chance to participate in the political process.

Indonesia, this research argues, suffers from that common mistake to exclude the losers in the reform process. The result is that, even though there have been democratic political institutions established, the democratization in the field of economy was far from succeeding. If anything, the capital power instead became stronger while the state became weaker.

The changing state-capital relation, or the post-crisis state weakening in the face of reconsolidated capital, together with the failure of post-authoritarian democratizing reforms, constitute the two main political causes of premature deindustrialization as derived from the experience of Indonesia. Even though this research does not suggest a generalization of these causes unto other experiences with premature deindustrialization in the rest of the developing countries, the two causes abstracted from Indonesia's case do tell us something about the situation of political changes occurring in the developing world.

The overall weakening of the state vis a vis strengthening power of capital is a common narration in various parts of the world as efforts to democratize the state virtually have not succeeded except in a handful outlying cases. The ruling of the state is captured by the interests of capital in favor of a weaker state, so the private capital may have more space to maneuver, evolve, and adapt to the everchanging social and political dynamics. It is the technicalities on which this general trend is standing on that differ from country to country, since the self-strengthening move of capital always meets specific contextual contingencies such as the social configuration and the cultural characteristics of the societies, geopolitical factors, and the path-dependent institutional arrangement of the local regimes.

What is striking is that this trend encompasses not only the countries moving in the direction of Polanyian marketization (1944), but also those in the opposite, countermovement direction. For example, we witness the emergence of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in various such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Here, the nation-state's sovereignty is eroded by the increasing corporate power under the push for marketization. However, we also witness attempts to strengthen corporate power and weaken the state's being carried by political leaders who is riding the wave of countermovement such as right-wing populism. The Republican party's tax reform bill during Trump administration is one of the examples.

Winters carefully notes (1996) that this kind of tension between state and private capital is an existential fact in capitalist society, or as he describes it, a society where there is a division of labor and where the subsistent production is limited. There is always an investment imperative to be met if the society wants to continue functioning, and with some luck, experience economic growth. As he puts it, there is only a dynamic of power between the two, contingent of certain factors such as alternative sources of investment at the hand of the state. In most cases, there is always an investment imperative and the capital controller always holds a structural power over the state.

This strengthening of private capital over the state and the weakening of the state vis a vis private capital after the critical juncture of 1997 crisis, capital flight, and 1998 *reformasi* is illustrated in figure 25. These two sides of the same phenomenon served as political causes of premature deindustrialization in Indonesia by changing the political economic setting in which the economic causes, i.e., liberalization-induced capital flight and China-induced commodity boom, took place. The following section about interplay between political and economic causes will elaborate more on that if the economic causes occurred in a different political-economic setting, i.e., stronger state over private capital than what was the case in post-New Order Indonesia, the premature deindustrialization is less likely to occur.

Figure 25. Changing balance of power between state and capital in Indonesia



Source: Adapted from Chua 2008

Whether these changes also play the same role as causing premature deindustrialization in other cases, or are the other cases caused by different political changes, are subject to further research to illuminate us more about what political changes come side by side with the economic changes, i.e., widespread premature deindustrialization, in today's developing countries.

V. Interplay between the Political and the Economic Causes

There are two sides of liberalization-induced capital flight as Indonesia experienced it. The first side is a more fixed reality, that is, there indeed is a valid need for new source of growth since the end of the end of the 1970s oil boom. However, the way and the source from which that needed continued growth is sought by Indonesian government is not the only possible choices. Of course, the decision makers do not live in a social vacuum where they can choose policies as they like it. There indeed are historical institutional constraints. The policy choices that were lined up in front of the Indonesian state at that time are the second side of the liberalization-induced capital flight.

The Indonesian state however had chosen, based on the configuration of interests and conflicts around the actors, to conduct a path of economic liberalization which has caused the manufacturing sector dominated by external and more mobile kinds of investments. The incentive for capital to stay committedly in Indonesia was then low since there was no comprehensive trajectory for building industrial linkages and the manufacturing sector was built mainly around the regional industrial fragmentation in which the components were imported, and the products were also mainly to be re-exported. In other words, Indonesian economy played the role of a mere hub for the bigger industrial bases such as China. This low commitment of the mobile capital surely played an important role in their decision to leave Indonesia once signs of a crisis kicked in. their absence then forced the post-authoritarian, post-crisis regimes to do all they can to lure back the capital, to fulfil the investment imperative. This has been the case since the state at that time did not have enough alternative source of investment.

The capital flight therefore was actually preventable if the state during the New Order regime was more aware of the need to gain the long-term commitment of the mobile capital by directing the investment toward industrial linkages building and was more cautious in maintaining the debt level of its corporate sector.

Moving to the timeline of after crisis era, this research argues that Suharto's and then Habibie's decisions to accept IMF's loans together with the conditionalities, around the time of the crisis, were arguably among the most important critical juncture that had put Indonesia on a development pathway different from other countries, such as Malaysia on the extreme case who did not take IMF's deal. The conditionalities from the IMF has forced Indonesia to bail out banks, privatize vital State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The bailing out of banks has put Indonesia under large amount of debts which harden the state's fiscal capacity to provide for basic needs of the citizens. And the SOEs, if they were not privatized, could have been alternative sources of investment, so the state could have handled the commodity boom differently. In that case, the state would also not need to let go almost all of its authority just to lure back the private capital, which would lead to the state's having stronger governing capacity over the market. With a stronger governing power, the state would have been able to open the way to a feasibility of long-term economic planning which is needed to implement industrial policies in favor of continued industrialization and progressive structural change of economy. Moreover, some vital SOEs were monopolized vertically by the state out of efficiency reasons due to the nature of the market such as electricity and oil. With those SOEs being privatized, and the prices of basic needs of the society being left on the fluctuating market price, the investment imperative became stronger as the capacity of the citizens to subsistent their needs is becoming less.

All these counterfactual argument leads to the narration of weaker state and stronger capital in terms of political and economic capacity and authority. With this development pathway that Indonesia is already on it, a trajectory toward wiser, long-term management of natural resources and navigation of commodity boom, is becoming farther from reality. Such wiser ways of management are for example rechanneling the revenues of export to a wealth fund; investing in processing activities for a higher value added of the natural resources, or in other words, natural resource-based industrialization as implemented by countries like Australia, Canada, and Norway. Another viable trajectory is directly rechanneling the revenues by the government by investing in the manufacturing sector—without necessarily blocking private investments.

This was actually the case on how Indonesian state managed the 1970s oil boom. Since the sector that was booming was dominated by the SOE, i.e., Pertamina, the revenues were able to be channeled to programs such as food sovereignty, mechanization of agriculture and high subsidies on primary education (Papanek et al. 2014). The only problem was that besides these positive rechanneling, the 1970s Pertamina was also corrupt to the core and serves as the pocket money for building the corporatist political arms of the regime. However, the paper argues that this is an avoidable side effect, not an inherent consequences of a bigger state sector in the economy.

China, Vietnam, and Taiwan have been among the examples on how big state sector can also be vibrant and act as the spearhead of the economic development. The problem during the New Order when the state sector was relatively bigger, was only that the regime was not able, or was not willing, to "take the benefit of authoritarian regime". On the other side of the table, a call for a bigger state sector does not necessarily translate into a call back for an authoritarian political system. A further re-investigation is needed in the future to check the relation between the form of a regime and the size and composition of its state sector in the economy.

VI. Conclusion

I have pointed out the necessity of the political causes to also occur in order for the premature deindustrialization to also occur. If the Indonesian state during the 2000s, relative to the private capital, was stronger as was the case during the New Order, the commodity boom would have been handled differently which may lead to, for example, a building of wealth fund, or the kick-off of natural resource-based industrialization project, or a bigger state sector in the economy in which the state does not rely as much on the private capital to invest in its manufacturing sector.

To overcome the occurring problem, this research calls for a bigger state sector by reexamining the liberalizations taken during the democratic transition, either which were taken by constitutional amendments, or which were taken as conditionalities of the IMF. Second, this research also calls for democratizing the state by opening up political field to include Hellmann's "losers" in the political processes, to curb the overwhelming capital's structural power over the state.

The author hopes that this research has made a scholarly contribution by 1) identifying two general political changes that are occurring in the Global South, where the premature deindustrialization trend is prominent, that are the weakening of the state and the strengthening of capital, and democratization as a political reform accompanied by economic reform—mostly neoliberal in nature; and 2) bringing the puzzle of current occurrence of premature deindustrialization in developing countries into the field of political science and requesting further engagement with this puzzle from political scientists.

There are, however, limitations that this research acknowledge: 1) further empirical research is still needed to test the proposed political causes of PD in other countries; and 2) further engagement is needed with established literature in political science such as development-democracy debate and elite and oligarchy theory.

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